The causal role argument against doxasticism about delusions

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Authors

Colleges, School and Institutes

Abstract

In this paper we consider an argument that is very influential in the philosophical literature, the argument from causal role against the view that delusions are beliefs. The argument has two premises, that many delusions fail to play belief-roles and that playing belief-roles is necessary for a mental state to be a belief. We assess both premises and suggest that they can be resisted.

Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)30-50
Number of pages21
JournalAvant: The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard
VolumeV
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2014

Keywords

  • delusions, beliefs, double bookkeeping, motivation, teleo-functionalism