The causal role argument against doxasticism about delusions

Kengo Miyazono, Lisa Bortolotti

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)
65 Downloads (Pure)


In this paper we consider an argument that is very influential in the philosophical literature, the argument from causal role against the view that delusions are beliefs. The argument has two premises, that many delusions fail to play belief-roles and that playing belief-roles is necessary for a mental state to be a belief. We assess both premises and suggest that they can be resisted.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)30-50
Number of pages21
JournalAvant: The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2014


  • delusions
  • beliefs
  • double bookkeeping
  • motivation
  • teleo-functionalism


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