Abstract
There is a family of metaethical views according to which (i) there are no objectively correct moral standards and (ii) whether a given moral claim is true depends in some way on moral standards accepted by either an individual (forms of subjectivism) or a community (forms of relativism). This chapter outlines the three most important versions of this type of theories: old-fashioned subjectivism and relativism, contextualism and new wave subjectivism and relativism. It also explores the main advantages of these views and the key objections to them.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | The Bloomsbury Companion of Ethics |
| Editors | Christian B. Miller |
| Place of Publication | London |
| Publisher | Bloomsbury Publishing |
| Chapter | 4 |
| Pages | 130-149 |
| Edition | 2 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781350217898 (PDF), 9781350217904 (Epub & Mobi) |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781350217881 |
| Publication status | Published - 16 Nov 2023 |
Keywords
- Moral relativsim
- Subjectivism
- Contextualism
- Truth relativism
- Disagreement
- Standard Ordering Semantics