The perceived split between 'analytical' and 'critical' traditions in mainstream philosophy is deeply outmoded and no longer relevant. In legal philosophy it persists. This article argues for an end to any treatment of one or other tradition as radically 'other'. It traces the division to a misunderstanding of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and its repercussions for normative legal theory. It demonstrates that a truly Heideggerian account of adjudication leads to similar normative conclusions to those of Ronald Dworkin. It further demonstrates that Heidegger's conception of 'practical philosophy' is similar to that of John Finnis. The article concludes with some remarks about the broader implications for how we treat key figures in the history of ideas in all of our theoretical engagements.
|Early online date||7 May 2015|
|Publication status||E-pub ahead of print - 7 May 2015|