Breaking the silence: motion silencing and experience of change

Ian Phillips*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)


The naïve view of temporal experience (Phillips, in: Lloyd D, Arstila V (eds) Subjective time: the philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of temporality, forthcoming-a) comprises two claims. First, that we are perceptually aware of temporal properties, such as succession and change. Second, that for any temporal property apparently presented in experience, our experience itself possesses that temporal property. In his paper 'Silencing the experience of change' (forthcoming), Watzl argues that this second naïve inheritance thesis faces a novel counter-example in the form of the striking motion silencing effects recently demonstrated by Suchow and Alvarez (Curr Biol 21(2):140-143, 2011). Here I clarify the form which any counter-example to naïve inheritance must take. I then explain how, on a plausible, rival 'crowding' interpretation of Suchow and Alvarez's data, motion silencing poses no more of a threat to naïve inheritance than standard cases of change blindness.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)693-707
Number of pages15
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number3
Early online date19 Jun 2013
Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2014


  • Change blindness
  • Crowding
  • Experience of change
  • Motion silencing
  • Temporal consciousness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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