An Analytic Attack against ARX Addition Exploiting Standard Side-channel Leakage

Yan Yan; Elisabeth Oswald; Srinivas Vivek

doi:10.5220/0010223600890097

An Analytic Attack against ARX Addition Exploiting Standard Side-channel Leakage

Yan Yan, Elisabeth Oswald, Srinivas Vivek

Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

In the last few years a new design paradigm, the so-called ARX (modular addition, rotation, exclusive-or) ciphers, have gained popularity in part because of their non-linear operation’s seemingly ‘inherent resilience’ against Differential Power Analysis (DPA) Attacks: the non-linear modular addition is not only known to be a poor target for DPA attacks, but also the computational complexity of DPA-style attacks grows exponentially with the operand size and thus DPA-style attacks quickly become practically infeasible. We however propose a novel DPA-style attack strategy that scales linearly with respect to the operand size in the chosen-message attack setting.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy - ICISSP
Publisher	SCITEPRESS, Science and Technology Publications, Lda
Pages	89-97
Number of pages	9
ISBN (Print)	9789897584916
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.5220/0010223600890097
Publication status	Published - Feb 2021
Event	7th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy, ICISSP 2021 - Virtual, Online Duration: 11 Feb 2021 → 13 Feb 2021

Publication series

Name	International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy
ISSN (Electronic)	2184-4356

Conference

Conference	7th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy, ICISSP 2021
City	Virtual, Online
Period	11/02/21 → 13/02/21

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This work has been funded in parts by the European Union (EU) via the ERC project 725042 (acronym SEAL). The third author’s work was funded by the INSPIRE Faculty Award (DST, Govt. of India).

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 by SCITEPRESS – Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All rights reserved.

Keywords

ARX Construction
Chosen Plaintext Attack
Hamming Weight
Side-channel Analysis

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computer Science (miscellaneous)
Information Systems

Access to Document

10.5220/0010223600890097Licence: Creative Commons: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND)

Cite this

Yan, Y., Oswald, E., & Vivek, S. (2021). An Analytic Attack against ARX Addition Exploiting Standard Side-channel Leakage. In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy - ICISSP (pp. 89-97). (International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy). SCITEPRESS, Science and Technology Publications, Lda. https://doi.org/10.5220/0010223600890097

Yan, Yan ; Oswald, Elisabeth ; Vivek, Srinivas. / An Analytic Attack against ARX Addition Exploiting Standard Side-channel Leakage. Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy - ICISSP. SCITEPRESS, Science and Technology Publications, Lda, 2021. pp. 89-97 (International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy).

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abstract = "In the last few years a new design paradigm, the so-called ARX (modular addition, rotation, exclusive-or) ciphers, have gained popularity in part because of their non-linear operation{\textquoteright}s seemingly {\textquoteleft}inherent resilience{\textquoteright} against Differential Power Analysis (DPA) Attacks: the non-linear modular addition is not only known to be a poor target for DPA attacks, but also the computational complexity of DPA-style attacks grows exponentially with the operand size and thus DPA-style attacks quickly become practically infeasible. We however propose a novel DPA-style attack strategy that scales linearly with respect to the operand size in the chosen-message attack setting.",

keywords = "ARX Construction, Chosen Plaintext Attack, Hamming Weight, Side-channel Analysis",

author = "Yan Yan and Elisabeth Oswald and Srinivas Vivek",

note = "Funding Information: This work has been funded in parts by the European Union (EU) via the ERC project 725042 (acronym SEAL). The third author{\textquoteright}s work was funded by the INSPIRE Faculty Award (DST, Govt. of India). Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021 by SCITEPRESS – Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All rights reserved.; 7th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy, ICISSP 2021 ; Conference date: 11-02-2021 Through 13-02-2021",

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Yan, Y, Oswald, E & Vivek, S 2021, An Analytic Attack against ARX Addition Exploiting Standard Side-channel Leakage. in Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy - ICISSP. International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy, SCITEPRESS, Science and Technology Publications, Lda, pp. 89-97, 7th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy, ICISSP 2021, Virtual, Online, 11/02/21. https://doi.org/10.5220/0010223600890097

An Analytic Attack against ARX Addition Exploiting Standard Side-channel Leakage. / Yan, Yan; Oswald, Elisabeth; Vivek, Srinivas.
Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy - ICISSP. SCITEPRESS, Science and Technology Publications, Lda, 2021. p. 89-97 (International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

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AB - In the last few years a new design paradigm, the so-called ARX (modular addition, rotation, exclusive-or) ciphers, have gained popularity in part because of their non-linear operation’s seemingly ‘inherent resilience’ against Differential Power Analysis (DPA) Attacks: the non-linear modular addition is not only known to be a poor target for DPA attacks, but also the computational complexity of DPA-style attacks grows exponentially with the operand size and thus DPA-style attacks quickly become practically infeasible. We however propose a novel DPA-style attack strategy that scales linearly with respect to the operand size in the chosen-message attack setting.

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Yan Y, Oswald E, Vivek S. An Analytic Attack against ARX Addition Exploiting Standard Side-channel Leakage. In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy - ICISSP. SCITEPRESS, Science and Technology Publications, Lda. 2021. p. 89-97. (International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy). doi: 10.5220/0010223600890097

An Analytic Attack against ARX Addition Exploiting Standard Side-channel Leakage

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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Cite this