Malawi: Parliamentary Debate under Executive Dominance

Nikolaos Frantzeskakis, Michael Wahman, T. Murat Yildirim

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

This chapter represents one of the very first quantitative analyses of parliamentary speechmaking in an African democracy. Looking at Malawi in the parliamentary term 2009–2014, we find that MPs in ministerial positions and party leadership speak significantly more than other MPs. We also find that those representing the major opposition party speak significantly more than other MPs. Given the candidate-centric nature of Malawian parliamentary politics and high levels of formal parliamentary openness, these findings run counter to the theory presented in this volume. We suggest that in order to understand speechmaking in the Malawi parliament, one has to take into account both the generally weak position of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive and the role-orientation of Malawian MPs. In a system with high MP turnover rates and significant local developmental needs, MPs tend to prioritize constituency development over contributions to the national legislative agenda. With resources highly centered on the executive, backbench MPs are unlikely to see significant benefits in pursuing an active legislative agenda. Consequently, MPs representing the government or those higher in opposition party hierarchies can dominate parliamentary speechmaking.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Politics of Legislative Debates
EditorsHanna Back, Marc Debus, Jorge M. Fernandes
PublisherOxford University Press
Chapter27
Pages553-571
Number of pages19
ISBN (Electronic)9780191883330
ISBN (Print)9780198849063
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 8 Oct 2021
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameThe Oxford Politics of Institutions
PublisherOxford University Press

Keywords

  • Malawi
  • parliament
  • executive
  • parties
  • opposition

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