A Framework of Negotiation and Reconciliation in the Triumviral period
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Nothing from the subsequent Augustan age can be fully explained without understanding the previous Triumviral period (43–31 BC). In this book, twenty experts from nine different countries and nineteen universities examine the Triumviral age not merely as a phase of transition to the Principate but as a proper period with its own dynamics and issues, which were a consequence of the previous years. The volume aims to address a series of underlying structural problems that emerged in that time, such as the legal nature of power attributed to the Triumvirs; changes and continuity in Republican institutions, both in Rome and the provinces of the Empire; the development of the very concept of civil war; the strategies of political communication and propaganda in order to win over public opinion; economic consequences for Rome and Italy, whether caused by the damage from constant wars or, alternatively, resulting from the proscriptions and confiscations carried out by the Triumvirs; and the transformation of Roman-Italian society. All these studies provide a complete, fresh and innovative picture of a key period that signaled the end of the Roman Republic.
THE TRIUMVIRAL PERIOD: CIVIL WAR, POLITICAL CRISIS AND SOCIOECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS

Francisco Pina Polo (ed.)
This book is dedicated to the memory of Fergus Millar
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In 29 BCE, the senate and the people of Rome set up a dedication to Imperator Caesar for the preservation of the Roman state:

\[
\text{senatus populusque Romanus / Imp(eratori) Caesari divi Iuli f(ilio) co(n)s(uli) quinct(o) / co(n)s(uli) design(ato) sext(o) imp(eratori) sept(ies) / re publica conservata.}^{1}
\]

The language of the honorific inscription, with its terminating ablative absolute (\textit{re publica conservata}), appears to confirm the successful achievement of the Triumviral assignment, which was to settle the state.\textsuperscript{2} Young Caesar, as

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\textsuperscript{1} \textit{ILS} 81 = \textit{CIL} 6.873. The marble block, on which this inscription was carved, was found in the Roman forum near the temple of Castor in the sixteenth century and measured 2.75m in length, c. 1m in height and 0.60m in depth. It is now lost. Rich 1998: 100-114; Lange 2009: 165-166; 2016: 130-131 assign the inscription to the possible Actian arch, voted by the senate on the return young Caesar in 29 BCE (Dio Cass. 51.19.1: ἄψις τροπαιοφόρος). Rich does note the issues assigning the inscription to the triple arch located between the temples of Divus Julius and of Castor (on the arch see Nedergaard 1999), due to its smaller dimensions.

\textsuperscript{2} For the formula \textit{triumviri rei publicae constituendae}, see \textit{RGDA} 1.4, 7.1; \textit{CIL} 1.2969; abbreviated as \textit{III Vir R. P. C.: Fasti Colotiani = Inscr. Ital.} 13.1.274; \textit{Inscr. Ital.} 10.4.21, 13.1.1b (\textit{Fasti Triumphales} p. 87 frag. XL, entries for 40 BCE); \textit{ILLRP} 416, 1276, 1286; \textit{CIL} 11.1330, 12.4340; on coinage of 43-37 BCE (first assignment): \textit{RRC} 490/3-4, 492/1-2,
the sole remaining (both alive and politically active) member of the Triumvirate established in October 43 BCE, could claim his singular accomplishment of extinguishing civil war and (magnanimously) transferring the res publica from his potestas to the arbitration of the senate and the people (RGDA 34.1).

Not only was young Caesar’s preservation and restoration of the state a solo feat, but also his rhetoric of the establishment of peace as the product of his victories was presented without reference to opponents (despite an acknowledgement of civil conflict). Young Caesar’s, and later Augustus’, narrative of peace was as an absolute concept – of pax parta terra marique⁢ – removing the relational framework of the concept that was evident in the ovations of young Caesar and Antony in 40 BCE: Imp(erator) Caesar…ovans…quod pacem fecit cum M. Antonio…/M(arcus) Antonius…ovans…quod pacem fecit cum Imp. Caesare.⁴ The peace of Caesar Augustus was an expression of a sanitised narrative that obscured the complex and disputed discourses of the late Republic and Triumviral period. The victor could claim, with confidence, ownership and delivery of not just pax, but concordia, libertas, pietas, salus and securitas to the res publica.⁵ But if the Augustan narrative is one of absolute certain stability as pax parta victoriis (RGDA 13), the threads of the various Triumviral narratives weave a different type of cloth. As Lange has stressed ‘the Triumvirate is a symbol of the civil wars, but also of the ending of civil strife’.⁶ If the Triumviral period ended with the construction of Augustan peace, it began with a framework of reconciliation and (re)alignment, with the construction of spaces for the negotiation of power. In reality, this performance and language of negotiation and exchange served as a vehicle for sustaining violence under the name of stability.

493/1, 494/1-15, 494/17-19, 494/35, 495/1-2, 496/1-3, 497/1-3, 516/1-5, 517/1-8, 518/1-2, 520/1, 521/1-2, 522/1-4, 523/1, 527/1-3, 529/4, 531/1, 533/2-3, 534/1, 536/1-4, 537/1; on the Triumviral assignment: Lange 2009: 18-26.

3 ILGR 158 (Nicopolis victory monument inscription), cf. Liv. 1.19.2; RGDA 13; see also Cornwell 2017: 81-120, esp. 112-117.

4 Inscr. Ital. 13.1.1b (Fasti Triumphales p. 87 frag. XL, entries for 40 BCE); see Cornwell 2017: 45-47.

For statues to Pax, Salus Publica and Concordia dedicated by Augustus in 10 BCE: Ov. Fast. 3.881-2; Dio Cass. 54.35.2; for claims of libertas: RGDA 1.1; RIC 1 Aug. 476; see also RGDA 34.2: virtutis clementiaeque et iustitiae et pietatis causa testatum est per eius clupei, cf. CAG 13.5 p. 361; Welch 2019. For a provincial acceptance of Augustus’ rhetoric of pax see e.g. CIL 12.4335, 14.2898-2899; OGIS 458; SEG 4.201; IGR 4.1173; see Cornwell 2017: 183-186.

In this paper, I offer an overview of the tensions inherent in the Triumvirate’s formation and maintenance in terms of a rhetoric of peace and reconciliation. I will first examine the initial formation in late October/early November 43 BCE drawing out some social structures and political ideologies used to construct a space of negotiation and reconciliation between the main political players. Within this discussion, I will examine pre-Triumviral models for conflict resolution, particularly the arrangement and ‘friendship’ of Crassus, Pompey and Caesar. Following on from such a framework, I will consider to what extent these structures facilitated conflict resolution and yet also offered a means of articulating control through the language of unity and agreement, in contrast to contestations and competition of ownership of ideals in the 40s BCE. Specific themes that this paper will further draw out are not only the reiteration of *concordia* within this period, but also the focus on the *concordia* of individuals rather than of the community as a whole. The ‘privatisation’ of political *concordia* will be explored through the sites of negotiation situated outside the political sphere, through personal and kinship diplomacy at the potential expense of constitutional structures and spaces. The ‘promise’ of reconciliation and peace was, in effect, the Triumviral ‘brand’, which was heavily promoted and advertised through media of mass communication, such as the coinage, at points of political tension and potential conflict. Nevertheless, while the contemporary Triumviral framework was one of reconciliation through negotiation, historical accounts produce different narratives, wherein the *φιλία* and negotiation of the Triumvirs is a rejection of reconciliation with their opponents and indeed the cause of *discordia*.

1. A Triumviral framework of *φιλία* and agreement

The Triumvirate began, according to Appian’s narrative (*B Civ. 4.2*), with *φιλία* established to end hostilities between young Caesar and Mark Antony (together with Lepidus). Similarly, Plutarch notes the attainment of *φιλία*, following a transition from the dissolution of hostilities (*Ant. 19.1*: εἰς διαλύσεις) to reconciliation: ἐπὶ δ’ οὖν ταῖς διαλλαγαῖς ταύταις οἱ στρατιώται περιστάντες ἥξιον καὶ γάμῳ τινι τὴν φιλίαν συνάψαι Καίσαρα (*Ant. 20.1*:...

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therefore, on account of these reconciliations, the soldiers surrounded them
and demanded that Caesar unite the friendship with marriage’). Cassius
Dio also outlines the mutual nature of the compact, although from the
outset he frames this as an agreement affected out of necessity, despite
mutual hatred.8 Φιλία, as the framework for an alliance between political
rivals, was likewise established in 60 BCE between Crassus, Pompey and
Caesar: Οὕτω μὲν δὴ καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἱ τρεῖς τήν τε φιλίαν συνέθεντο, καὶ ὄρκους
αὐτὴν πιστωσάμενοι τά τε κοινά δι’ ἕαυτῶν ἐποίησαντο (Dio Cass. 37.57.1:
‘Thus the three for these reasons formed their friendship and ratified it with
oaths, and managed public affairs amongst themselves’), and again in mid
44 BCE, when Antony and young Caesar were temporarily brought together
by the tribunes: οἱ δὲ ἐπεμέμφοντο ἀλλήλοις καὶ συνέβαινον ἐς φιλίαν (App.
B Civ. 3.30: ‘they placed the blamed on each other and came together in
friendship’). Such ‘friendship’ was forged out of necessity, rather than
mutual affection. Indeed, while Appian and Plutarch use a framework of
φιλία, this does not necessarily amount to an establishment of amicitia
between the three.9 However, while language of amicitialamicus is not used
explicitly in the Latin narratives of the Triumviral formation, Velleius does
talk about the arrangement in terms of a societas, which may be viewed as
relational to amicitia, as a relationship formed in response to common
interests and utility.10

Friendship and alliance as a utility of interests in the Latin narratives of
the Triumviral agreement also appear to draw on the language of interstate
relations.11 Velleius’ societas might operate within the socio-political field of
Roman friendship, however, Florus (2.16) presents the peace (pax) between

8 Dio Cass. 46.54.4: τοὺς ἄλλους ἐχθροὺς προτιμωρῆσασθαι δι’ ἄλλῃς δυνάμεις,
προσποιητέν όμολογίαν ἐποίησαντο (‘[since] they desired to have one another’s assistance in
taking vengeance on their other enemies first, they reached a pretend agreement’).
9 See Williams 2012: 1-62 on the meaning and framework of Roman amicitia, esp. 32
for the distinction with φιλία, and 54 for identifying someone as an amicus if they are referred
to by that term; Hellegouarc’h 1963: 62-90 on the different forms of amicitia.
10 On societas and its associations with coniunctio and concordia see Hellegouarc’h 1963:
80-90. See Cic. Planc. 5 for consensus et societas consiliorum et voluntatum as the bonds of
amicitia; Cic. Off. 1.54 for marriage as the prima societas; on the utility of amicitia see
Williams 2012: 50.
11 On the internalising of language to describe interstate relations, and war and peace
see Cornwell 2018. For the language of φιλία and the evolution of diplomatic friendship in
Classical Greece, see Bauslaugh 1991: 56-64.
the three leaders as made *velut foedus*. Similarly, Livy’s *Periochae* 120 alludes to the relational quality of *pax* made with an (external) opponent: *C. Caesar pacem cum Antonio et Lepido fecit.* This formula no doubt also echoes the language of the ovations awarded to both young Caesar and Antony in 40 BCE, demonstrating the application, during the civil wars, of the concept of *pax* increasingly to internal, political (and interpersonal) relations. The language of friendship was, of course, also applicable to interstate relations, implying the personal relations that ultimately unpinned such alliances, as the formula *socius et amicus* implies.

As previously mentioned, Velleius presents the agreement as the initiation of a *potentiae societas*, yet he also stresses the underlying need for *concordia* between Antony and young Caesar. *Concordia*, or the negation thereof (*discordia*), is similarly key to Suetonius’ presentation of the Triumviral negotiations.  Again, the compact between Crassus, Pompey and Caesar is framed in the narratives in terms of concord and like-mindedness: συμφρονησάντων δὲ ἐκείνων καὶ τὰ ἑταιρικά σφων ὡμολόγησαν (Dio Cass. 37.57.2: ‘with their like-mindedness, their companions also were in agreement’). Such arrangements of *φιλία* serve to articulate the potential association of shared interests with stability and *concordia*. These concepts of *dis/con-cordia* imply a political and civic orientation, not necessarily revealed from the focus on *pax* and *foedus* in the other Latin narratives.

In fact, these mixed presentations of Triumviral negotiation, *φιλία* and *concordia*, having elements of internal and external conflict resolution, reflect

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12 On *foedus* as part of interstate negotiations, see Varr. *Ling.* 5.86; see Cornwell 2017: 17-18, and 27-32 for the relationship of *pax* and *foedus*. See Gladhill 2016: 17-61 on the semantics of *foedus*, *fides*, and the meaning of ritual alliance; see also Hellegouarc’h 1963: 38-40.
13 Liv 1.19.2 qualifies *pax* of the gates of Janus in terms of the pacification of other peoples (*pacatos circa omnes populos*); Cornwell 2017: 15-23 on conventional meanings of *pax*.
14 Cornwell 2017: 23-34 on the landscape of *pax* in the late Republic, and 43-79 on the application of *pax* to political discourse during civil war; see also Cornwell 2018. Cic. *Phil.* 13.2 describes the potential relationship between Scipio and Sulla in similar terms of *pax* (*pacem cum Scipione Sulla sive faciebat sive simulabat*: ‘whether Sulla was actually making or pretending peace with Scipio’).
16 Vell. Pat. 2.65.1-2: *si Caesar eius aspurnaretur concordiam …. Tum inita potentiae societas* (‘if Caesar had spurned his (offer of) agreement…then began their alliance of power’).
17 Suet. *Aug.* 62: *reconciliatus post primam discordiam Antonio* (‘reconciled with Antony after their initial disagreement’).
the complex political language and action of the late Republic. This had become increasingly dominated by concepts of internal violence and civil dissent characterised both with the terminology of external war and with a heightened application of a diverse range of ideals to stress civic stability. The ‘*hostis*’ declaration formula, introduced by Sulla in 88,\(^{18}\) effectively began a process (or plausibly continued that already began by the so-called *senatus consultum ultimum*, albeit it in a different tone) that both formalised and normalised the use of the language of war within domestic politics.\(^{19}\) Yet, even though a framework of interstate conflict was being applied to interpersonal, political relations at Rome, it was also being contested as part of the competitive discourse of Republican politics. The status applied either to individuals or to the situation and circumstances was debated and fluid. Those declared *hostes* could turn the tables on their opponents with similar declarations and a conflict could be debated as being a *tumultrus* or a *bellum*, depending on the orientation and alliances of those characterising it as such, as was the case during the debates concerning the senate relations and reaction of Mark Antony in early 43.\(^{20}\)

In parallel to the development and escalation of a rhetoric of ‘internal war’, we can track the intensification and diversification of ideals within the public, political sphere. This is most apparent during the 40s BCE with Fortuna, Salus, Valetudo, Libertas, Pietas, Fides, Felicitas, Honos, Clementia, Pax, and Concordia all appearing with varied frequency of the coinage over the decade.\(^{21}\) Several of these ideals had a tradition of Cult at Rome at least from the late fourth/early third centuries,\(^{22}\) tied as they were to the safety of the state, yet even these were potential sites of contestation, certainly from the mid second century BCE onwards (if not earlier), most notable in the instance of Concordia. Without digressing too much into the history of the Cult and Temple(s) to Concordia at Rome, it is enough to mention the

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18 Cic. *Brut.* 168; Liv. *Per.* 77; Val. Max. 1.5.5, 3.8.5; App. *B Civ.* 1.60. Other sources have suggested that either a *lex* (Vell. Pat. 2.19.1) or a *senatus consultum* (senatorial decree) (Florus 2.9.6) was used to judge (*iudicare*) them as *hostes*. Diodorus 27.29.3 is unclear as to whether a *lex* or *senatus consultum* was used; Plut. *Sulla* 10.1 refers to the death penalty, rather than a *hostis* declaration as the decision of the senate. On the initial application of the *hostis* declarations in 88 and 87, see Lintott 1968: 155; Bauman 1973; Gaughan 2010: 126-131; Allély 2012: 21-28.

19 Allély 2012; Cornwell 2018; Rosenblitt 2019.


21 Cornwell 2020.

debate over the placement of the statue to Concordia, originally set up *in publico* by the censor of 164, Q. Marcius Philippus, and later removed to the Curia by the censor of 154, L. Cassius Longinus (Cic. *De Dom.* 130 and 136); the disputed nature of the Concordia commemorated in the Opimian Temple of 121 (Plut. *C. Gracch.* 17.6); and finally the staging of political debates in the temple by both Antony and Cicero, and the manipulation of such performances in the following conflict.23

Ideas and ideals intended to promote stability and agreement were just as much sites of contestation and conflict as the explicit language of war and hostility that had taken firm root by the time of the civil wars of the 40s and the formation of the Triumvirate in late 43. With this brief ideological sketch in mind, let us return to those negotiations surrounding the establishment of φιλία and societas near Bononia.

2. Sites of negotiation and the sociology of power24

As sites of negotiation go, an island in the middle of a river offers a strong indication of neutrality and equality, with all parties arriving from the outside, from their own spaces of authority.25 Indeed, rivers, as naturally-occurring dividing lines within the landscape and often recognised as delineating boundaries (political or administrative in nature), were the ideal site, situated between disputing polities and territories, for diplomatic encounter and exchange.26 This is perhaps best exemplified in the meeting of Gaius Caesar and the Parthian king Phraataces in 1 CE, which took place *in insula quam amnis*

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24 Elias 2006: 5 ‘certain figurations of interdependent people made it possible for individuals with a small circle of helpers to maintain themselves and their dynasties in more or less unrestricted power’.

25 For a detailed examination of the role of ‘Face-to-face dialogue: on the symbolism of neutral spaces’, including the liminal spaces created at camp fortifications and by water, see García Riaza in this volume.

26 Purcell 2012: esp. 382-383.
Euphrates ambiebat, whose space was constructed as Roman on near bank (in nostra ripa) and Parthian on far (Vell. Pat. 2.101). Equality of the negotiating parties was carefully orchestrated, avoiding any of the diplomatic ambiguity (or rather possible accusations of superiority) seen in the diplomatic encounter on the Roman bank in 96 BCE. Then the Parthian king, displeased at apparent subordination of Parthia by means of not only the location of the meeting but also Sulla taking the central seat at the negotiating table (between the chairs for Parthia and Cappadocia), had his representative executed on his return.27

The orchestration of the site of negotiation between young Caesar and Antony (and Lepidus whose position varies in the narratives as regards to his role) was a clearly articulated message of ostensible equality. The site, an island on a river located between Mutina and Bononia emphasised this message, as did the numbers of forces present. Both Appian and Dio stress the parity of forces of either side.28 The island also offered a private, or at least physically remote site of negotiation as presented in Appian’s narrative (B Civ. 4.2). The route to the negotiating table moves from the stationing of each of their five legions ἀντικαθιστάντες (‘standing opposed’), to moving with 300 men to the bridge access to the island. Here, in Appian’s account, Lepidus’ role of quasi-mediator or neutral party is emphasised by his early arrival and security sweep of the island, before Antony and young Caesar proceed alone across the bridges to join him. At least in terms of socially constructed space we have moved from a large-scale military space of army camps to just the three integral negotiators, although as we will see the role of the soldiers within the reconciliations was far from passive. Variants on this formula can be observed in the negotiations at Puteoli/Misenum in 39. Negotiations begin first on two artificial platforms in the sea, with Sextus Pompeius and Libo on the seaward side and young Caesar and Antony on the shoreward side, separated by water, and later on a mound surrounded by the seawater.29 Antony and young Caesar would meet between Metapontum and Tarentum on a river, rowing out to the middle before determining to which, or indeed whose, side of the river they retired first.30

27 Plut. Sull. 5.4; Vell. Pat. 2.24.
28 App. B Civ. 4.2; Dio Cass. 46.55.1: στρατιώτας ἰσαρίθμους ἔχοντες.
29 App. B Civ. 5.71-2; Dio Cass. 48.36.1 has young Caesar and Antony on the land and Sextus on a mound in the sea, serving perhaps to further stress the land/sea division of their spheres of influence.
30 App. B Civ. 5.94.
What is perhaps notable about the spaces of negotiation during the Triumviral period in comparison to earlier constructions of reconciliation between political figures in the Roman state is the dislocation from the constitutional, political spaces at Rome and particularly the forum, and the apparent need to frame the space as diplomatically neutral, as if between interstate parties. In 70 BCE, according to Appian, the *populus*, fearing the threat of *stasis* due to the presence of both consuls’ armies outside the city, appealed directly to the consuls seated in the forum (App. *B Civ.* 1.121: τῶν ὑπάτων ἐν ἀγορᾷ προκαθημένων). The interactions here between consuls and the *populus* give shape to the social formation of power and negotiation and to the forum space as the appropriate and logical arena for such negotiations. Nevertheless, we can also observe a shift in location of such constitutionally constructed sites during the 50s, notably when the magistrates, pro-magistrates, with a total of 120 lictors, and 200 senators meet Caesar in north Italy.\(^{31}\) In this construction of constitutional space, the personal renegotiation of power between Caesar, Pompey and Crassus can be understood to have taken place, although it seems that there must have been some level of ‘private’ and interpersonal agreements, even if these were publicly known, as Cicero’s letter to Lentulus Spinther of the meeting at Luca may suggest.\(^{32}\)

Notable in the Bononia arrangement is the fact that Lepidus (the ‘mediator’) does not take (in Appian’s account) the position ἐν μεσῷ, which is taken instead by young Caesar as consul – a framework of constitutional powers is still nominally evoked. If for Appian (and his sources), Lepidus was less of a military threat to the current negotiation than either Antony or young Caesar,\(^{33}\) his position at the negotiating table at least seems to have ostensibly acknowledged his parity to the other two in the formation of the Triumvirate. Nevertheless, the position of Lepidus within the reconciliation narratives is secondary: the rupture of *concordia* is between Antony and young Caesar (Suet. *Aug.* 62). A rupture which, in the eyes of the soldiers, could only be healed not just by the possible show of the joining of right hands between the Triumvirs (Flor. 2.16: *Apud confluentes inter Perusiam et Bononianam iungunt manus, et exercitus consalutabant*), but through the *concordia* symbolised in the

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32 Cic. *Fam.* 1.9.9.
union of young Caesar to Antony’s step-daughter, Clodia.\textsuperscript{34} The φιλία/societas of the two was solidified and transformed into συγγένεωs/adjinitas.\textsuperscript{35}

With the formation of the Triumvirate (although this would not be legally constituted until the lex Titia on 27 November) there was ostensibly a compact and sworn alliance that on some level framed how the Triumvirs should approach questions of war, discord, peace and reconciliation, albeit a framework they themselves constructed for the purposes of securing power. Whilst it is tempting to view the act of negotiation as a mere façade, the parameters set by the first meeting not only defined the relationships between the three men and between the Triumvirs and their soldiers but also established the social practices and symbols to convey adherence to their agreement.\textsuperscript{36}

3. Reiterations of reconciliation and kinship diplomacy

The value of negotiation and ostensible acts of reconciliation was the foundation upon which the Triumvirate established itself: an act of conciliation, which would nominally begin the process for setting the civil wars aright (App. B Civ. 4.2). Yet if the Triumvirate’s function was established through and framed by the notion of harmony and reconciliation after a period of discordia (Suet. Aug. 62; Vell. Pat. 2.65), this was not the only time that the concept of disharmony and dissension amongst the Triumvirs – notably Antony and young Caesar – would resonate in the narratives. Horace’s Satire 1.5.29 implies the repeated rupture of friendship between the two Triumvirs, with Maecenas and Cocceius sent to Brundisium as legati, aversos soliti conponere amicos. The fragments of Livy for 40 BCE also emphasise the existence of dissensio, resolved with the two armies and standards coming together in una castra (Liv. Fr. 51-53).

That the agreement of the Triumvirs is followed, in the narratives of Appian and Dio Cassius, by ill omens at Rome (albeit lists of omens that

\textsuperscript{34} Suet. Aug. 62; Plut. Ant. 20.1; Vell. Pat. 2.65; Dio Cass. 46.55, see also Dio Cass. 48.5.2 for the dissolution of the marriage and συγγένεωs.

\textsuperscript{35} Vell. Pat. 2.65; Dio Cass. 46.56.3. For the distinction of adjinitas and societas as forms of amicitia see Hellegouarc’h 1963: 64-90. Suet. Aug. 62 refers to the necessitudo established between young Caesar and Antony as a result of the marriage; according to Hellegouarc’h 1963: 68 the term does not necessary apply to familial relations, unlike adjinitas. See Williams 2012: 42-44 for the various Latin labels of friendship.

\textsuperscript{36} For friendship as utility, see Williams 2012: 17-19, 49-53; see also Hellegouarc’h 1963: 80-90.
barely match one another besides the clashing of arms being heard) evidently foreshadows further conflict and the proscriptions to come. Rather pointedly, Dio ends his list with vultures roosting on the temples of the Genius Populi and of Concordia (47.2.3), following this immediately with the massacre of the proscribed ‘in the houses…in the streets… in the fora and around the temples’ (47.3.1). For Dio, the actions of the Triumvirs exemplify the collapse of concordia within the state. In this the tension and almost paradox of the Triumviral framework (within the narratives) is revealed: the establishment of concord begets further discord. The discordia of the Triumviral period would also be reworked in later ‘Augustan’ narratives as the crudelitas of Lepidus and the clementia of Augustus, since blame for the atrocities inflicted as a result of the proscriptions had to be apportioned somewhere, while still acknowledging the social disruption in the wake of the Triumviral compact.

This recognition of the discordia of the Triumviral period and the preceding decades was not restricted to the observations of later historians. Sallust, as a Triumviral writer, reflected on the political trauma of the Sullan regime but importantly from within the repercussions of that regime and the continued application of ‘hostile politics’ and bella civilia (Sall. Hist. frag. 1.12) – a theme so central to the Histories and Sallust’s own time of writing. Sallust’s Historiae may be viewed, in part, as a response to the language of restoration, concordia et pax, of his own time, viewed through the lens of the previous generation: specie concordiae et pacis, quae sceleri et parricidio suo nomina indidit (Hist. 1.55.24: ‘the appearance of concord and peace, which names he has given to his wickedness and parricide’). Sallust’s speech of Lepidus, whilst tempered by Sallust’s own authorial voice, is still a space within the narrative where the nature of autocratic power within the state to the disruption of stability and concord is questioned. As Rosenblitt has recently stressed ‘the speech [itself] constitutes a disruption of concordia and therefore stands as evidence within the Sallustian narrative that Sulla’s power did not bring concord’. That Sallust drew on Cicero’s Philippics to furnish the language of Philippus reveals the validity of his speeches as part of contemporary discourse, just as much as a historical critique of a post-Sullan world.

37 App. B Civ. 4.14; Dio Cass. 47.2-3.
38 Akar 2013: 440-441.
39 See CIL 6.1527 (Laudatio Turiae) esp. 1.6a, 11-19; Osgood 2014: 45-65.
40 Gerrish 2019; Rosenblitt 2019: 115-139.
41 Rosenblitt 2019: 98; see also Rosenblitt 2013.
As the narratives on the T triumviral period illustrate, the ideological value of dis-/con-cordia, alongside frameworks of societas and adfinitas, was potent. Reconciliation and displays of concordia were the tools through which T triumviral control was articulated and maintained, against any charges of discordia. As has already been stressed above, the establishment of concordia between young Caesar and Antony at Bononia in 43 was symbolised not only by their joining of hands but also through the establishment of a marriage contact between young Caesar and Antony’s step-daughter. The mutually beneficial alliance (societas) or friendship (φιλία) was extended to a form of relationship that was ‘réalisée sur un base essentiellement familiale par la partique du mariage’, such as adfinitas and necessitudo.

The betrothal, as an enactment and proof of the concordia established, serves to illustrate the T triumviral ‘brand’ and promotion of reconciliation and peace, which was to be achieved through the personal, kinship negotiations of these two individuals. Not only does the sphere within which concordia was being enacted move away from the Ciceronian ideal of concordia civium/concordia ordinum, but also we can observe a shift in audience from the civic crowd at Rome to the armies. All accounts of the conference of Bononia stress that the marriage alliance between Antony and young Caesar was at the urging of both armies or just Antony’s, according to Dio’s narrative (46.46.3). Similarly at Brundisium, according to Appian’s narrative, initially the praetorian cohorts of Antony (αἵ τε στρατηγίδες αὐτοῦ τάξεις) engage their former comrades (τοὺς συνεστρατευμένους σφίσιν) in conversation at young Caesar’s camp, while young Caesar’s men stress the alleged diplomatic nature of their presence (διαλλαγὰς ἐπινοοῦντες ἀμφοτέροις). Moreover, after Cocceius’ arrival and negotiations with both sides, young Caesar’s soldiers elected πρέσβεις to be sent to both T triumvirs whose purpose was to ensure the achievement of reconciliation (διαλλάξαι). These πρέσβεις together with Cocceius (who was ‘οἰκεῖον ἀμφοῖν/ friendly to both sides’), Pollio (representing Antony’s interests) and Maecenas (representing young Caesar’s) acting as mediators (οἱ διαλλακταὶ) proposed the marriage alliance between the two men.

42 Hellegouarc’h 1963: 64.
43 Concordia civium: Cic. Sest. 71, 87; Phil. 4.14.3, 4.14.8; 10.8; Rep. 1.40, 2.69; concordia ordinum: Cat. 2.19; Att. 1.18.3; concordia senatus: prov. cons. 47.8; Phil. 4.15.9; equestris concordia: Att. 1.17.9. For Cicero’s construction of consensual politics, see Rosenblitt 2019: 1-2, 120; Akar 2013: 240-278; Achard 1981: 35-40, 72-74.
44 App. B Civ. 5.59.
45 App. B Civ. 5.64.
The adoption of such independently minded initiatives may also be observed in Caesar’s narrative of the *Civil War*, when, at the Ebro, soldiers from both sides co-mingled in the camps of Petreius and Afranius and of Caesar seeking a peace and an end to the conflict. The difficulties experienced during the civil war in 49-48 BCE particularly in regard to supply line logistics and resources has recently been well articulated by Richard Westall, providing forceful and practical motivation behind Caesar’s rapidity of campaign and also revealing concerns of hungry and famine motivating the soldiers’ interests.46 In Caesar’s narrative Petreius interrupted the *colloquia* of the soldiers, driving out and killing any Caesarians found in his camp, whereas Caesar ordered his adversaries’ soldiers in his own camp to be sent back (*B Civ.* 1.74-77). According to Batstone and Damon, the first book of Caesar’s *de bello civili* serves as an allegory of the whole war, with Caesar bringing peace in the wake of Ilerda.47 Here his opponents, Afranius and Petreius, who up to this point have provided weak and even deceitful models for diplomatic exchanges (1.74-76), finally request a negotiation (*colloquium petunt*, 1.84.1). As a resolution to the failed public negotiations, which he pushed for at the opening of the book, Caesar rejects the request for a private meeting (*semoto a militibus loco*) creating a very public display before the soldiers and including Afranius’ son as an *obses* (1.84.2). If nothing else, Caesar’s account demonstrates the importance of the perception and reception of negotiation by an audience, and particularly the immediate audience of the troops.

The desire for the soldiers to receive visible affirmations of concord is demonstrated in the narratives by the physical gestures, such as embracing and the taking of the right hand. This display of *fides* and *concordia*, conventionally referred to by scholarship as the *dextrarum iunctio*, is perhaps most well recognised in political settings with the affirmation of agreement and harmony between parties, such as the reconciliation of Pompey and Crassus in 70 BCE.48 Such unification between opposed parties was depicted

46  Westall 2018: 86-123, 196-236.
47  Batstone – Damon 2006: 75-84.
48  App. *B Civ.* 1.121: ἔς τὸν Πομπήιον ἐχώρει, τὴν χεῖρα προτείνων ἐπὶ διαλλαγαίς… καὶ δεξιωσμένον (‘he offered Pompey his hand in the way of reconciliation…They shook hands’). For the joining of right hands as a sign of *fides* see Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.104: *ubi fides, ubi exsercations, ubi dextrae complexusque?* (‘where is the loyalty, where are the solemn oaths, where are the right hands and embraces?’), cf. Cic. *Att.* 7.1.4: *ubi illae sunt densae dextrae?* (‘where are those mutual pledges?’), on which see Shackleton Bailey (1965-70) 3.279; see Piganiol (1959) for an alternative reading of *aeneae dextrae*. On the relationship of *manus* and *fides* see Otto 1909: 2281-2286; Boyancé 1964; Levi 1985; Lind 1989: 6; Thome 2000: 54.
visually through the joining of hands on the coinage since c. 70, though there in relation to the unification of Italia and Roma (RRC 403/1). From 48 BCE onwards, the shorthand symbol of two joined right hands appeared with regularity on the coinage on the civil wars and Triumviral periods (Table 1). The clasped hands (dextrarum iunctio) were displayed in uniform fashion of the coinage of all three Triumvirs in 42 BCE, as well as accompanying Concordia herself on coinage of the same year. The caduceus, the symbol of negotiation and pax, would appear on the coinage minted after the treaty at Brundisium with the image of the joined hands around the caduceus serving to reinforce the Triumviral rhetoric and on-brand message. The intense proliferation of the numismatic messages of Triumviral harmony continued down to c. 38 BCE, although Lepidus had effectively disappeared from the coinage after his consulship of 42. We should acknowledge that by 40 the mint at Rome closed, with the mints now moving with the various generals in the field. Such a move is understandable during periods of large-scale warfare and armies to be paid. Alongside the logistical and strategic reasons for the moving mints is again a subtle hint of the integrity of the army as a primary audience and witness of Triumviral reconciliation and peace.⁴⁹

Within this framework of visible signs and symbols promoting rhetorics of harmony and peace during a period of war, I would like to consider further the role of marriage alliances and kinship diplomacy. The use of marriage as a tool of political alliance is nothing new. Narratives of the alliance between Caesar and Pompey emphasise not only the bond of marriage between these two men, but also Caesar’s own marriage to the daughter of his successor in the consulship, Lucius Calpurnius.⁵⁰ These bonds of adfinitas/συγγένεια were an important aspect of negotiations amongst political peers and were an arena of debate in and of themselves. Cato’s reaction to Caesar’s various marriage negotiations in 59 BCE was to cry out that Rome’s empire was being bargained away in marriage contracts (διαμαστροπεύεσθαι γάμοις τὴν ἡγεμονίαν: App. B Civ. 2.14, cf. Plut. Caes. 14.7). This was clearly an aspect of politicking that Cato notably railed against on more than one occasion: he himself rejected various arrangements of marriage alliances with Pompey, viewing such contracts as tantamount to bribery.⁵¹ This did not mean that Cato himself was immune from similar attacks. When he re-married his former wife Marcia, whom he had divorced in

⁵¹ Plut. Cat. 30, 45.2; Plut. Pomp. 44.
order that his friend Hortensius might marry her and produce an heir (Plut. Cat. 25), Caesar accused him of ‘earning a wage through the marriage’ (μισθαρνίαν ἐπὶ τῷ γάμῳ), as Marcia was now Hortensius’ heir. While Caesar’s accusations are based on charges of avarice and financial profit rather than political capital, the anecdote nevertheless demonstrates the dynamic social interactions and exchanges that marriage facilitated and promoted. Moreover,

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52 Plut. Cat. 52.4.
TABLE 2: KINSHIP DIPLOMACY AND FAMILIAL NEGOTIATIONS IN THE TRIUMVIRAL PERIOD (44–30 BCE).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Sources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Antony and Lepidus’ sons as hostages to negotiations with assassins</td>
<td>App. B Civ. 3.142; Dio Cass. 44.34.6; cf. Plut. Ant. 14 (only Antony’s son mentioned)</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>Lepidus’ son betrothed to Antony’s daughter</td>
<td>Dio Cass. 44.53.6 (cf. also App. B Civ. 5.93; Dio Cass. 46.52)</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>Triumviral conference on island between Mutina and Bononia; betrothal of young Caesar to Antony’s stepdaughter, Clodia, at the urging of the soldiers</td>
<td>Vell. Pat. 2.65.2; Suet. Aug. 62; Plut. Ant. 20.1; Dio Cass. 46.56.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Conflict at Perusia: dissolution of marriage ties between young Caesar and Antony</td>
<td>Dio Cass. 48.5.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Julia, Antony’s mother, sent by Sextus Pompeius to propose friendship with envoys</td>
<td>Dio Cass. 48.15.2 (cf. 48. 16.2); App. B Civ. 5. 52</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Young Caesar sends Mucia, Sextus Pompeius’ mother, to negotiate marriage of young Caesar to Scribonia, sister of Sextus’ father-in-law, Libo.</td>
<td>App. B Civ. 5.63</td>
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<td>Young Caesar writes to Julia, Antony’s mother, as a device for open correspondence with Antony (without having to concede seniority to Antony)</td>
<td>Vell. Pat. 2.78.1; Plut. Ant. 30–31; App. B Civ. 5.64; Liv. Per. 127; Horace Sat. 1.5.29 (aversos amicos)</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>Reconciliation of Antony and young Caesar at Brundisium; Antony married to Octavia</td>
<td>App. B Civ. 5.69-72</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Relatives of Libo and Sextus Pompeius’ mother, Mucia, are used to compel Libo and Sextus to come to the negotiating table with Antony and young Caesar</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>Young Caesar divorces Scribonia</td>
<td>Dio Cass. 48.34.4</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>Agreement between Sextus Pompeius and young Caesar and Antony at Puetoli; betrothal of Sextus’ daughter to Marcellus (Antony’s stepson and young Caesar’s nephew)</td>
<td>App. B Civ. 5.73; Dio Cass. 48.38.3</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>Young Caesar marries Livia</td>
<td>Suet. Aug. 62; Dio Cass. 48.44.1</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>Octavia negotiates agreement between Antony and young Caesar</td>
<td>Plut.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>and Antony betroths daughter to Antony’s son (Antyllus) and Antony</td>
<td>Cat. 25.2-3.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>betroths his daughter (by Octavia) to Domitius Ahenobarbus</td>
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<td>54</td>
<td>Marriage of the elites provided a contractual and social framework</td>
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<td>for expressing the bonds of a relationship between political figures.</td>
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<td>55</td>
<td>The utility of marriage to forge connections and between political</td>
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<td>of Triumviral kinship ties in 30 BCE. In the accounts of Velleius</td>
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<td>Paternclus and Suetonius, the betrothal of</td>
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Plutarch’s account of Hortensius’ motivations for marriage (first to Cato’s daughter, then to his wife) grounds the request in Hortensius’ desire to strengthen their relationship from being mere associates and companions (μὴ συνήθης εἶναι μηδὲ ἑταῖρος μόνον) to become a κοινωνία παίδων (‘a communion of children’). Marriage of the elites provided a contractual and social framework for expressing the bonds of a relationship between political figures.

The utility of marriage to forge connections and between political families had clear relevance as a social practice and ritual symbol within the rhetoric of Triumviral reconciliation. Indeed, the use not only of marriage but also of children as pignora/obsides (‘pledges/hostages’ of negotiation) and family members (usually mothers and sisters) as negotiators, is a strong characteristic of a decade of negotiation and renegotiation, founded on alliances which were outwardly exemplified through marriage alliance. Table 2 documents the various usages of ‘kinship diplomacy’ from the aftermath of Caesar’s assassination to the eradication of any vestige of Triumviral kinship ties in 30 BCE. In the accounts of Velleius Paterculus and Suetonius, the betrothal of

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53 Plut. Cat. 25.2-3. For the use of ideas of communion and commonality in political alliances and ‘friendships’ see also App. B Civ. 2.17: οἱ κοινωνοὶ τῆς δυναστείας.
54 See Treggiari 1991 for a complete study of Roman marriage; see also Hellegouarc’h 1963: 13.
55 See Rohr Vio in this volume.
young Caesar to Clodia is the outward and concluding demonstration of the end of *discordia*. Similarly, the fragments and *Periochae* of Livy book 127 underline the *dissensio* of 41-40 BCE which was to be resolved and the *concordia ducum* to be preserved through the marriage of Antony to Octavia. Marriage (and betrothal) as a tool was a means of formalising political alliances and, I would argue, given its strong associations with *concordia*, made it a highly suitable vehicle to present Triumviral stability after reconciliation.

Of course, *concordia*’s dominant sphere of use in the late Republic was the political.\(^{56}\) In this context, the *dextrarum iunctio* on the coinage has been associated with political reconciliations. The depiction of the deity Concordia and the symbol of the joined hands of the Triumviral coinage (most explicitly on coinage minted by Vibius Varus in 42, of Concordia and the clasped hands: *RRC* 494/41) must, in the first instance, be understood as a political (and possibly military) idea of *concordia*. Nevertheless, we should remember that such iconography was not confined to solely political depictions of mutual agreement and that it had a wider applicability for a Roman audience. The gesture of the clasped hands, in fact, encompassed a wide range of scenarios in artistic depictions, from interstate relations to *hospitium*, and even marital union.\(^{57}\) The use of the *dextrarum iunctio* in funerary art from

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56 On Concordia as a political concept see: Levick 1978; Lobur 2008; Akar 2013; see also Cornwell (forthcoming).

57 For the joining of hands in interstate relations see, for example, Nep. *Them.* 8.4.4: *rex eum data dextra in fidem recipert*; Liv. 1.1.8: *dextra data fidem futurae amicitiae sanxisse*; Liv. 28.35.1: *Numidia cum ipso utique congregi Scipione volebat [Massinissa] atque eius dextra fidem sancire*; Liv. 30.13.8: *tum recordatio hospitii dextraeque datae et foederis publice et privatim iuncti*; Liv. 45.12.6: *tum demum Popilius dextram regi [Antiochus] tamquam socio atque amico porrexit*; see also the wall fresco from a tomb on the Esquiline, depicting the negotiation between Q. Fabius and M. Fannius during the Samnite Wars of the first half of the third century BCE (Musei Capitolini collection inv. 1025). It should be noted that here the two figures are offering their right hands, but have not clasped them. My thanks to Dominik Maschek for drawing my attention to this distinction.


For the joining of hands in marriage see, for example, Ov. *Met.* 14.297: *inde fides dextraeque datae thalamque receptus / coniugii dotem sociorum copora poscit*; Stat. *Silv.* 3.4.53-5: *norat caelestis oculos ducis ipaque taedas / iuxerat et plena dederat conubia dextra*; see Treggari 1991: esp. 164-165 for the artistic significance of the joining of hands in marriage, in contrast to the
the late first BCE onwards indicates that the gesture was frequently used as a shorthand to signify marriage or a married couple. Moreover, the concept of *concordia coniugum* is clearly attested in literary sources from Plautus onwards, notably in his *Amphitryon*, whose plot is in part driven by the *tumultus* between wife and husband. Mercury tells the audience *denique Alcumenam Iuppiter / rediget antiquam coniugi in concordiam* (*Amph.* 474-5: 'Finally, Jupiter will return Alcumena to old concord with her husband'). Cicero certainly attests to the concept that marriage should be based on agreement: *eaes nuptiae plenae dignitatis, plenae concordiae* (*Cluent.* 12) and the epigraphic record indicates that such *concordia*, at least as the ideal, endures: *nota concordia nostra* (*CIL 6.1527 [laudatio Turiae], 2.34*).

None of this is to deny the overt political rhetoric of the *dextrarum iunctio* on the coinage of the Triumviral period. Nevertheless, the range of the gesture and motif in art, applicable as it was to numerous scenarios of pledging faith, indicates that it was a useful artistic tool open to multi-layered applications. The coins of 42 and 39 offer a generic depiction of *concordia* (together with *pax* in 39), albeit it one intimately associated with the individuals of the Triumvirate. I would argue that given the relevance of the establishment of *adfinitas* and *necessitudo*, at the insistence of the troops in the narratives, it is not implausible to seem the symbolic value of marriage permeating the references to *concordia*. Indeed, that Antony made use of Octavia on his eastern coinage would further stress the relevance of such visual indications. Such coinage, along with all coinage minted as a display of Triumviral unity presumably aimed to appeal, in the first instance, to the troops.

*Concordia* had become the possession of a few select individuals, rather than the *civitas*, although the soldiers appear to have been (self-)styled as stake-holders. Most notable is the dedication of a *signum Concordiae*, together with an altar on 12 October 40 BCE at Casinum, in southern Latium, by the

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limited literary testimony, although there is plenty regarding the gesture as a pledge of faith in other circumstances, see n. 48 above for some instances of *data dextra* and *fides*.


59 See also Plaut. *Amph.* 962, 965.

60 *RPC* 1463-1465 (the jugate bare heads of Antony and young Caesar, facing the draped bust of Octavia on the obverse); *RPC* 1468-1469 (head of Antony facing the bust of Octavia on the obverse); *RPC* 1470 (jugate heads of Antony and Octavia); *Syd* 1197 (ivy-crowned bust of Antony on obverse; draped bust of Octavia above a cista, flanked by coiled serpents on the reverse); *Syd* 1198 (conjoined bust of Antony and Octavia on the obverse).
duoviri Marcus Papius and Lucius Matrius.\textsuperscript{61} Coarelli has argued that Casinum was most likely elevated from a \textit{municipium} to \textit{colonia} in the veteran settlements of 41.\textsuperscript{62} Their choice of Concordia suggests the contemporary currency of the term to such a community, which may plausibly be echoed in several of the names of other contemporary veteran settlements such as \textit{Iulia Concordia} at Beneventum, \textit{Concordia Iulia [Felix Augusta]} at Capua, and \textit{Iulia Concordia} at Concordia.\textsuperscript{63} The Triumviral rhetoric of \textit{concordia} appears to have had a resonance with soldiers and veterans, beyond the immediate present of the marriage union, which was proof of the concord itself. It also represented the union of the two armies themselves: \textit{hique pepigerunt fidem confirmatisiam et in una castra conferri signa utrisque exercitus iuserunt} (Liv. Fr. 52 [127] Porphyrio: ‘they fixed upon the most resolute faith and they ordered the standards of both armies to be carried into one camp’).

The numismatic shorthand would in fact come also to indicate the \textit{fides exercituum} during the civil wars of 69 CE.\textsuperscript{64}

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After their final negotiations at Tarentum in 37, there was little cause or need for Antony and young Caesar to re-enter negotiations until Antony’s rejection of his marriage with Octavia, although channels of communication in the form of private letters and public speeches and messages, as well as constant embassies between the two appear to have been maintained (Dio Cass. 5.2.1). The \textit{repudium}, which Antony served Octavia (Liv. Per. 132; Dio Cass. 50.3.2), was an explicit severing of the συγγένεως adfinitias between the two remaining Triumvirs. The rejection of the bonds of \textit{concordia} signified in the marital union of 40 BCE was effectively the termination of the political currency of reconciliation that had shaped much of the Triumviral rhetoric.

\textsuperscript{61} CIL 10.5159.

\textsuperscript{62} Coarelli 2007.

\textsuperscript{63} Keppie 1983: 49-82, esp. 58-69. For allusions to \textit{pax} in relation to a colonial settlement see Forum Iulii as \textit{Colonia Octavonorum Pacensis Classica}: Plin. HN 3.5.34; CIL 12.285 = ILN Fréjus 117; CIL 12.3203 (Forum Iulii Pacatum); Christol 2015. See also \textit{Pax Iulia} in Lusitania.

\textsuperscript{64} RIC Civil Wars 118-122, 126; RIC Vit. 41, 47, 52-54, 67; continued by Vespasian in 71: RIC Vesp. 70-72, 156, 229. The clasped hands together with the caduceus were also associated with \textit{PAX}: RIC Civil Wars 2, 4-7, 10, 22, 31, 34, 103, 113; and with \textit{PAX ET LIBERTAS}: RIC Civil Wars 57-58.
A Framework of Negotiation and Reconciliation

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