William E. Connolly: Pluralism without transcendence

In the context of multiculturalism and identity politics the concept of 'pluralism' has become the common sense of our times. Here, I mark out the distinctiveness of William Connolly's approach to pluralism vis-à-vis the neo-Kantian perspectives of John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas. Unlike the neo-Kantian perspectives, Connolly's account of 'network pluralism' denies the possibility of any element of transcendence from the plurality of forces that make up the world. Having explored the role that 'agonistic respect' plays in Connolly's version of pluralism, I make the case that his thought retains traces of (Spinozan pan-) theism, in the sense that he imagines that forms of regularity tend to emerge spontaneously from the immanent movement of social forces. The paper concludes with intimations of an alternative account of social regularity, one that emphasises the transcendental moment understood as necessary/impossible.