When the last remaining servants of the League of Nations (LON), led by Sean Lester, its final Secretary General, arrived at the San Francisco conference in the summer of 1945, belatedly invited by the United States government, they were “given no role and only seats in the last row of the gallery”. Amidst “much evocation of new orders and new worlds”, the main players at the conference scrupulously made “as little mention as possible of the organization that had gone before”.¹ This act of diplomatic theatre symbolized a wider rupture with the past, ensuring that the nascent United Nations (UN) would not be tarnished by association with its purportedly ‘failed’ predecessor. San Francisco, gleaming on the Pacific, was separated by a wide continent and another ocean from war-ravaged Europe, and particularly from the LON’s cavernous, empty headquarters in Geneva: the founding of the UN was meant to be a hinge, pivoting the world into a new era full of promise.²

In certain respects it was - and it did. Differences between the LON and the UN were pronounced from the outset. The UN, and especially its General Assembly, was fundamentally more representative of peoples and nations than had been the ‘League of Empires’, to employ Susan Pedersen’s apt term, and it grew far more so as decolonization, in complex partnership with the Cold War, swelled the ranks of the main parliamentary organ.³ The UN also differed in its lack of certain powers that the LON had enjoyed, most noticeably as a result of the
introduction of the veto-system in the Security Council. But despite these major changes the UN also quietly assimilated – often in ways artfully hidden from the global public’s view - many of the LON’s organizations and experts, building on their work in a range of ‘technical’ (though still eminently political) areas, from healthcare to social and economic development policies, through, for example, the reformed World Health Organization and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).4

Historians have long chronicled the UN’s rise from the ashes of World War II, yielding a spectrum of conclusions from the laudatory and teleological to the critical and disaggregating.5 Across the spectrum, however, many of them have shared a view of the LON as a salutary failure, the indispensable political counterpoint and analytical premise of the UN’s rise, and a failure habitually sketched in a brisk opening panorama peopled with Klemens Von Metternich, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Woodrow Wilson, Aristide Briand and Adolf Hitler, before the author turns to a portrait of the post-1945 dawn.6 Karl Polanyi set an early example of this approach when he wrote that “In vain did Geneva look toward the restoration of such a [balance of power] system in an enlarged and improved Concert of Europe called the League of Nations; in vain were facilities for consultation and joint action provided in the Covenant of the League, for the essential precondition of independent power units was now lacking”.7 Only in the last decade have scholars gone back to the LON, asking not why it failed – and by implication why the UN ‘succeeded’, or might yet succeed - but how the League worked, and what legacies its machinery, its personnel, and its global audience inspired.8

This book advances through the breaches in older historiography engineered by those scholars, as the contributors draw on the new literature’s insights to explore, through a global approach, the overlap between the LON and UN. They do so across the approximate period from the 1920s
to the 1970s, the long moment of the rise of the nation-state as a dominant political form worldwide, while also dropping periodically back into the late nineteenth century, in order to appraise the legacies of the first age of globalization. This is a chronology chosen advisedly and it has significant implications. Ranging from the “Wilsonian Moment” after World War I to the conjuncture of the Helsinki Accords and the twin rise of human rights and neo-liberalism in the 1970s, the chapters tack back and forth across the ‘Year Zero’ of 1945, nuancing the naturalized binaries historians have balanced on that broad-shouldered year: empire versus the nation-state, (anti)-Fascism versus the Cold War, racial-civilizational hierarchy versus developmental-economic hierarchy, and group-based rights claims versus individual rights claims. By doing so we hope to contribute to a wider debate on the periodization of the twentieth century stimulated by the growth of global histories of empire as a political formation, which often end in 1945. We also challenge other chronological patterns, such as Charles S. Maier’s influential analysis of the two post war moments of 1918 and 1945 in terms of embedded liberalism, a paradigm still influential in international history and international relations (IR).

Indeed, in the neighboring discipline of IR we hope more generally to enrich and refigure the ways in which constructivist, post-structuralist, critical and historically minded IR scholars conceive of international institutions, by providing a bridge to the new international history, one supported by a solid span of case studies. We hope thereby to foster a more sustained and mutually beneficial exchange between the fields. IR scholars of varied theoretical allegiance, from Robert Cox, Martha Finnemore, John Ikenberry, and Thomas Weiss, have long analyzed the ways in which institutions contribute to the construction of international norms and global orders, while debate on the nature of international organizations has regularly divided such noted structural realists as John J. Mearsheimer from such broadly liberal internationalists as Anne-
Marie Slaughter. Exponents of more global approaches to IR, meanwhile, have increasingly deployed historical approaches to focus on bloc politics, smaller states and civil society actors, and, as in the case of Amitav Acharya for example, have emphasized the importance of non-Western theories and regional specificities. The essays below will nourish such approaches, helping to expand and historicize views of the LON and the UN and the ways they shaped the international order. In doing so they bring into focus not just how institutions changed but also how international practices relating to the end of empire, nation-building in the postcolonial world and the creation of rights regimes evolved. As part of this process, many of the chapters draw out specific visions of how institutions worked as negotiated platforms, forums for debate and in some cases, agents themselves. Nathan Kurz’s incisive study of petitioning, for example, offers a new interpretation of the international legal system at mid-century ‘from below’ by positioning the LON and UN athwart locally specific yet internationally resonant strands of political reason.

We thereby invite constructivist IR scholars towards still more granular historicizing of how institutions work and how they effected and continue to effect change in both state policies and broader cultures of the ‘international’. Far from setting the varying schools of thought against each other, we encourage engagement with critical and positivist IR theory alike in deliberating on the dynamic role that these organizations have played in shaping internationalisms across time. It is argued in many of the chapters below that internationalism was far more than the product of what global institutions like the UN or LON did centrally, or how they funneled or shaped the sovereign power of empires and nation-states. Rather, internationalism in this volume includes regional cooperation, non-state activism, the rise of international civil society and the global dialogue between local actors and the international visions of the elites. As the case
studies show, all this sustained an array of different types and forms of internationalism, and thus offers plentiful resources to IR scholars who have long moved past static categories of analysis such as ‘development’ and ‘modernity’. In undercutting the telos of such logics, the book opens up, in George Lawson’s terms, different “context[s] and narrative[s]” of internationalism, but it also sharpens and refreshes modes of enquiry based on the social scientific staples of “eventfulness and ideal-typification”.

Across the watershed of 1945 then, the chapters examine the interconnected evolution of internationalist ideas, institutions and practices between the LON and UN, encompassing empirical fields from political strategy to economic development, from international law to practices of rights, and from humanitarianism to the changing forms of empire. Changes in internationalist thought and technocracy are thereby placed into dialogue with practices that connected Geneva with many parts of the world, such as the re-constitution of political identity in the Middle East or the imperial use of forced labor. As a whole, we show how the LON and UN both shaped and were shaped by global internationalism, in the rich variety of its protagonists and the grinding tectonics of its norms.

Crucially, the book takes this approach not just from the habitual ‘centers’ of League and UN politics, the fetishized lieux de mémoire of Geneva, New York or Bretton Woods, where the clacking of secretariat typewriters echoed against the carved wheat sheaves of prosperity foretold, but from a global perspective. We do not neglect the importance of the politicians and diplomats who strode the stage in the Palais des Nations or at the UN Headquarters in Manhattan, or ignore the administrative and technocratic bureaucracies that operated the scenery and drafted the scripts. But our central argument is that although the LON and UN shaped
internationalism from the center, as political proscenia, technocratic clearing houses and vehicles for world ordering, they were just as powerfully molded by internationalisms that welled up globally, far beyond the main stages of Geneva and New York City. As such, the history of internationalism at the LON and UN must be grasped as much in Japan and Argentina, for example, as in Geneva and Manhattan. Indeed, as historians including Meredith Terretta and José Antonio Sánchez Román argue, the prisons of West Africa or the banks of the Amazon and Tigris were places just as ‘international’, and quite as constitutive of ‘internationalism’, as the smoke-filled committee rooms and champagne-oiled assemblies overlooking Lac Leman or the East River.

To give an example, Nova Robinson’s chapter in this book, on international women’s rights from 1920-1953, opens at a typical League event – a pre-Assembly reception in Geneva that included a keynote by Maria Vérone, a leading French advocate of women’s rights, and that likely also featured the popping of champagne corks, the massed “artillery of the League of Nations”. But crucially, Robinson also weaves into her account the campaigns of the General Oriental Feminist Alliance, a regional Arab women’s organization based in Syria, and appraises the January 1931 gathering, in Lahore, of the All Asian Women’s Conference. By bringing the delegates at Lahore into analytical conversation with the delegates who saw Vérone at her Swiss podium, Robinson is able to show how the internationalist “spirit of Geneva” was partly made in the Punjab. In doing so she also warns international historians against reproducing, in the balance of their research, those hierarchies and exclusions that structured the cast and made the stars of the cacophonous, long-running performances in Geneva and New York City. Likewise, Konrad Lawson’s study of the visions for world federalism conjured in the ruins of defeat by Japanese politician-writers Ozaki Yukio and Kagawa Toyohiko shows how the global re-ordering that
took place after 1945 must be grasped not just at San Francisco or Bretton Woods, but also in how the discussions and disappointments of those epochal meetings opened up national and regional spaces, in which the tortured transformation of older ideas unfolded for use in a new, postwar society.

As the geographical and archival diversity of these examples suggests, the strength of a collective volume lies in its ability to “allow various specialists to enter into a broader dialogue while addressing specific, common themes”. Methodologically, meanwhile, the scope of a collective analysis allows for a blend of the insights of de-centered ethnography, lately exemplified by Lori Allen’s recent work on human rights practices in Palestine, with wide-angled views on the spatially expansive cultures of internationalism, as in the work of Anne-Isabelle Richard, Helen McCarthy and Glenda Sluga on the associative infrastructure of the League, and finally with political studies of the dynamics in play on the central stages of Geneva and Manhattan.

As a whole, the chapters that follow construct a multi-scalar, dialogical, and fine-grained historical analysis of the role of international organizations as they shaped and were shaped by political internationalism across the twentieth century. Together they present an exceptionally wide, though far from complete, ensemble of actors, across social hierarchies and racialized geographies, and show how the interactions of those actors tested the limits of the LON and UN as international institutions, and developed internationalism as a variegated practice around the world.

For international historians and students of international relations the consequences of this argument are significant, since they mandate a critical re-engagement with area studies, global history and social history, and with a variety of sources far beyond the holdings of the
international organizations themselves. For if the appeal of the LON and UN archives has
consisted in their apparent convocation of the world’s opinions and petitions under one roof, and
perhaps in their translation of that polyglot clamor into English and French, the idea that the
overlapping internationalism of the two organizations welled up at the margins quite as much as
it was made at the center challenges the epistemological hegemony of those documents.24 As
Terretta has aptly noted of the new wave of human rights histories - in a manner applicable to the
wider historiography on internationalism and international institutions - they have generally
excluded “the narrative accounts of grassroots activists in favor of official state documents, UN
resolutions, or the letters, speeches, and writings of elected office-holders, UN representatives,
and colonial administrators … But how far can we go in examining human rights and
decolonization in the Afro-Asian bloc without contextualizing the particular settings in which
human rights discourses were invoked?”25 Meeting this challenge will require international
historians to travel further, learn more languages, and above all collaborate more systematically
in order to capture the meanings and practices of internationalism at the LON and the UN.26 This
volume takes a step in that direction.

II
Efforts to institutionalize the management of the world order have a history as old as the exercise
of imperial power, and the narrower process of institutionalization has frequently been
accompanied by the attempts of legislators, national states and varyingly mediated global publics
to systematize and contest the wider objectives and meaning of internationalism as a social and
cultural force field.27 From the Magna Carta to the Diet of Worms, and from the Hague
Conventions on International Law of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the geopolitical
clearing houses built at the Congresses of Vienna and Berlin, collective strategies to create and
govern a system of international relations, and to develop legally binding agreements in order to
realize a specific vision of world order, have underpinned they system that we now refer to as
global governance. In the litany of institutions that have shaped international relations and their
interpenetrated norms and cultures, however, the LON and the UN are distinguished, as Sluga
has lately noted, by their emergence within global wars of unprecedented scale and
destructiveness. The League slowly took shape in the years around 1920, following the defeat
of the Central Powers in World War I, while the United Nations came into being, as we saw
above, during the post-World War II moment around 1945, an extension of the alliance that had
defeated the Axis Powers. But while both institutions were forged during wartime, each
developed distinct visions for how to manage peacetime relations, facilitate social progress and
resolve international security dilemmas, due in part to the wider context and deeper roots of their
respective eras. Nathan Kurz’s contribution to this volume, for example, on Jewish NGOs in the
late 1940s, shows how numerous protagonists at the UN, many of whom had worked for or in
contact with the LON, set out to create, interpret, and disseminate various accounts of the League
so as to justify specific policies after 1945. We must therefore acknowledge both of the
institutions as distinct regimes of global governance, specific centers of their respective
internationalist force fields, the character of which is open to exegetical interpretation by
historians. But we must also see the LON and UN as a single, interpenetrated, and temporally
layered whole, whose empirical global history is indispensable to that work of exegesis, and is
only now being written.

Based on the famous ‘Fourteen Points’ outlined in January 1918 by the American President
Woodrow Wilson, the League of Nations came into being as an instrument with which to manage international security crises, and crucially, to keep the power of Germany and other aggressor states in check following World War I. Wilson presented his ‘Fourteen Points’ as a series of edicts about how the imperial world system would be reformed, and how relations between states would henceforth be managed; its often vague premises were elaborated, mitigated and reworked at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The Covenant of the League was its governing charter and statement of purpose, and was drawn up by Wilson and his advisors in contentious collaboration with the victorious allied powers, dominated by Great Britain and France. It was an effort to realize many of the Wilsonian principles, setting out policies supposed to prevent another world war. The Covenant therefore proposed a series of security measures, including disarmament and the use of arbitration to settle international disputes. It also contained a list of treaties on a variety of related technical and social issues, from drug and human trafficking to global health initiatives and labor conditions, and two geopolitical management systems that acted to “adjudicate relations of sovereignty”: protection of minorities, mainly in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and administration of former subjects of the Central Powers in the Mandated territories, scattered through the Middle East, Africa and the Pacific.31

The LON’s birth in the mirrored delivery room of Versailles meant that it was dominated by the victors: of its fifty or so member states, Germany joined only in 1926 and left again seven years later, the USA never joined at all, and the Soviet Union joined only in 1934. Despite this, the League was never simply a tool of Britain and France. Having survived being abandoned by the USA, it became an ungovernable theatre for international publicity and norm making in the 1920s, and increasingly a factory of influential technocratic knowledge production in the 1930s - as in the case of the economic and financial activities lately documented by Patricia Clavin.32
Overall, as Susan Pedersen has convincingly argued, what was most important about the League was its role as a public platform, managed by an international bureaucracy of technicians and experts, on which individuals, international organizations, and nations-in-the-making could air their views and petitions, and find an audience.

Turning to the UN, as preparations began in earnest for a new international organization even before World War II concluded, policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic were keen – as noted above – to avoid any association with the tarnished image of the LON. The United Nations was received in San Francisco with fanfare from the war-weary international public, and was greeted especially enthusiastically in the Global South, where it appeared as a means to unravel the imperial system. From its inception therefore, the new organization did not just protect the interests of the Western powers, but again became an important platform and a mechanism through which the international visions of other actors were amplified and heard. Advocates for decolonization, civil rights activists and a range of other groups objecting to imperial practices, such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), led by American sociologist and activist W.E.B Du Bois, seized upon the organization as a means by which to pursue his agenda for civil rights. The San Francisco planners’ announcement of a new era of universal ideals was music to the ears of the beleaguered societies still living under imperial or mandated rule, to the nationalist aspirations of their future leaders under the colonial yoke, but also to the nascent anti-colonial movement which would radically impact the UN in the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, the truly representative structure of the new organization was lauded as a platform for discourses about rights, the universalizing of human rights and the deconstruction of the racialist, traditional, liberal international order.

As the organization developed through the 1950s and 1960s it was particularly shaped by the
visions and ambitions of anti-colonial actors who sought to implement and realize the principles enshrined in the Charter by creating, through the UN, mechanisms, tools and policies designed to end empire and imperialism through formal means. The success of the decolonization process managed and supervised by the UN can thus be partly attributed to the role of newly-independent states lobbying in the chambers of the Security Council and the General Assembly for a shift in norms of imperial politics, and to their invigoration of the potential of the Charter.33 At the same time during these years, the visionary Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld adopted an interventionist approach to international politics, empowering his office with the support of the anti-colonial lobby and driving the anti-colonial agenda forward.34 In the process, he helped to activate the agency of the UN, positioning it as a peacekeeping organization, a neutral arbiter between states and as a monitor of peace settlements from the Suez Canal in 1956 to the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963.

Building on these achievements, through the 1970s and the 1980s the UN developed as much more than a “Parliament of Man” paralyzed by Cold War politics. From asserting the rights of states to control their natural resources, to efforts to reshape the international economic order, through to the development of a myriad of human rights and the expansion of forms and expressions of developmental practice through the 1970s and the 1980s, internationalism became increasingly variegated and diversified - and yet more visible than ever.35 The end of the Cold War and the resurgence of interest in the UN as a means of managing international conflicts led to the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s in Bosnia, Rwanda and Kosovo. Out of these experiences, both positive and negative, emerged the doctrine of ‘Responsibility to Protect’, which continues to define how the international community approaches questions of intervention, protection of citizens and conflict resolution. The UN remains at the center of a
wide array of debates on how to manage international relations, development, humanitarianism, social and economic equality, environmental problems and international security dilemmas among other areas of global governance.

In sum, both the League and the United Nations operated not as unified actors, but rather as ‘platforms’ for both formalizing and splintering political ideas and international norms, and as laboratories and toolkits of legal and technical procedures, which as Natasha Wheatley has lately shown in the case of Palestinian petitioners to the LON, could then be used to generate new spectrums of negotiation and dissidence with which to return to the fray on the ‘platforms’ of Geneva and New York.36

III

How did the LON and the UN effect change - and in relation to which forms of global internationalism - during the shift from a world of empires to one of nation-states?

In the first section below, both institutions are viewed as a platform for interaction between states, and as an arena in which international norms were reified and reconstituted through the increasingly representative constituency in the varied LON and UN bodies and the global networks with which those bodies connected. In this way, both institutions served to collate and codify nascent normative practices, for instance around various rights claims, into recognized international norms, or in some cases into international law. This is particularly evident in these chapters, which examine the evolution of ideas and principles such as human rights, as discussed by Andrew Arsan, and economic sovereignty, as discussed by José Antonio Sánchez Román, Mats Ingulstad and Lucas Lixinski. Arsan contextualizes the role of Charles Malik, in numerous...
accounts as a figure of the UN ‘center’ *par excellence*, which carve him out alongside the likes of René Cassin as a founding father of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. While acknowledging Malik’s role in the committees of the early UN, Arsan shows how his allegiance to Heideggerian thought and his long steeping in the traditions of Lebanese national particularism means we must see neither Malik, nor the ideas of human rights he helped elaborate, as examples of ‘conventional’ post-1945 internationalism, even to the degree postulated in the revisionist accounts, such as Samuel Moyn’s, that have lately downplayed the salience of human rights in the 1940s. Instead, Arsan argues we must recognize the irreconcilably tangled multiplicity that informed Malik’s critique of the sovereign nation state as the basis of internationalism, and thereby come to terms with the powerful global and interwar influences on the elaboration of the UN human rights regime.

José Antonio Sánchez Román, meanwhile, focusing on ideas of economic sovereignty, outlines the emergence, well before the fabled era of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in the 1940s, of a “new, unevenly and intermittently unified global periphery”, including Brazil, Romania and Iran, in the LON’s technical economic meetings of the 1920s. By focusing on the politics of fluvial trade, shipping, and the international taxation of imperial big business in the 1920s, Román shows how practices of economic sovereignty crystallized in Geneva, Brussels and Barcelona in part through the creation of new connections between, for example, Brazil, Iran and British Mandate Iraq on river navigation, or between Argentina and South Africa on monetary policy. Drawing on several Argentinean and Brazilian archives, and marrying business history with global intellectual history to remarkable effect, Román also shows how Latin American jurists, such as the Venezuelan Federico Álvarez Feo, fought against the recycling at the League of nineteenth century imperial legal practices of
extraterritoriality, and against influential business lobbies’ use of a liberal economic vulgate to camouflage monopoly power. As Feo proclaimed, arguing that the LON committee for double taxation should investigate foreign utility companies gouging citizens of Latin American states: “the law of supply and demand does not work in many South American countries.” Feo’s assertion, Román demonstrates, was an early instance of the wider Latin American attempt to refuse the concept of ‘backwardness’ between roughly 1920 and 1980, and to work through the LON and UN to reshape economic sovereignty accordingly.

The illumination provided by a ‘de-centered’ Latin American perspective on the international order recurs in Mats Ingulstad’s and Lucas Lixinski’s chapter on Pan-Americanism at the LON and UN. They show how the international politics of empire and decolonization, as they emerged in Geneva and subsequently in New York, were powerfully affected not just by the European empires’ self-preservation instincts, as influentially described by Mark Mazower, but by forms of regional and hemispheric internationalism with roots in the nineteenth century. Latin-American states’ experience with the Monroe Doctrine, which underpinned the hegemony of the United States in the Western Hemisphere, informed their approach to both the LON Covenant and the UN Charter: Article 51 and Chapter VIII (on regional arrangements) of the latter were particularly influenced by Latin American perspectives. As Jesús-María Yepes, the Colombian jurist and successively a delegate to the LON Assembly, the wartime Pan-American conferences and the 1945 San Francisco conference put it: “the Republics of the New World, whose spirit of international collaboration is well known, did not want to abandon a regional system that was well organized and had proved its mettle, in favor of another, universalist system whose efficiency had not yet been proven ... the Charter of the United Nations therefore implies no derogation to the Pan-American system.” Consequently, on issues such as dispute arbitration
and non-intervention, Latin Americans toggled ceaselessly, generally by means of international
law and lawyers, between the successive regional and global scales of internationalism on offer,
in the pursuit of a more resilient mode of national sovereignty.

By tracing the evolution of these concepts of human rights, economic and national sovereignty
therefore, the first three chapters characterize the League and the UN as networked political
forges, where ideas were catalyzed, modified and legitimized.

In the second section, three chapters show how the secretariats of the LON and UN worked in
combination with a proliferating batch of sub-agencies and a closely orbiting set of philanthropic
foundations and non-governmental associations to develop expertise in a range of different fields
of global governance. Here too, the simultaneously distinct and interlinked character of the LON
and UN comes to the fore. Nathan Kurz’s chapter on individual petitioning at the LON and UN
shows how the two petition regimes’ legal vocabulary, and the procedures devised as part of the
respective processes, made it possible for individuals to test the legitimacy of the international
order and spur grassroots activism. Shifting between the interwar politics of the 1933 Bernheim
Petition to the LON, made in defense of Central European minority rights threatened by Nazism,
and the later activities of Jewish NGOs lobbying the UN in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Kurz
dissects the complex interrelationship between the two institutions, which cannot be as easily
decoupled as some recent literature has suggested. Drawing on innovative sources including
television talk shows, and concentrating on the practical and social legal politics of rights rather
than simply on the intellectual politics of abstract categories in the thought of major theorists, he
shows how petitioning allowed local experience to be crafted into international knowledge, and
how post-1945 Jewish activists reconstructed the Bernheim Petition in the service of their goal to universalize minority rights.

Florian Hannig’s chapter takes up another sphere of activity at the other end of our chronological range, as he shows how the UN’s permanent and expansive role in the system of humanitarian aid expertise had its origins in UN planners’ interpretation of the LON’s record, but fully crystallized only in the 1970s. De-centering the history of international humanitarianism, Hannig positions the East Pakistan/Bangladesh crisis of 1971 as the moment at which the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) definitively came to the fore, coordinating some ten million refugees through a hugely expanded budget and also contributing to the establishment of the United Nations Disaster Relief Fund and the development of the World Food Programme (WFP). Hannig identifies three broad phases that led to this moment. First came the years from 1943-1951, when deliberately temporary UN expedients, responding to the LON’s perceived track record, sought to alleviate post-World War Two suffering, largely in Europe. Second was the period 1949-1970, the era of the high Cold War and of national sovereignty-focused decolonization, when ad-hoc agencies with a limited mandate responded to specific crises such as the Agadir earthquake of 1960 in Morocco, or the displacement occasioned by the close of the Algerian War of Independence in 1962, while the permanent UN agencies concentrated on economic development. Finally, Hannig analyzes the period since 1971, as the UN created a durable, global humanitarian relief regime. His chapter illuminates how the 1930s and 1970s were both decades of growing technocracy at the LON and UN respectively, and also how both decades saw waves of new geopolitical multipolarity that pushed states, including the USA, to re-envisage their relationship to international organizations. Against this backdrop Hannig emphasizes how in the post-Biafra climate of public opinion, and thanks to contingencies
including Pakistan’s exclusion of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UNHCR stepped into the breach in 1971, part of the wider rise of human rights politics in that decade.44

Finally, Nova Robinson’s chapter on the Liaison Committee of International Women’s Organizations (LCIWO) and the Origins of an International Women’s Convention similarly explores the role of the LON and UN in developing expertise, this time in the service of women’s rights, and again shows how the two institutions also helped to produce exclusions even within campaigns for legal equality. As representative to the LON and UN for a long list of national women’s rights organizations, the LCIWO created a repertoire of publicity tactics and juridical arguments in seeking to make the international sphere deliver formal legal equality for women around the world, as the culmination of decades of struggle. Based on expert studies, and pushing to expand the often male-dominated definition of legitimate expertise, activists felt an international treaty could then be used to pressure recalcitrant national governments to enforce rules on equality between the sexes in a range of areas. But the largely North Atlantic and middle class membership of the LCIWO – the same women who have generally been the subject of scholarship on this question to date - substantially excluded the concerns and demands of women in the colonial world.45 Far from accepting this marginalization, such women organized and fought to make their own claims heard and to place their own representatives, such as the Ottoman and then Lebanese women’s activist Nour Hamada (1897-1963), at the heart of the debate. As Robinson shows in her path breaking work, the women of the colonized world must be brought fully into this history, not least because the patterns of exclusion and inclusion established at their expense at the LON would strongly influence precisely who participated in the post-1945 international debate on women’s rights at the UN, right through to the 1970s.
Overall, this section shows how the members of the adjunct agencies and central secretariats of each institution, in dialogue with a wide range of non-governmental groups and social movements welling up around the world, helped to bring key issues to the attention of international society. More than that, it shows how numerous internationalist actors worked to make the LON and UN sites for the production of expertise that would bring about change, and thereby produced policies that continue to have important legacies for international approaches to such questions today.

In its third section, the book takes a wide-angled view of how the LON and the UN acted in different ways as crucibles for change in world order, and shows how shifts in the balance of international relations related to changing forms of internationalism. To do so the chapters deploy local and imperial frames of analysis to identify crucial wider contexts and establish the ways in which the LON and UN were shaped or disaggregated by those contexts. Sarah Shields’ study of what she calls ‘consociational politics’ starts from two local cases: the Sanjak (district) of Alexandretta/Iskenderun, in the north of French Mandate Syria, and the earlier case of the city of Mosul, in British Mandate Iraq. Through a close analysis of the way the LON mediated the Turkish-French dispute over Alexandretta in 1936 and the Turkish-British conflict over Mosul in 1925, Shields shows how the Wilsonian logic of sovereignty, based on popular consent, led to an essentialist - and essentializing - quest to categorize individuals as part of religious ‘communities’, whether majority or minority. Since the political balance of representation in Alexandretta and Mosul, and consequently the territorial fate of the two regions, was to be indexed to the size of each ‘community’, voter registration processes became an over-stoked furnace in which political identities and constitutional facts were forged in a
frantic atmosphere of ultra-instrumentalized historical and sociological claim-making. Shields shows how despite the fact that individual LON missions to Mosul returned with much changed assumptions about the possibility of even allocating ‘communal identity’, let alone basing political preferences on it, governments in Ankara, Damascus and Beirut all bought into the notion that the identity of the governed would determine their politics, and used the premise to build irredentist campaigns at the LON. Shields then expands her argument into the UN era, examining the subsequent trajectory of consociationalism as a paradigm in post-1945 political science and assessing the ways in which the UN staged the distillation and distribution of this paradigm into the constitutional arrangements of newly independent and developing countries. She closes with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in 2003, and the body blow dealt to the Iraqi nation state in the aftermath by the American imposition of a consociational set of political arrangements based on hazy assumptions about the meaning of religious community.

Konrad Lawson’s chapter takes up another context of global re-ordering against a backdrop of US military offensive, this time in East Asia at the time of the UN’s birth. Lawson recovers the surge of creative transnational idealism that characterized the 1940s – the “apogee of internationalism” according to Sluga – and the calls for various forms of world federalism prompted both by the experience of World War II and the introduction of atomic weaponry and also by interwar ideas for regional and world organization in Japan, which reached a climax with the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere announced in 1940. Lawson delivers a close reading of the way two key figures in Japanese politics - Ozaki Yukio and Kagawa Toyohiko – responded to the context of defeat and the potential of global internationalism in its aftermath. As Lawson notes, across issues from language and education reform to the applicability of the historical pattern of Japanese national integration to the creation of a world government, as
“founding president of the League for the Establishment of a World Federation (Sekai renpō kensetsu dōmei, predecessor to the World Federation movement in Japan today) and a leading representative of an embattled strain of prewar liberal politics, Ozaki Yukio provided the Japanese world federalist movement with a grandfather-like leader”. Simultaneously, the more famous Kagawa Toyohiko, a Christian evangelist, cooperativist and social activist, despite his equivocal wartime support for the Japanese expansion into Asia, pivoted in 1945 to describe the San Francisco conference of that year as merely the first step in the creation of a genuine ‘world state’ (sekai kokka). By showing how both thinkers drew on decades of intellectual and political experimentation in Japan to critique the LON and UN as merely the first step to a fuller world federation, Lawson portrays how the two institutions acted as a catalyst for dynamics far from Geneva and New York City: catalysts that also had powerful pre-war, regional and national roots.

Finally, in a chapter spanning the years 1919-1962, Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and José Pedro Monteiro cap the book by appraising the impact of the LON and UN on another imperial formation, the Portuguese Empire in Africa, and specifically on the politics of forced labor. Forced labor was an elemental aspect of the politics of colonial social hierarchy in colonies such as Angola and Mozambique, and also indispensable to the century-long series of projects to revivify Portuguese Empire through the creation of ‘new Brazils in Africa’. In a trio of case studies – after World War I and World War II and finally in 1957-1962, closing with the abolition of the dual labor regime – the authors explore ways in which engagement with the LON and UN, and with transnational modes of publicity and NGOs, forced the Portuguese Empire to rethink and internally scrutinize its policies on forced labor, even as it became an imperial and metropolitan political outlier in the UN era, when newly independent countries such as Ghana
quickly became key antagonists for Lisbon at the UN by using the legal tools furnished by the International Labor Organization (ILO).

Ultimately this book offers a multifaceted and global perspective on internationalism, explicitly connecting the LON and UN while simultaneously outlining their differences, and emphasizing the influence of movements and powers that welled up around the world, far from Geneva and New York yet in dialogue with those main stages. In doing so it reveals the inescapable complexity and diversity of internationalisms, from the visions of Charles Malik to the revolutionary visions of Nour, Hamada and from the Portuguese colonial administration wrestling with the Ghanaian government at the ILO to the efforts of Latin American states to bring their influence to bear on the international order. Striking a balance between national policies, institutional standards and practices of internationalism, each of the chapters tracks its question and actors across a range of levels of interaction. We hope that by outlining a more global approach to twentieth century internationalism – encompassing forces that welled up in South and East Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe as well as the North Atlantic West – and by treating its two central institutions as a conjoined entity, we will encourage further research along these lines. Such research will mingle international institutional perspectives with a serious engagement with local histories, national views and regional ideas about world order, based on archives and secondary historiographies in a wider variety of languages. By showing how the League and the UN were shaped by movements welling up from the outside, the two institutions emerge as networked platforms, effective instruments and sometimes agents through which the contested nature of internationalism, in a variety of shapes and sizes, evolved across the twentieth century.


19 We thank Meredith Terretta for making this point to us. See Meredith Terretta, “‘We Had Been Fooled into Thinking that the UN Watches over the Entire World’: Human Rights, UN Trust Territories, and Africa's Decolonization,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 34, (2012): 329-360 and the chapter from José Antonio Sánchez Román in this volume.


22 James and Leake (eds.), *Decolonization and the Cold War*, 5.

23 Lori Allen, *The Rise and Fall of Human Rights: Cynicism and Politics in Occupied Palestine* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013); Anne-Isabelle Richard, “Competition and Complementarity: Civil Society Networks and the Question of Decentralizing the League of

Although certainly the League of Nations struggled and often failed to translate petitions sent to it in Arabic and Armenian, partly out of suspicion of those translators available in Geneva.

Terretta, “‘We Had Been Fooled”, 331.

See also on this issue Keith David Watenpaugh, Bread from Stones: The Middle East and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015).

For the notion of a force field see Pedersen, The Guardians, 5.


We are grateful for Susan Pedersen’s comments on these analytical axes.


32 Clavin, *Securing the World Economy*.


36 Natasha Wheatley, “Mandatory Interpretation: Legal Hermeneutics and the New International Order in Arab and Jewish Petitions to the League of Nations,” *Past and Present* 227 (2015), 205. See for a later and related approach to the Palestinian cause at the UN, Paul Thomas Chamberlin,


