Does Venture Capital Backing Improve Disclosure Controls and Procedures? Evidence from Management’s Post-IPO Disclosures

Douglas Cumming, Lars Helge Hass*, Linda A. Myers, Monika Tarsalewska

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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Abstract

Firm managers make ethical decisions regarding the form and quality of disclosure. Disclosure can have long-term implications for performance, earnings manipulation, and even fraud. We investigate the impact of venture capital (VC) backing on the quality and informativeness of disclosure controls and procedures for newly public companies. We find that these controls and procedures are stronger, as evidenced by fewer material weaknesses in internal control under Section 302 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, when companies are VC-backed. Moreover, these disclosures are informative and are more likely to be followed by subsequent financial statement restatements than are disclosures made by non-VC-backed IPO companies.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)539-563
JournalJournal of Business Ethics
Volume187
Issue number3
Early online date6 Nov 2022
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2023

Keywords

  • Venture capital
  • Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002
  • Material weaknesses
  • Disclosure controls and procedures
  • Initial public offerings
  • Management disclosure
  • Corporate governance

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