The causal role argument against doxasticism about delusions

Kengo Miyazono; Lisa Bortolotti

doi:10.26913/50302014.0112.0003

The causal role argument against doxasticism about delusions

Kengo Miyazono, Lisa Bortolotti

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

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Abstract

In this paper we consider an argument that is very influential in the philosophical literature, the argument from causal role against the view that delusions are beliefs. The argument has two premises, that many delusions fail to play belief-roles and that playing belief-roles is necessary for a mental state to be a belief. We assess both premises and suggest that they can be resisted.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	30-50
Number of pages	21
Journal	Avant: The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard
Volume	V
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.26913/50302014.0112.0003
Publication status	Published - 2014

Keywords

delusions
beliefs
double bookkeeping
motivation
teleo-functionalism

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MiyazonoK2014CasualFinal published version, 450 KBLicence: Creative Commons: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND)

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Fellowship: The epistemic innocence of imperfect cognitions
Bortolotti, L.
Arts and Humanities Research Council
2/09/13 → 1/09/14
Project: Research Councils

Cite this

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KW - motivation

KW - teleo-functionalism

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The causal role argument against doxasticism about delusions

Abstract

Keywords

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Fellowship: The epistemic innocence of imperfect cognitions

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