TY - JOUR
T1 - Lead arranger reputation and the structure of loan syndicates
AU - Chaudhry, Sajid
AU - Kleimeier, Stefanie
PY - 2015/9/1
Y1 - 2015/9/1
N2 - This study explores the effects of information asymmetry and arranger reputations on syndicated loan structures. The moral hazard problem arising from information asymmetries between borrowers and a syndicate can be overcome only by the most reputable arrangers. When arrangers have an information advantage over participants, both moral hazard and adverse selection problems appear. However, the adverse selection problem arises only when low-reputation arrangers lend to opaque borrowers.
AB - This study explores the effects of information asymmetry and arranger reputations on syndicated loan structures. The moral hazard problem arising from information asymmetries between borrowers and a syndicate can be overcome only by the most reputable arrangers. When arrangers have an information advantage over participants, both moral hazard and adverse selection problems appear. However, the adverse selection problem arises only when low-reputation arrangers lend to opaque borrowers.
U2 - 10.1016/j.intfin.2015.05.021
DO - 10.1016/j.intfin.2015.05.021
M3 - Article
SN - 1042-4431
VL - 38
JO - Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money
JF - Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money
ER -