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The bifurcation of the two worlds: assessing the gap between
internationals and locals in state-building processes

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The Bifurcation of the Two Worlds: Assessing the Gap Between Internationals and Locals in State-Building Processes

***Abstract:** More and more studies highlight the limits of state-building conducted 'from the top-down'. Building on the literature on the subject and using a Rosenauian concept in a novel way, this article posits that international interventions tend to create a 'bifurcation of the two worlds'. Departing from a study of Kosovo and Timor-Leste, the article posits that the massive arrival of staff involved in international governance will create a social gap between the international and the local 'worlds', which will in turn fuel local resistance as this gap will become target of narratives of resistance by certain local actors. This bifurcation is exemplified by the 'white car syndrome', a concept representing the horde of white UN vehicles accompanying major interventions and developed in this contribution. Thus, this article attempts to shed a new light on the legitimacy crises that Kosovo and Timor-Leste experienced at the beginning of the current century, while increasing the linkages between development studies and peace studies.*

Introduction

There is an emerging trend in the literature on state-building that identifies the significant limits of state-building when unrelated to the needs and perceptions of the local society targeted by the intervention. External actors necessarily affect the socio-political processes of the target state. It is not the case that nation-building implies interference while state-building focused on institutions does not; no matter how one defines the terms, an international intervention necessarily implies a degree of interference. In that regard and as I have argued elsewhere, the common cliché saying that it is possible to undertake state-building activities without embarking in nation-building appears misguided.ⁱ In that context, as Chiuyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur have highlighted in their work, international interventions do not generate only positive and beneficial outcomes – they can have negative consequences, even if most of the time unintended.ⁱⁱ This new research direction in the study of international interventions is also

reflected by the burgeoning literature on the critique of liberal peaceⁱⁱⁱ and by new trends in the study of humanitarianism.^{iv}

Various studies have highlighted the limits of top-down approaches, especially in the context of Kosovo^v and Timor-Leste.^{vi} This present contribution will build from this existing work and contribute to the understanding of the legitimacy gap between international interveners on the one hand and segments of local population and local actors on the other. The massive arrival of staff involved in international governance will create a social gap between the international and the local ‘worlds’, which will in turn fuel local resistance as this gap will become target of narratives of resistance by certain local actors. This article posits that we could understand and use one of James Rosenau’s seminal contributions – the bifurcation of the two worlds – in a novel way in the context of international interventions. Building on the literature of the subject, one could argue that direct governance of war-torn territories is hardly compatible with the objective of fostering and nurturing legitimacy in an externally-led state-building project. In that regard, the ‘political’ and ‘social’ worlds seem far apart – the political response, namely direct governance, seems unfit to adequately address the social challenges of postwar state-building. However, more than just an academic metaphor, the ‘bifurcation of the two worlds’ can be understood as a practical assessment of the situation in Kosovo and Timor-Leste. The difference in the living standards between the ‘internationals’ and the ‘locals’, as well as the ‘white car syndrome’, a concept developed in this contribution, will come to exemplify concretely the exogenous character of the international missions. As observed and analysed under the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo

(UNMIK; from 1999) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET; 1999-2002), local actors will tap into the discontent to mobilize sections of the local population against the United Nations, in a scenario that appeared unlikely back in 1999 when the UN benefited from high levels of local support in Kosovo or in Timor-Leste.

This article takes the stance that perception is in itself a major factor of legitimacy and legitimization. As Ian Hurd states, ‘legitimacy refers to the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed. It is a subjective quality, relational between actor and institution, and defined by the actor’s perception of the institution’.^{vii} The limits of top-down state-building interventions in terms of building legitimacy on the ground has already been analyzed by many scholars. However, departing from Hurd’s definition of legitimacy, this article explores the narratives of resistance to the international interventions in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, hinting at the paradox of statebuilders being deliberately and firmly isolated yet highly visible at the same time. In that regard, one has to agree with Orford that most internationalist accounts of post-conflict reconstruction too often serve to obscure the power relations that intervention produces, and the exploitation that it enables, hereby silencing these voices of contestation.^{viii} This contribution furthers this research agenda by providing a specific analysis of the local resistance experienced in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, while building bridges with other case studies such as Afghanistan, Cambodia or Namibia.

The ‘more is better’ approach and its implications

There is a general consensus, in both policy and academia, that reconstruction of the sovereign state is necessary and that state collapse necessitates external assistance in a transitional period. In the exception, one could find a certain number of academics who defend the idea that societies experiencing major crises should be allowed a ‘fresh start’. For instance, Andreas Mehler and Claude Ribaux state that ‘the collapse of states in crisis need not be prevented, since a ‘better state’ cannot emerge until that collapse has taken place.’ Similarly, for Samuel Eisenstadt, ‘collapse, far from being an anomaly, both in the real world and in social evolutionary theory, presents in dramatic form not the end of social institutions, but almost always the beginning of new ones.’ Timothy Raeymaekers also argues that “we should start thinking hard about the possibility that state collapse presents a plausible, and perhaps even likely, outcome for some states in the system.”^{ix} However, the opinion of William Zartman is more reflective of the current consensus on state-building issues: ‘it is necessary to provide a large, informally representative forum, and if the contenders for power do not do so, an external force to guarantee security and free expression during the legitimization process may be required. [...] In all three areas – power, participation, and resources – it is hard to get around the usefulness, if not the outright need, of external assistance’.^x The exact nature of this external assistance is nevertheless widely debated.

A certain trend has been emerging in the 1990s, leading to a prescription that ‘more is better’ in terms of state-building, where ‘the more intrusive the intervention, the more successful the outcome’.^{xi} It is an assessment supported generally by a military perspective of state-building issues. For instance, Zachary Selden of the US Army

College writes that ‘in short, more is better; this equation underscores the need to have reserves of deployable personnel capable of spanning the spectrum between “hard” and “soft” capabilities’.^{xii} The ‘more is better’ perspective also echoes the Powell or Weinberger doctrine, which states that every resource and tool should be used to achieve decisive force against the enemy, minimizing US casualties and ending the conflict quickly by forcing the weaker force to capitulate. It also presents interesting parallels with the Clausewitzian logic, for which war is an act of force, the application of which knows no logical limit by virtue of its escalatory dynamics.

One of the best examples of the ‘more is better’ framework is the widely-quoted RAND study on US-led state-building operations, directed by James Dobbins et al.. The study identifies five case studies (Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan), and contrasts these with the historic cases of Germany and Japan, that have according to them ‘set a standard for post-conflict nation-building that has not since been equalled’. Their conclusion is that a high level of economic assistance and high numbers of troops deployed for a long time were crucial for the success of the two historic operations and can explain why recent operations showed little success: ‘the higher level of input accounts in significant measure for the higher level of output measured in the development of democratic institutions and economic growth’.^{xiii} Needless to say, the authors do not seem to acknowledge the sharp contextual differences existing between the cases, varying across nearly fifty years and taking place in substantially different international context. Actually, it seems to be the case with various studies taking Japan and Germany as a yardstick to compare other state-building ventures. According to Jan-

Werner Müller, ‘analogical reasoning is likely to have poor results for reasons rooted in cognitive psychology’. Analogies reduce the complexity of the situation at-hand for a decision-maker and analogies also serve to create a sense of ‘instant legitimacy’ for the policy prescriptions advocated. Yuen Foong Khong concurs, arguing that American policy-makers all too often rely on faulty, simplified historical analogies to justify commonalities that simply do not exist.^{xiv}

Moreover, the most recent study made by Dobbins et al., this time on UN’s role in nation-building and meant to complement their previous study, goes along the same lines. While the authors recognize that the UN has shown, *mutatis mutandis*, better results with a ‘light-footprint’ approach, they wrote that ‘the United States would be well advised to leave the small footprint, low profile approach to the United Nations, and resume supersizing its nation-building missions’. This prescription echoes Steven Ratner’s remarks, when he said that ‘interveners ought to err on the side of more rather than less even though the empirical evidence to date does not obviously support a more is better perspective’.^{xv}

Assessing specific turbulences to statebuilding

As this article previously stated, the nature of external interventions, be they more or less massive in human or economic terms, will invariably have effects on state-building. Massive international interventions, going along the lines of ‘more is better’ will impact the local state-building process, in ways sometimes unforeseen by the interveners,

generating resistance. To use Rosenauian concepts in my own words, I argue that the ‘bifurcation of two worlds’, led to specific ‘turbulences’ in Kosovo and Timor-Leste.^{xvi} I do not refer to the ‘two worlds’ here in terms of the multi-centered and state-centered, which is the crux of Rosenau’s contribution, but rather in terms of ‘political’ and ‘social’ spheres. Hence, the political response, namely direct governance, seems unfit to correctly address the social challenges of postwar state-building. In other words, the idea of direct governance of a territory, at least in its contemporary form in Kosovo or in Timor-Leste, is hardly compatible with the objective of fostering and nurturing legitimacy in an externally-led state-building project. The direct governance by an international administration contributes to exacerbating ‘asocial forms of alienation’ in the words of Chopra and Hohe, or, to use a Durkheimian concept, contributes to specific forms of anomie, understood as a breakdown in moral norms, which ‘springs from the lack of collective forces at certain points in society’.^{xvii}

In the context of prolonged administration, it is difficult for external actors to avoid the social backlash inherent to the exercise of authority. As Jane Stromseth, David Wippman and Rosa Brooks assert, ‘there is no honor for domestic populations in being the object of an intervention. Local gratitude can be quickly vitiated by a sense of humiliation or disappointed expectations’.^{xviii} Lacking the social bond necessary to instil a relationship of trust between a given government and its citizens, international rule is almost certain to be resented by the local population and to be seen as a blow to their dignity. David Harland, head of the United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit and who served as Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General for UNTAET, notes that ‘all

international administration, however benign, is to some extent illegitimate. International administration, even when it is aligned with the wishes of the people concerned, is almost always imposed from outside'. He continues: 'fundamental political illegitimacy of an administration mandated from the outside poses some unique problems, with which the UN continues to wrestle'.^{xix}

It is interesting to note that some authors prefer to simply avoid this issue, delegitimizing the concepts of protectorate or trusteeship in a UN context. For instance, Bothe and Marauhn state that 'the concepts of occupation, protectorate and trusteeship as such are ideologically still linked to particular political and historical situations, related to traditional armed conflicts or to colonialism. Simply referring to or relying upon these concepts may give rise to fears that the UN provides a forum for a new form of "benevolent colonialism"'.^{xx} However, as mentioned earlier, what is important here is not the substance of the claims, or to judge if these claims are objectively grounded, but the fact that they are voiced by segments of the local population and, as such, are an expression of a political reality experienced by international administrations. In that regard, these discursive politics have to be included in the analysis, as a symptom of social anomie created by the outside intervention. These claims might be 'exaggerated by local actors', as claimed by Deputy International Administrator for Kosovo, Charles Brayshaw, or 'only partially justified', as noted by Deputy International Administrator for Timor-Leste, Jean-Christophe Cady.^{xxi} However, as Bain states,

It is not enough to call trusteeship by another name in order to escape the opprobrium if this ugliness. It is not enough to merely assert a preference for human rights or some other value in order to embrace trusteeship while avoiding

the stigma of empire. Nor it is enough to ground trusteeship in the universal claims of human rights in order to seek immunization from the reproach that often attaches to anti-paternal critiques.^{xxii}

Bifurcation of the two worlds

More than an academic metaphor, one could also argue that the ‘bifurcation of the two worlds’ can be understood as a practical assessment of the situation in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, depicting the gap between the ‘international’ and ‘local’ way of life. This process of differentiation will come to be resented from the local population and seen as embodying the exogenous character of the international presence and state-building agenda when instrumentalized by local actors. It is a phenomenon that goes beyond the strict organizational distinction and does not restrict itself to the UN in a context of international administration. Similarly, this ‘gap’ between the local and international way of living is not specific to Kosovo or Timor-Leste and is presents in almost all peace missions with sizeable international component.

For instance in Cambodia under UNTAC, a ‘dual economy’ created by the international intervention was also noticeable. As noted by Julio Jeldres, ‘the arrival of the UN mission created a false economy centered around hotels, shopping centers, restaurants, and bars that Cambodians cannot afford’. There was an ‘enormous disparity between the salaries that the UN paid to its Cambodian employees and those of their non-Cambodian colleagues’, a policy that ‘aroused anti-UN feeling’.^{xxiii} UNTAC international officials were paid a per diem of US\$145 while the average annual income at this time was approximately US\$160. Land values, rents, and the prices of services and utilities soared,

with no commensurate increase in government wages. The price of gas and pork doubled because of the high UN salaries. As Shawcross recalls, ‘as a result, a double economy quickly developed and a large proportion of civil servants left their desks in order to profit from the private sector boom. In Phnom Penh inflation, corruption, and nepotism became ever more pervasive’.^{xxiv} The UNTAC mission was also infamous for its impact on prostitution in Cambodia. Estimates put the number of pre-UNTAC sex workers at around 6,000, which then increased to 20,000,^{xxv} with a tenfold increase in the number of blood donors testing HIV-positive in the same period.^{xxvi} The prostitution scandals certainly affected the image of the mission, especially given the pale response provided by the UN establishment. Yasushi Akashi, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General reportedly answered ‘boys will be boys’ when confronted in a press conference.^{xxvii} In this context, the acronym ‘UNTAC’ was quickly ridiculed as ‘UN Transmission of AIDS to Cambodians’.^{xxviii} As Steve Heder and Judy Ledgerwood, from the UNTAC Information Division, recognize:

UNTAC was seen as one more occupying army, one more distant, aloof, uncaring, and potentially dangerous authority to be outwardly subservient to, just to be on the safe side. As stories of outrageous acts by individual ill-disciplined soldiers piled up and were told and retold, UNTAC was also seen with horror as a horde of drinking, whoring, half-naked drivers who ran over people and couldn’t care less.^{xxix}

For David Roberts, a long-time expert of Cambodia, the mission brought societal tensions that took a heavy toll on the Cambodian social fabric. He even argues that ‘when a “culture of violence” took greater root [in Cambodia], it was as much a function of the tensions UNTAC’s arrival caused, as it was the legacy of Pol Pot, or of the continuity in the arbitrary violence of the 1960s’.^{xxx} It was a process that was candidly recognized by a UN report examining the after-effects of UNTAC, stating: ‘what is particularly disturbing

is that this pattern of intervention may have served to transform the Cambodian economy and society in such a way as to distort or undermine the development process for many years to come'.^{xxxii} This contradicts the generally optimistic assessments of UN's role in Cambodia, made by the UN itself^{xxxiii} or by scholars.^{xxxiii}

Hence, for Steele, 'every UN mission is plagued by a daily sense of financial and social apartheid between expatriate officials and local people (...) complaints about a "them" and "us" culture in UN missions are commonplace'.^{xxxiv} It is also a general trend identified by Ghani and Lockhart when discussing the distinction between international and local bureaucracies. For them, offices of international organizations and NGOs display all the 'signs that mark them as places of privilege'. 'Although physically present in Africa, Latin America, or Asia, mentally most of the bureaucrats working in these buildings remain firmly back in the developed world'. They add: 'though living in the same country, the two bureaucracies – one international and well-funded from abroad, one national and almost always starved for funds – are conceptually miles apart and therefore rarely interact meaningfully'. The result is a bifurcation of the two worlds, where 'foreign officials gravitate toward each other socially as well through their clubs and other groups, thus creating segregated spaces of interaction'.^{xxxv}

However, this feature of the international life tends to take a very specific political expression as the authority exerted by the international mission increases and takes the shape of an international administration. In fact, politicized by local actors, these issues

tend to take a whole new meaning, targeting the exogenous character of the state-building agenda conducted by the international administrators.

In Timor-Leste, this 'bifurcation of the two worlds' has been exemplified mainly by two issues: the accommodation of UN officials in the early time of the mission on floating hotels chartered for the occasion, and the establishment of the UNTAET headquarters in the Governor's hotel, which has been formerly occupied by the Indonesian administrator. These two policies sent unfortunate signals to the local population, and were quickly seen as 'a constant reminder to the people of Dili that their long experience of being ruled by a privileged class was not yet over'.^{xxxvi} One CNRT official states that 'I think it is very obvious that East Timorese are becoming more and more marginalised. It is almost as though an elite world has been created by the UN expatriate community'.^{xxxvii} In that context, the local frustration and resentment have been further exacerbated by the difference in living conditions: 'Dili today does not present a pretty picture, with a separate expatriate world superimposed on a scene of destruction and poverty. The foreigners are rich, with cars, offices, hot running water, Sunday barbecues. The East Timorese have almost nothing'.^{xxxviii} For a local commentator, 'The contrasting incomes and lifestyles between the expatriates and nationals in Timor-Leste, particularly in Dili, has caused deep envy and anger among the local population.' He goes on to say 'that's why rock attacks still happen occasionally, even if the war has ended. Those rocks are being thrown at UNTAET cars during night time, smashing window screens. This outpouring of anger is triggered by the flagrant display of wealth amidst the widespread poverty around the local people'.^{xxxix}

One of the first political acts of de Mello as international administrator was to charter boats in order to accommodate UN personnel in the first phase of the deployment.^{xI} While it was a practical way of providing secure accommodation in those first difficult months, the fact that these ships were restricted to internationals created a commotion in the Timorese society. It quickly became the supreme expression of the social distinction, physically and socially, between the international and local worlds. As noted by Chopra, in the context of UNTAET, ‘comparisons with colonial administrations became unavoidable, and affirmed by various forms of segregation between expatriates and the Timorese’. Timorese were turned into the servants of foreigners in their own land, since they could apply only for menial jobs. Physically, the UN’s hermetic office world was increasingly disconnected from life on the streets. Floating container hotels restricted the access of Timorese, except to serve drinks and food.^{xII} Another account of the floating hotel comes from an aid worker around the same time: ‘that night on the way home from work, I pass a ship the size of an oil tanker, dwarfing the palm trees. It is the UN hotel. International staff serve, manage and cook. Food comes from Singapore and Australia. It serves 600 guests, paying AS\$ 150 a night. Not a cent gets into the local economy’.^{xIII}

The social distinction induced by the ‘floating hotels’ was as much a matter of perception as objective reality. As noted by Power, ‘the floating hotels were not grand – the ships were really nothing more than barges topped with four layers of stacked containers – but from the vantage point of the Timorese onshore, the ships looked like luxury liners, especially after a rooftop disco opened on one’. Reverend Max Surjadinata after a trip to

Timor-Leste in April 2000 concurs: ‘on the waterfront downtown, there is a huge monstrosity called Hotel Olympia, an edifice constructed from container boxes put on top of each other’. Jose Ramos-Horta even called the new businessmen in Timor-Leste the ‘carpetbaggers’, saying ‘they are building air-conditioned shipping containers - calling them hotels - and charging more than \$100 for the privilege’.^{xliii}

The issue that Timorese nationals were initially barred from dining or sleeping on the ships further stirred unrest. In the first demonstration against the UN presence in January 2000, protestors held posters declaring ‘East Timorese need food and medicine, not hotels and discotheques’.^{xliiv} As noted by Jake Jacobson, a US liaison officer in Dili, ‘you see the *Olympia* [floating hotel] and all the Land Rovers lined up outside, and you know you’re seeing the symbol of the foreign invasion and the gap between the haves and the have-nots. The East Timorese know that too. It’s bound to cause resentment at some point’.^{xliv} The ships would become such a headache for the SRSG that he finally decided to limit the club’s hours in July 2000 because of some recent ‘incidents involving UNTAET personnel and local persons’.^{xlvi} In his letter, de Mello reminded international personnel that the United Nations requires them ‘at all times to maintain the highest standards of integrity and conduct’. According to Power, by then, the damage had long been done. The chartering of the boats was most probably well intentioned; the UN deciding it should not compete for the sparse useable housing remaining in Dili. However, on the other side, many Timorese have argued that the UN should have launched a crash programme to help local families accommodate international staff by

funding immediate refurbishing and renovation, rather than providing lucrative contracts to international corporations.^{xlvi}

The second event that increased the perception of a gap between ‘internationals’ and ‘locals’ happened in 2000, when the UN decided to move its headquarters to the Governor’s House, a two-story colonnaded mansion which had previously housed the Portuguese and the Indonesian colonial powers.^{xlvi} The same argument can be made here, concerning the inherent difficulty of finding accommodations big enough for the UN administration in a country where most of the infrastructure was destroyed. Furthermore, Chesterman sees the installation in the Governor’s hotel and the rentals of floating hotels as demonstrations of the transitional nature of the mission.^{xli} However, certain political actors resented these decisions, as will be discussed below.

Furthermore, this political evolution has to be put into the wider context of the cultural upheavals created by the arrival of foreigners in a very traditional Timor-Leste, where the Church is a powerful and revered institution.¹ The differences of ways of life between internationals and locals are stark. As Murdoch reports:

many women are scantily clad, a few even go topless at more secluded areas, while closer to town, along a winding track littered with beer cans, Timorese women swim at another beach wearing long sleeved shirts and shorts. The arrival of almost 10,000 UN peacekeepers and UN personnel in East Timor after last year's violence and destruction has raised concerns about a clash of cultures in the staunchly Catholic territory and is fuelling anti-foreign sentiments among Timorese.^{li}

Yet another interesting representation of this cultural divide happens when a crocodile was seen on 30 August 2001 in a tidal canal near the Turismo hotel in Dili, a place

widely frequented by internationals. The crocodile is seen as a holy animal in Timor-Leste, with the popular myth being that an old crocodile became the island of Timor, a clear reference to the geographical shape of the territory and its rugged terrain. Some Timorese thought that ‘the crocodile wanted to guard Timorese culture and protect it from loose foreign morals. Women had offended Christ by bathing under the gaze of his giant statue in skimpy bikinis, or even naked, at Areia Branca, which had become a popular weekend haunt for foreigners’.^{lii}

Furthermore, if UNTAET managed to avoid growth of the prostitution and pornography industries seen under UNTAC, it was nevertheless still an issue in Timor-Leste.^{liii} In November 2000, angry youths in Dili threw stones at UN police officers after a mob of 3,000 peoples chased four alleged prostitutes.^{liv} Irena Cristalis recalls that ‘prostitution and HIV/AIDS followed in their wake [UN officials], as did pornography, which small boys peddled on DVDs in front of ‘Hello Mister,’ the first supermarket to open’.^{lv} Bishop Bello also took the issues of prostitution and AIDS in a speech, accusing foreigners of corrupting Timor-Leste. President Joao Gusmão also complained that ‘currently the Old Market is a decadent place showing signs of moral decadence where freedom is often mistaken with anarchy’.^{lvi} It might not be a coincidence that among the businesses ransacked in 2002, in one of the most violent incidents after 1999, was the Australian-owned ‘Hello Mister’ supermarket, which specializes in supplying imported goods to UN and other foreign workers. The mob ‘attack[ed] specific targets, beginning with the parliament and the Hello Mister store, and expanding to a few other foreign-owned

stores'.^{lvii} Indeed, the supermarket is one of 'myriad signs of the gaping social distance that has emerged between locals and foreign officials'.^{lviii}

The impacts of the international presence, exemplified by the chartering of floating hotels or the increase in prostitution, were quickly resented by the local population and the local elite. With the UN firmly entrenched in Timor-Leste by the year 2000, and with the progressive building up of the state-building architecture, Timorese gradually felt excluded from the governance process. Gusmão directly addressed the issue in his speech on New Year's Eve of 2001, stressing 'we are witnessing another phenomenon in East Timor; that of an obsessive acculturation to standards that hundreds of international experts try to convey to East Timorese'. He added that 'we do not call for a hasty transition period, an inadequate one "à la Cambodia" where the international staff left a vacuum behind after leaving', he said. 'For this reason, we defend a clearly phased strategy for the political process. Rather than considering the success it may be for the UN we are concentrated on a process that may bring success to the suffering people of East Timor'.^{lix} For Chesterman, it sounded like the "Asian values" argument in the 1990s, when South-East Asian leaders were defending their authoritarian regimes against the exportation of norms from the West;^{lx} however, it can also arguably be understood as a local reaction to the international presence, which had already suffered considerable decline in legitimacy. In fact, it is quite telling that Gusmão integrates Cambodia references in his speech, having been himself warned by Hun Sen about UN politics and impacts on countries in 1999. Hun Sen admittedly said to Gusmão and Ramos-Horta that 'the UN will come with their white cars and their high salaries, and they will run around

busily for two or three years. Then their mandate will expire, they will leave, and you will be left with almost nothing'.^{lxi} After that, Gusmão and Ramos-Horta in their first meeting with Vieira de Mello asked the later to promise that the UN will not run Timor like it ran Cambodia. 'We don't want you to come and go and for us to be left shaking our heads and saying, was that a storm that just passed through here'? Vieira de Mello agreed and promised: 'we will not repeat Cambodia here'.^{lxii} However, the New Year speech by Gusmão seemed to refer to this discussion with Vieira de Mello, expressing more than anything else the Timorese discontent with the nature of the state-building agenda conducted by the UN in Timor-Leste.

Recognizing the nature of the problem, the UN decided to adopt a new policy of reducing its peacekeeping force in April 2000. Fabrizio Hochschild, special assistant to the UN Special Representative in East Timor, stated that 'there are, as many have highlighted, social implications in having such a large number of foreigners in a relatively small country'.^{lxiii} The plan was unfortunately shelved after the death of a peacekeeper in July 2000. Sergio Vieira de Mello also recognized the importance of this form of contestation, stating at the UN Security Council that 'something is clearly not right if UNTAET can cost \$692 million whereas the complete budget of East Timor is \$59 million. Can it therefore come as a surprise that there is so much criticism of U.N. extravagances while the Timorese continue to suffer'?^{lxiv}

However, representing the complexity of the dilemma of international intervention, even the measures trying to bridge this international-local gap tend to further exacerbate it. For

instance, in Timor-Leste, UNTAET tried to keep in check the allowances given to local staff, in order to avoid the creation of two economies and the brain drain caused by the difference between living wages in government and in UN. As McAuley stated, ‘the UN [was] scared of repeating the screw-up in Cambodia, where UN drivers were getting more than government ministers.’^{lxv} Nevertheless, the difference in living conditions between international and local employees fuelled the resentment toward UNTAET. UNTAET international staff were paid on average 20-30 times more than their local staff, who received less than 1 per cent of the total UNTAET budget. The guidelines for the employment of local workers by humanitarian agencies specified that the wage range for a worker deemed ‘unskilled’ should be between 20-25,000 rupiah per day (approximately US\$5-6), and UNTAET paid them between 25,000-30,000 rupiah per day (the average salary in Timor-Leste was around US\$3 a day at that time). UNTAET’s main positions were reserved for internationally recruited personnel. Only support staff such as drivers, security guards and interpreters were recruited locally, that is before the “Timorization” process.^{lxvi} Furthermore, a breakdown of the UNTAET 2001 budget shows that the 2,000 local staff working for the world organization cost approximately US\$5.5 million, while the cost of buying bottled water for UNTAET personnel was US\$4 million.^{lxvii} Gabrielson noted that giving the contract of bottled water to a local bottled-water company could have created up to 1,000 jobs. The rehabilitation of Dili’s water system would have cost US\$4 million and could have allowed up to 100,000 persons access to drinking water. Additionally, when the UN cut daily living allowances of international civilian police staff to US\$95 from US\$110 per day in January 2001, de Mello had to face the contestation of two hundred UN employees, who signed a petition complaining

they could not live on that. Jan Koller, the UN employee who was leading the movement against the cut, said that because of this policy, ‘a lot of staff members will now have to start digging into their salaries at home’, and that ‘will affect worker’s ability to take vacations, renovate destroyed accommodations, eat in restaurants and travel to and from work’.^{lxviii}

The white car syndrome: symptom of the bifurcation of the two worlds

Perhaps the best example of this gap between the two worlds resides in the study of forms of locomotion used by the two “social groups.” More than anecdotal, the study of vehicles driven by internationals and locals help understand and picture the local resentment towards internationals. It is well known that vehicles are social status symbols, but in peace missions and especially in international administrations, they tend to acquire specific political references. The separation of the two “ways of life” is clear-cut in this case.

As one UNMIK official recalled as early as 1999, ‘we arrived at the outskirts of Pristina and navigated several traffic jams, comprising a jumbled mix of four-wheel-drive vehicles adorned with the emblems of the world’s various humanitarian organizations, and a bevy of private cars with no licence plates’.^{lxix} Similar accounts have been made in different missions. One United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) official deployed in Namibia recalls how ‘scores of white vehicles – VW Golfs and Toyota four-wheel-drive Land Cruisers – were painted with “UN” in big block letters on either side,

while storefronts and warehouses were renovated, and prefabricated structures transported in and erected to provide office space. UNTAG staff filled hotels to capacity, and caravans and tents were installed in outlying regions'.^{lxx} Similarly, in Cambodia, 'already by the time of Vieira de Mello's early arrival, herds of Cambodian cyclos, or bicycle-powered sedan chairs, were being overwhelmed on the roads by gleaming white Toyota Land Cruisers belonging to UN agencies or humanitarian aid groups'.^{lxxi} Accounts of the ubiquitous UN trucks can also be found in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 'for people living in post-war societies under international/UN mandates, the term global governance is not abstract. Administrative authority and nominal rule of law amid disruption and destruction may be experienced (or perceived) as being in the hands of those outsiders who reside in compounds with white cars and a particular flag'.^{lxxii} In fact, one could easily agree with Ignatieff that 'the spectacle of disgruntled locals, sitting in cafés, watching earnest young internationals speeding around to important meetings in Toyota Land Cruisers has been repeated in every nation-building experiment of the 1990s'.^{lxxiii}

Mention of the 'white-car syndrome' as a concept has been first referred to in development studies, especially by Donini. He noted in 1996 that 'the UN is perceived as self-evidently wealthy yet, apparently, delivering very little on the ground. The white cars of the aid workers are seen by some in the same light as the black Land Cruisers of the commanders and drug traffickers - status symbols of the "fat cats". The white car is coming to be equated less with hand-outs and more with empty promises'.^{lxxiv} In the same vein, he noted recently that

The good news is that humanitarian values are present and resonate in all cultures. The bad news is that the baggage – modus operandi, management style, white car syndrome, personal behaviour – that comes with the assistance is a source of considerable tension in the relationship between “outsiders” and “insiders”. At best we are seen as competent, well-meaning and sometimes inconsiderate. At worst, as arrogant, culturally insensitive vectors of alien agendas.^{lxxv}

In yet another publication, Donini stated that ‘the definition of an “outsider” is, naturally, largely in the eye of the beholder. Foreigners in big white vehicles are outsiders *par excellence*’.^{lxxvi}

If the spectacle of UN Toyota Land Cruisers “speeding around” has been commonplace in the 1990s, in the field of peace operation and humanitarian action altogether, nowhere it has conveyed more political meaning than in the case of international administrations, especially because local actors have expressly used this issue to associate it with the exogenous character of the state-building agenda promoted by the UN. It became another expression of the overwhelming presence of the international administration, emblemizing the foreign rule imposed from the outside. Thus, while believed ‘absolutely necessary considering the state of the roads and the Kosovo winter’,^{lxxvii} the use of these vehicles has been targeted as one expression of the exogenous presence being imposed on Kosovo and Timor-Leste. In a personal interview when he was under house arrest in Pristina, Albin Kurti, leader of the Vetevendosje! Movement (Self-Determination) told me how he and his colleagues perceived the omnipresence of lavish white UN trucks as ‘symbolic violence’,^{lxxviii} referring here to Bourdieu’s concept. For Bourdieu, symbolic violence is the tacit almost unconscious modes of cultural or social domination occurring within the every-day social habits maintained over conscious

subjects. Hence, symbolic power refers here to an aspect of most forms of power as they are routinely deployed in social life. ‘Symbolic violence’ specifies in theoretical terms the processes whereby, in all societies, order and social restraint are produced by indirect, cultural mechanisms rather than by direct, coercive social control.^{lxxxix} For in the routine flow of day-to-day life, power is seldom exercised as overt physical force: instead, it is transmuted into a symbolic force.^{lxxx} Hence, symbolic violence requires to be accepted as legitimate by the subject to reach its aim. Bourdieu calls it the process of misrecognition (*méconnaissance*): ‘the process whereby power relations are perceived not for what they objectively are but in a form which renders them legitimate in the eyes of the beholder’.^{lxxx} In the context of Kosovo, one could argue that local actors denouncing what they directly refer to as ‘symbolic violence’ can clearly contribute to weaken the legitimacy of the international intervention, as the power relations are no longer ‘concealed’ but overtly displayed.^{lxxxii}

Kurti also consciously made a connection between the “white-car syndrome” and the specific conception of the territory from the outset justifying the presence of an international administration; it has been dubbed in an earlier article the ‘empty shell perspective’.^{lxxxiii} For Kurti, ‘the jeep is a symptom. For UNMIK, Kosovo seems sometimes like a desert and sometimes like a jungle, where jeeps are needed’.^{lxxxiv} The UN acts as if Kosovo did not exist until the new foreign rulers arrived in 1999, according to Kurti. ‘We were discovered then’, he says, ‘like the inhabitants of the New World when the Spanish suddenly arrived’. He adds: ‘It’s a Before and After Christ approach’.^{lxxxv}

The Vetevendosje! Movement has specifically targeted UN vehicles in their contestation. For instance, the activists modified the traditional UN logo on the vehicles, adding a 'F' and a 'D' to UN, making it 'FUND', loosely meaning 'End' in Albanian. Always faithful to their theatrical practices, the movement has distributed parking tickets to UN vehicles, for 'parking at the wrong spot – Kosova' and deflated the tires of the vehicles arguing that: 'people can breathe freely only when this unjust regime dies. This is why we have released the air from the tyres of their vehicles'.^{lxxxvi}

Kurti's route of resistance tells a lot about the legitimacy dilemma facing international administration. Vetevendosje! started as a movement against the occupation of Serbia in Kosovo in 1997. The Kosovo Action Network (KAN), as it was known at this time, campaigned for clarifying the fate of missing persons in Kosovo and organized petitions and non-violent student protests. Albin Kurti, who was a student leader and one of the leaders of the movement, acquired national fame for being a political prisoner in Milošević's jails. However, after 1999, the movement started to be marginalized and was looking for a new vocation. Quickly enough, the movement turned to oppose the 'anti-democratic regime of UNMIK'. The movement officially morphed in 2004. In what they consider the conceptual genesis of their movement, they read, in front of UNMIK buildings and precisely on the fifth anniversary of the Resolution 1244, a 'Citizen's Declaration' and promised to struggle against the illegitimate regime of UNMIK. For Kurti, UNMIK and Serbia are two sides of the same coin and one aspect of domination cannot be distinguished from the other.^{lxxxvii} One is external (Serbia), the other is internal

(UNMIK), but they closely resemble each other. For him, the problem was not a couple of rotten apples in the barrel, but was systemic. ‘Absolute power isolates from power’, Kurti added, loosely quoting from Hannah Arendt. Hannah Arendt exposes in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* that power became the essence of political action and the center of political thought when it was separated from the political community which it should serve.^{lxxxviii} However, the contestation toward the ‘white-car syndrome’ goes beyond the Vetevendosje! Movement. As one NGO leader said to Lesley Abdela, deputy director for Democratisation in Kosovo for the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, only four months after NATO intervention: ‘you “internationals” are polluting our air and clogging up our roads with all your white vehicles. You refuse to employ us as professionals in your organisations. There are thousands of you’.^{lxxxix} In Abdela’s words, these comments ‘summed up the mood’ at this time.

Similarly, in Timor-Leste the means of locomotion used by the UN has been significantly politicized,^{xc} making the comparison between the two international administrations interesting. Accounts of their ubiquitous presence are manifold, some even believed that the expression ‘white car syndrome’ was invented in Timor-Leste.^{xc1} McBeth notes that ‘for some in East Timor, the contrast in resources is illustrated by the spectacle of highly paid UN staffers tooling around in luxury four-wheel vehicles and sipping cafe lattes in tree-shaded cafes’.^{xcii} Barker also reports ‘an armada of big, white four-wheel-drive vehicles cruises and clogs the dusty roads of Dili carrying the army of United Nations soldiers, policemen and civil servants that is preparing the world’s newest impoverished nation for independence’.^{xciii} This is a quantitative phenomenon, with Dodd reporting that

‘the number of four-wheel-drive vehicles parked outside UNTAET’s Dili headquarters gives the impression of an off-road convention’.^{xciv} Traub also asserts that ‘U.N. officials drive around in big, late-model Land Rovers while the Timorese walk along the cracked sidewalks or the decaying wharf. It is a combustible situation, and sparks are starting to fly’.^{xcv} The contestation has even been adopted by the upper echelons of the Timorese leadership. After reports, that proved false, that UNTAET would spend US\$15 million on the purchase of new vehicles, Gusmão threatened to boycott the important Lisbon donors’ conference in 2000. Gusmão told senior CNRT officials it would be immoral to go to Lisbon and ask for additional reconstruction aid to rebuild his shattered country if he was unaware of how the UN had spent previous donor funds.^{xcvi} As mentioned earlier, Hun Sen, the premier of Cambodia, warned Gusmão and Ramos-Horta as early as September 1999 that ‘the UN will come with their white cars and their high salaries, and they will run around busily for two or three years, then their mandate will expire, they will leave, and you will be left with almost nothing’. Gusmão confronted this issue directly, stating publicly in 2000 that ‘we are not interested in a *legacy of cars and laws*, nor are we interested in a legacy of development plans for the future designed by [people] other than East Timorese (italics added)’.^{xcvii}

A final aspect of the “white-car syndrome” worthy of mention here is the driving behavior of UN personnel. Curt Gabrielson notes how ‘UN vehicles’ speed to be consistently higher than that of local cars. They frequently whiz past groups of pedestrians and, predictably, a number of East Timorese have been killed by UN trucks’.^{xcviii} In all Pouligny’s inquiries among the local people, ‘problems of driving on

the roads and accidents caused by international staff generally came at the top of the list'. From one country to another, the same accusations were made against 'those who place themselves above the law'; besides the road accidents, it was a 'lack of respect' that was emphasized most often; besides speeding, there was the recurring image of cars splashing mud as they went by or forcing their way through the road.^{xcix} However, this resentment will take a specific form in Kosovo and in Timor-Leste, due to the unprecedented powers granted to the UN and the politicization of the issue by local actors.

Conclusion: new avenues for state-building

Lessons drawn from international experiments in Kosovo and Timor-Leste have led to the birth of a concept inside the organization, the 'light footprint approach' that came to be associated with the work of the UN official Lakhdar Brahimi. The light footprint approach - a term coined during the planning of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) - advocates that UN activities should be limited to those that are appropriate to the local needs and context, and that international staff should be limited to the minimum required, with an effort to ensure local capacity-building, so that nationals can take over from the UN as soon as possible. Hence, for Malone, 'Brahimi's approach is designed in reaction to many things he did not like in East Timor and Kosovo, mainly the idea of the UN governing, rather than assisting local leaderships in governing'.^c It does not mean the end of intervention, it rather implies a different form of exercising authority in a foreign setting: 'to underscore the primacy of local over foreign concerns in no way means that the international partners have to accept the views of the local parties unconditionally and without discussion. But it does mean that arrogance is not

acceptable, and humility and genuine respect for the local population indispensable'.^{ci} Furthermore, it involves taking into account all aspects of international interventions, including unintended ones.

As this article posited, massive international interventions, especially international administrations, may lead to unforeseen consequences over local state-building processes. It can exacerbate the exogenous nature of the international presence, leading to a 'bifurcation of the two worlds'. In turn, the concept of bifurcation can be understood in terms of the bifurcation of the political and social spheres - the political response, namely direct governance, seems unfit to correctly address the social challenges of postwar state-building – or, more generally, in terms of the bifurcation of the international and local worlds. In the latter depiction of the concept, the 'bifurcation of the two worlds' can be seen to be present in most international interventions – albeit the scope of this international-local gap will mainly depend on the authority vested in the mission and policies adopted by international officials. Moreover, its effects can be mitigated by various institutional arrangements. Ombudsman institutions for instance can be instrumental in assuring a certain degree of trust between the international presence and the local population, thus helping the mission to mitigate the effects of its presence. This article has also further developed the concept of 'white car syndrome' as one salient form of the 'bifurcation of the two worlds'. In that regard, this contribution hopes to further the current research agenda on the critique of the liberal peace and the unintended consequences of statebuilding and peacebuilding missions, while at the same time building bridges between development studies and peace studies.

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ⁱ N Lemay-Hébert, 'Statebuilding Without Nationbuilding? Legitimacy, State-Failure and the Limits of the Institutional Approach', *Journal of Intervention and State-Building*, 3 (1), 2009, pp 21-45.

ⁱⁱ C Aoi, C de Coning & R Thakur, 'Unintended Consequences, Complex Peace Operations and Peacebuilding Systems,' in C Aoi, C de Coning & R Thakur (ed.), *Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations*, Tokyo : United Nations University Press, 2007, p 3.

ⁱⁱⁱ See for instance : D Chandler, 'The EU and Southeastern Europe : The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance', *Third World Quarterly*, 31(1), 2010, pp 69-85; R Paris, 'International Peacebuilding and the "Mission Civilisatrice"', *Review of International Studies*, 28(4), October 2002, pp 637-656; O Richmond, 'Becoming Liberal, Unbecoming Liberalism: Liberal-Local Hybridity via the Everyday as a Response to the Paradoxes of Liberal Peacebuilding', *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 3(3), November 2009, pp 324-344.

^{iv} D Kennedy, *The Dark Sides of Virtue : Reassessing International Humanitarianism*, Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2004 ; D Fassin & M Pandolfi, *States of Contemporary Emergency. The Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions*, New York : Zone Books, 2010.

^v A Hehir, 'Autonomous Province Building: Identification Theory and the Failure of UNMIK', *International Peacekeeping*, 13(2), June 2006, pp 200-213; N Lemay-Hebert, 'State-Building From the Outside-in: UNMIK and its Paradox', *Journal of Public and International Affairs*, 20, Fall 2009, pp 65-86; B Pula, 'The UN in Kosovo: Administering Democratization' in F Bieber and Z Daskalovski (ed.), *Understanding the War in Kosovo*, London: Frank Cass, 2003.

^{vi} J Beauvais, 'Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of UN State-Building in East Timor', *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, 33, 2001, pp 1101-1178; J Chopra, 'Building State Failure in East Timor', *Development and Change*, 33(5), 2002, pp 979-1000; A Goldstone, 'UNTAET with Hindsight: The Peculiarities of Politics in an Incomplete State', *Global Governance* 10(1), January/March 2004, pp 83-98; P Gorjão, 'The Legacy and Lessons of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 24(2), August 2002, pp 313-336; N Lemay-Hebert, 'UNPOL and Police Reform in Timor-Leste: Accomplishments and Setbacks', *International Peacekeeping*, 16(3), June 2009, pp 393-406; A Surkhe, 'Peacekeepers as Nation-Builders: Dilemmas of the UN in East Timor', *International Peacekeeping*, 8(4), 2001, pp 1-20.

^{vii} I Hurd, 'Legitimacy and Authority in International Relations', *International Organization*, 53(2), Spring 1999, 381.

^{viii} A Orford, *Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and The Use of Force in International Law*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p 158.

^{ix} A Mehler & C Ribaux, *Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in Technical Cooperation: An Overview of the National and International Debate*, Wiesbaden: Universum Verlanganstalt / Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 2000, p 107; S Eisenstadt, 'Beyond Collapse', in N Yoffee & G Cowgill (ed.), *The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations*, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988, p 243; T Raeymaekers, *Collapse or Order? Questioning State Collapse in Africa?* Conflict Research Group, Working Paper no. 1, May 2005, 7. See also: M Doornbos, 'State Collapse and Fresh Starts : Some Critical Reflections', in J Milliken (ed.), *State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003, pp 45-62; and the proponents of the laissez-faire approach: E Luttwak, 'Give War a Chance',

Foreign Affairs, 78 (4), July-August 1999, pp 36-44; and J Herbst, 'Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice', in R Rotberg (ed.), *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004, pp 302-318.

^x W Zartman, 'Putting Things Back Together', in W Zartman (ed.), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995, pp 270-272. The three areas the author refers to are 1) reconcentrating central power (the powerful must be recognized as legitimate, or the legitimate must be made powerful); 2) increasing state legitimacy through participation; and 3) raising and allocating economic resources in support of peace.

^{xi} C Zuercher, *Is More Better? Evaluating External-Led State Building After 1989*, CDDRL Working Paper number 54, Stanford University, April 2006, 2.

^{xii} Z Selden, 'Stabilization and Democratization: Renewing the Transatlantic Alliance', *Parameters*, 37(4), Winter 2007-2008, p 97; C Powell, 'U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead', *Foreign Affairs*, 72(5), Winter 1992-93, pp 32-45; C Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon*, New York: Warner Books, 1990, pp 453-454; P Paret, 'Clausewitz' in P Paret (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, p 199.

^{xiii} J Dobbins et al. *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, Santa Monica: Rand Report MR-1753-RC, 2003, p 160-161.

^{xiv} J-W Müller, *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p 27; Y Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, p 7 [quoted in D Allen, 'The Impact of War and Successful Reconstruction: Evaluating the Bush Administration's Germany-Japan-Iraq Analogy', Paper Presented at the International Studies Association Annual Conference, 3 March 2005, Honolulu, p 4].

^{xv} J Dobbins et al. *UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq*, Santa Monica: RAND report MG-304, 2005, p 245; S Krasner, 'Sovereignty and Governance', Lecture at the Legatum Prosperity Symposium, Brompton Hall, United Kingdom, 20-22 June 2008, p 23.

^{xvi} J Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.

^{xvii} J Chopra & T Hohe, 'Participatory Intervention', *Global Governance*, 10(3), July-September 2004, p 290; E Durkheim, 'Suicide: A Study' in *Sociology*, trans. by J Spaulding and G Simpson, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997, p 382.

^{xviii} J Stromseth, D Wippman & R Brooks, *Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of Law After Military Interventions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 52.

^{xix} D Harland, 'Legitimacy and Effectiveness in International Administration', *Global Governance*, 10(1), January-March 2004, p 15.

^{xx} M Bothe & T Marauhn, 'UN Administration of Kosovo and East Timor: Concept, Legality and Limitations of Security Council-Mandated Trusteeship Administration', in C Tomuschat (ed.), *Kosovo and the International Community: a Legal Assessment*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002, p 218. See also: S Ratner, 'The United Nations in Cambodia: A Model for Resolution of Internal Conflict?' in L Damrosch (ed.), *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts*, New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1993, p 267.

^{xxi} *Koha Ditore*, 18 June 2004, p 10, quoted in: UNDP, USAID and RIINVEST, "Early Warning Report 7: May-August 2004," http://www.ks.undp.org/repository/docs/ewr_7engl.pdf, p 4; P Alford, 'Rebuilding E Timor is Proving a Thankless Task', *The Australian*, 27 June 2000.

^{xxii} W Bain, *Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p 172.

^{xxiii} J Jeldres, 'The UN and the Cambodian Transition', *Journal of Democracy*, 4(4), October 1993, pp 107 and 116.

^{xxiv} W Shawcross, *Cambodia's New Deal*, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994, 15.

^{xxv} S Koyama & H Myrntinen, 'Unintended Consequences of Peace Operations on Timor Leste from a Gender Perspective', in C Aoi, C de Coning & R Thakur (ed.), *Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007, p 33.

^{xxvi} WHO report, quoted in: T Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p 150.

- ^{xxvii} *Ibid.*, p 33. Samantha Power recalls Akashi saying ‘I am not a puritan. Eighteen-year-old hot-blooded soldiers who come in from the field after working hard should be able to chase after young, beautiful beings of the opposite sex’. In a similar way, Janet Heininger explained that “part of the problem stemmed from soldiers who were underutilized.” The statement goes without comment. S Power, *Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World*, New York: Penguin Press, 2008, p 117; J Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia*, New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994, p 129.
- ^{xxviii} S Power, *Chasing the Flame*, p 117
- ^{xxix} S Heder & J Ledgerwood, ‘Politics of Violence: An Introduction,’ in S Heder & J Ledgerwood (ed.), *Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition under United Nations Peacekeeping*, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1996, p 32.
- ^{xxx} D Roberts, *Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-1999: Power, Elitism and Democracy*, Richmond: Curzon, 2001, p 62.
- ^{xxxi} Internal UN report quoted by S Prasso, ‘Cambodia: A \$3 Billion Boondoggle’, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 51(2), March 1995, p 40.
- ^{xxxii} Security Council Resolution 880 expressed its great satisfaction that the goals of the Paris Agreements have been fulfilled. See: United Nations, *Resolution 880 (1993) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3303rd Meeting, on 4 November 1993*, UN. Doc. S/RES/880, 4 November 1993.
- ^{xxxiii} For instance, Sandrine Barbier writes that UNTAC’s “principale caractéristique est d’illustrer parfaitement la volonté des Nations Unies de s’attacher (sic) non seulement aux conséquences mais aussi aux causes d’un conflit.” S Barbier, *Cambodge 1991-1993: MIPRENUC, APRONUC*, Paris: Montchrestien, 1999, p 9. UNTAC was also perceived as an “international success” and even qualified as a model for future peace missions by certain scholars.
- ^{xxxiv} J Steele, ‘Nation Building in East Timor’, *World Policy Journal* 19, Summer 2002, 83-84.
- ^{xxxv} A Ghani & C Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p 19.
- ^{xxxvi} J Dunn, *A Rough Passage to Independence*, New South Wales: Longueville, 2003, p 368. Interestingly enough, according to Dunn, the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) leaders were hostile to this accommodation intrusion, but they then proceeded to make a similar arrangement.
- ^{xxxvii} M Dodd, ‘Social Unrest Could Force UN Troop Cuts in East Timor’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 25 April 2000.
- ^{xxxviii} S Mydans, ‘Ruined East Timor Awaits Miracle’, *The New York Times*, 22 April 2000. David Lamb concurs: ‘the influx of foreigners has in effect created two societies--one poor and jobless, the other rich and employed’. D Lamb, ‘E. Timorese Independence Fight Worth Cost’, *Los Angeles Times*, 22 June 2000. Christopher Lundry also states that: “the UNTAET presence led to a clearly bifurcated economy, with UNTAET and most aid workers occupying the top tier, and most East Timorese stagnating in poverty.” C Lundry, ‘East Timor’ in T Leonard (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the Developing World*, London: Routledge, 2006, p 525.
- ^{xxxix} R Fadjri, ‘Dollars Flowing From Passports’, *Tempo Magazine*, 30 October – 5 November 2001.
- ^{xl} Several boats have been used that way, including the *Central Maritime*, the *Amos*, the *Veksa* and the *Olympia*. Setiyardi, ‘Timor’s Floating Hotels’, *Tempo Magazine*, October 30 – 5 November 2001.
- ^{xli} J Chopra, ‘The UN’s Kingdom of East Timor’, *Survival*, 42(3), Autumn 2000, p 33.
- ^{xlii} K Rietveld, ‘The Ecology of Disaster Recovery’, *East Timor Diary*, 20 April 2000, quoted in: A Simms, ‘Chapter 2: The Ecology of Disaster Recovery’, in The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (ed.), *World Disaster Report 2001: Focus on Recovery*.
- ^{xliii} M Surjadinata, ‘Observations From East Timor’, *Life in a Time of Transition Report*, April 2000. B Connole, ‘Irony in the Pacific for Long-Distance Diplomat’, *The Australian*, 26 June 2000; Power, *Chasing the Flame*, p 312.
- ^{xliv} UN Wire, ‘Unemployed Citizens Protest Foreign Worker Hires’, 5 January 2000.
- ^{xlv} Quoted in: D Lamb, ‘E. Timorese Say Independence Fight Worth Cost’, *Los Angeles Times*, 22 June 2000.
- ^{xlvi} ‘In Brief’, The La’o Hamutuk Bulletin 1(2), 17 July 2000. In January 2000, a report confirmed that ‘14 East Timorese youths, some of them intoxicated, had a confrontation with UN staff working on floating accommodation barges, which are moored in Dili’s Harbour and used by UN staff. Such confrontations

have now become an almost nightly occurrence'. S Inbaraj, 'Limping to Recovery, Frustrations Run High', *Inter Press Service*, 4 January 2000.

^{xlvi} 'Staff at U.N. floating hotel strikes for better pay', *Deutsche Press-Agentur*, 11 February 2000.

^{xlvii} De Mello even moved into the same office that had housed months ago the unpopular Indonesian governor. J Traub, 'Inventing East Timor', *Foreign Affairs*, 79(4), July-August 2000.

^{xlvi} S Chesterman, 'East Timor in Transition: From Conflict Prevention to State-Building', International Peace Academy Working Paper, May 2001, p 1.

^l A Kohen, 'The Catholic Church and the Independence of East Timor', in R Tanter, M Selden & S Shalom (ed.), *Bitter lowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia and the World Community*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001, pp 43-51.

^{li} L Murdoch, 'Timor's Social Gap', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 15 April 2000.

^{lii} I Cristalis, *Bitter Dawn: East Timor, a People's Story*, London: Zed Books, 2002, p 272. The end of the story as recalled by Cristalis is that when Australian soldiers realised that crocodiles are 'some sort of totem' in Timor-Leste, they alerted a famous Australian crocodile hunter, who built a state-of-the-art crocodile enclosure costing tens of thousands of dollars.

^{liii} M Dodd, 'East Timor Looks to Coffee', *The Age*, 26 December 2000. See also: 'Students and the Porno Industry', *Lian Maubere Magazine*, 29 June 2001; Koyama & Myrntinen, 'Unintended consequences of peace operations on Timor Leste from a gender perspective'.

^{liv} 'Mob Throws Stones At UN Police In E Timor Before UN Visit', *Associated Press*, 10 November 2000. In a second incident three days after, young men chased another woman and explained their action by the fact that 'they are upset about the immodest dress of some East Timorese and foreign women, and by the fact that they have "foreign sweethearts"'. 'East Timor: Youths Chase Woman, Stone Security Forces at Dili Market', *Lusa*, 13 November 2000.

^{lv} Cristalis, *Bitter Dawn*, 274. Furthermore, Richard Holbrooke singled out Timor-Leste for the problems related to AIDS propagation by peacekeepers. See: I Arieff, 'Holbrooke Slams UN Peacekeeping on AIDS Prevention', *Reuters*, 22 December 2000, <http://etan.org/et2000c/december/24-31/22holbro.htm> (last accessed 23 June 2009). The Northern Territory Chief Minister in Australia publicly requested HIV tests for UN personnel before coming to Australia. M Dodd, 'HIV Tests in E Timor To Be Optional', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 28 June 2001. See also: J Jolliffe, 'AIDS Spectre Looms Over Dili', *The Age*, 1 December 2001.

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