A Ramsey Bound on Stable Sets in Jordan Pillage Games

Manfred Kerber, Colin Rowat

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)
216 Downloads (Pure)


Jordan (J Econ Theory 131(1):26-44, 2006) defined 'pillage games', a class of cooperative games whose dominance operator is represented by a 'power function' satisfying coalitional and resource monotonicity axioms. In this environment, he proved that stable sets must be finite. We provide a graph theoretical interpretation of the problem which tightens the finite bound to a Ramsey number. We also prove that the Jordan pillage axioms are independent.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)461-466
Number of pages6
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Issue number3
Early online date4 Jul 2010
Publication statusPublished - 1 Aug 2011


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