The economics of vocation or 'why is a badly paid nurse a good nurse'?

Anthony Heyes*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

106 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Given the longstanding shortage of nurses in many jurisdictions, why could not nursing wages be raised to attract more people into the profession? We tell a story in which the status of nursing as a 'vocation' implies that increasing wages reduces the average quality of applicants attracted. The underlying mechanism accords with the notion that increasing wages might attract the 'wrong sort' of people into the profession and highlights an (in)efficiency wage mechanism, particular to vocations, which makes wages sticky up wards. The analysis has implications for job design in vocation-based sectors such as nursing and teaching.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)561-569
Number of pages9
JournalJournal of Health Economics
Volume24
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2005

Keywords

  • Job satisfaction
  • Labor supply
  • Motivation
  • Nursing
  • Vocation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Health Policy
  • Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health

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