Abstract concepts and emotion: Cross-linguistic evidence and arguments against affective embodiment

Bodo Winter*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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Abstract

How are abstract concepts such as ‘freedom' and ‘democracy' represented in the mind? One prominent proposal suggests that abstract concepts are grounded in emotion. Supporting this ‘affective embodiment' account, abstract concepts are rated to be more strongly positive or more strongly negative than concrete concepts. This paper demonstrates that this finding generalizes across languages by synthesizing rating data from Cantonese, Mandarin Chinese, Croatian, Dutch, French, German, Indonesian, Italian, Polish and Spanish. However, a deeper look at the same data suggests that the idea of emotional grounding only characterizes a small subset of abstract concepts. Moreover, when the concreteness/abstractness dimension is not operationalized using concreteness ratings, it is actually found that concrete concepts are rated as more emotional than abstract ones. Altogether, these results suggest limitations to the idea that emotion is an important factor in the grounding of abstract concepts.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘Concepts in interaction: social engagement and inner experiences’.
Original languageEnglish
Article number20210368
Number of pages13
JournalPhilosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B
Volume378
Early online date26 Dec 2022
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 13 Feb 2023

Keywords

  • abstract concepts
  • concepts
  • abstraction
  • emotion
  • emotional valence
  • embodiment
  • affect
  • grounding
  • grounded cognition
  • embodied cognition

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