Abstract
We examine theory and evidence on agents in private-market entrepreneurial financings. After controlling for the endogenous issuer-agent matching and a whole host of other controls, the empirical findings in this paper indicate that agents attract more investors, broaden the geographic investor and capital base, and increase the percentage of investors and capital from investors that are more vulnerable to the costs of information asymmetry. We also find that more capable agents generally provide more valuable benefits to private entrepreneurial firm financings than less capable agents, and that increasing the number of agents in a financing further increases value to issuing firms.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 345-374 |
Number of pages | 30 |
Journal | Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice |
Volume | 39 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Mar 2015 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2013 Baylor University.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Business and International Management
- Economics and Econometrics
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Dive into the research topics of 'The Role of Agents in Private Entrepreneurial Finance'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Prizes
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Bank of Canada Best Paper Award for The Role of Agents in Private Entrepreneurial Finance
Cumming, D. (Recipient), Sept 2011
Prize: Prize (including medals and awards)