TY - GEN
T1 - On Efficient and Secure Compression Functions for Arithmetization-Oriented Hashing
AU - Andreeva, Elena
AU - Bhattacharyya, Rishiraj
AU - Roy, Arnab
AU - Trevisani, Stefano
PY - 2024/4/8
Y1 - 2024/4/8
N2 - ZK-SNARKs, a fundamental component of privacyoriented payment systems, identity protocols, or anonymous voting systems, are advanced cryptographic protocols for verifiable computation: modern SNARKs allow to encode the invariants of a program, expressed as an arithmetic circuit, in an appropriate constraint language from which short, zero-knowledge proofs for correct computations can be constructed. One of the most important computations that is run through SNARK systems is the verification of Merkle tree (MT) opening proofs, which relies on the evaluation of a fixed-input-length (FIL) cryptographic compression function over binary MTs. As classical, bit-oriented hash functions like SHA-2 are not compactly representable in SNARK frameworks, Arithmetization-Oriented (AO) cryptographic designs have emerged as an alternative, efficient solution. Today, the majority of AO compression functions are constructed from permutation-based hashing modes, such as Sponge. While this approach allows cost savings, compared to blockcipher-based modes, as it does not require key-scheduling, AO blockcipher schedulers are often cheap to compute. Furthermore, classical bit-oriented cryptography has long studied how to construct provably secure compression functions from blockciphers, following the Preneel-Govaerts-Vandewalle (PGV) framework. The potential efficiency gains together with the strong provable security foundations in the classic setting, motivate the study of AO blockcipher-based compression functions. In this work, we propose AO PGV-LC and PGV-ELC, two AO blockcipher-based FIL compression modes inspired by and extending the classical PGV approach, offering parametrizable input and output sizes and coming with provable security guarantees in the AO setting. We prove the collision and preimage resistance in the ideal cipher model, and give bounds for collision and opening resistance over MTs of arbitrary arity. We compare experimentally the AO PGV-ELC mode over the HADES blockcipher with its popular and widely adopted Sponge instantation, POSEIDON, and its improved variant POSEIDON2. Our resulting constructions are up to 3× faster than POSEIDON and 2× faster than POSEIDON2 in native x86 execution, and up to 50% faster in the Groth16 SNARK framework. Finally, we study the benefits of using MTs of arity wider than two, proposing a new strategy to obtain a compact R1CS constraint system in such case. In fact, by combining an efficient parametrization of the HADES blockcipher over the PGV-ELC mode, together with an optimal choice of the MT arity, we measuerd an improvement of up to 9× in native MT construction time, and up to 2.5× in proof generation time, compared to POSEIDON over binary MTs.
AB - ZK-SNARKs, a fundamental component of privacyoriented payment systems, identity protocols, or anonymous voting systems, are advanced cryptographic protocols for verifiable computation: modern SNARKs allow to encode the invariants of a program, expressed as an arithmetic circuit, in an appropriate constraint language from which short, zero-knowledge proofs for correct computations can be constructed. One of the most important computations that is run through SNARK systems is the verification of Merkle tree (MT) opening proofs, which relies on the evaluation of a fixed-input-length (FIL) cryptographic compression function over binary MTs. As classical, bit-oriented hash functions like SHA-2 are not compactly representable in SNARK frameworks, Arithmetization-Oriented (AO) cryptographic designs have emerged as an alternative, efficient solution. Today, the majority of AO compression functions are constructed from permutation-based hashing modes, such as Sponge. While this approach allows cost savings, compared to blockcipher-based modes, as it does not require key-scheduling, AO blockcipher schedulers are often cheap to compute. Furthermore, classical bit-oriented cryptography has long studied how to construct provably secure compression functions from blockciphers, following the Preneel-Govaerts-Vandewalle (PGV) framework. The potential efficiency gains together with the strong provable security foundations in the classic setting, motivate the study of AO blockcipher-based compression functions. In this work, we propose AO PGV-LC and PGV-ELC, two AO blockcipher-based FIL compression modes inspired by and extending the classical PGV approach, offering parametrizable input and output sizes and coming with provable security guarantees in the AO setting. We prove the collision and preimage resistance in the ideal cipher model, and give bounds for collision and opening resistance over MTs of arbitrary arity. We compare experimentally the AO PGV-ELC mode over the HADES blockcipher with its popular and widely adopted Sponge instantation, POSEIDON, and its improved variant POSEIDON2. Our resulting constructions are up to 3× faster than POSEIDON and 2× faster than POSEIDON2 in native x86 execution, and up to 50% faster in the Groth16 SNARK framework. Finally, we study the benefits of using MTs of arity wider than two, proposing a new strategy to obtain a compact R1CS constraint system in such case. In fact, by combining an efficient parametrization of the HADES blockcipher over the PGV-ELC mode, together with an optimal choice of the MT arity, we measuerd an improvement of up to 9× in native MT construction time, and up to 2.5× in proof generation time, compared to POSEIDON over binary MTs.
KW - Hash function
KW - Block cipher
KW - Arithmetization-Oriented ·
KW - Merkle tree
KW - ZeroKnowledge
KW - SNARK
KW - Poseidon
UR - https://www.computer.org/csdl/proceedings
UR - https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome/1000142/all-proceedings
U2 - 10.1109/CSF61375.2024.00032
DO - 10.1109/CSF61375.2024.00032
M3 - Conference contribution
T3 - IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
SP - 558
EP - 573
BT - 2024 IEEE 37th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)
PB - IEEE
T2 - 37th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Y2 - 8 July 2024 through 12 July 2024
ER -