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CHAPTER 61

UNITED NATIONS STABILIZATION MISSION IN HAITI (MINUSTAH)

NICOLAS LEMAY-HÉBERT

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations (UN) Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established in April 2004 to replace the Multinational Interim Force that had been deployed to stabilize the country in February. That same month, President Aristide was once again forced to flee Haiti amid political turmoil and violence. For some, Aristide was a victim of international imperialism. The story is probably more complex, rooted in Haiti’s social struggles, and affected by strong international and local factors. Overall, both domestic and international constraints led Aristide to break with his original populist agenda in his second administration and revert to older methods of governance. With the conflict between pro-government forces and the opposition (under the loose umbrella of the Convergence Démocratique and Group of 184) heating up, Aristide lost the loyalty of some of his supporters and found himself increasingly isolated. Calls for his resignation became more insistent. On 29 February 2004, Aristide resigned and left the country at a time of great volatility (he claimed to have been abducted by the United States). Subsequently, the United Nations, the United States, Canada, and the European Union were instrumental in the formation of a government of technocrats, headed by Gérard Latortue, to lead the transition to the elections of 2006.

MINUSTAH was deployed in June 2004 to facilitate this process and re-establish stability in the country. MINUSTAH’s presence in Haiti has been marked by several internal and external shocks, affecting this stabilization agenda. The worldwide food price
inflation of 2008 led to riots in most major centers in the country and to the resignation of the then Prime Minister Jacques-Édouard Alexis. Political instability had also been exacerbated by natural disasters, including a series of tropical storms and hurricanes in 2008. However, the earthquake of 10 January 2010 brought an unprecedented degree of devastation to Haiti. Estimates vary between 200,000 and 300,000 persons injured, 65,000 to 316,000 deaths. Most of the state apparatus was destroyed and infrastructural damage extended from Leogane to the cities of Port-au-Prince, Grand-Goâve, Petit-Goâve, Jacmel, and Carefour. Adding to these setbacks, MINUSTAH’s tenure has been marked by various alleged scandals involving peacekeeping personnel, including sexual misconduct and, most especially, the cholera affair that rocked the United Nations.

MINUSTAH’s mandate

MINUSTAH was set up by UNSC Resolution 1542, 30 April 2004, to support Haiti’s transitional government in ensuring a secure and stable environment within which Haitian constitutional and political processes could take place. The mandate included support for security sector reform (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs and the reform of the Haitian National Police), promotion and protection of human rights, and assistance in organizing and monitoring elections in the country.

UNSC Resolution 1608, 22 June 2005; UNSC Resolution 1702, 15 August 2006; UNSC Resolution 1743, 15 February 2007; UNSC Resolution 1780, 15 October 2007; and UNSC Resolution 1840, 14 October 2008, adjusted the mandate of the mission and MINUSTAH’s authorized strength to adapt to the changing circumstances on the ground.

Following the 12 January 2010 earthquake, the UN Security Council, through UNSC Resolution 1908, 19 January 2010, increased its authorized strength from 6,940 troops and 2,211 police to 8,940 troops and 3,711 police to support the immediate recovery, reconstruction, and stability efforts in the country. UNSC Resolution 1927, 4 June 2010, added another 680 police as a “temporary surge capacity.” UNSC Resolution 2070, 12 October 2012, initiated MINUSTAH’s withdrawal, cutting the authorized strength to 6,270 troops and 2,601 police. MINUSTAH is the first UN peacekeeping mission with a majority of Latin American troops.

Duration: From June 2004

Initial authorized strength: up to 6,700 troops; 1,622 civilian police; 548 international civilian personnel; 154 UN volunteers; 995 local civilian staff

Actual strength (as of 31 May 2013): 6,179 troops; 2,630 police (including formed police units); 435 international civilian personnel; 194 UN volunteers; 1,323 local civilian staff

Main troop and police contributors (more than 100 personnel), as of 30 June 2013: Brazil (1,407); Uruguay (942); Sri Lanka (874); Jordan (595); Argentina (578); Nepal (507); Chile (479); India (458); Peru (373); Bangladesh (321); Bolivia (208); Rwanda (180); Philippines (178); Indonesia (173); Paraguay (163); Senegal (151); Pakistan (147); Guatemala (137); Côte d’Ivoire (127); Canada (126).
MINUSTAH: MANDATE, ACHIEVEMENTS AND LIMITATIONS

MINUSTAH’s mandate differs from preceding UN missions in Haiti in two ways. First, it has a greater emphasis on security exemplified by the contributing countries’ lasting commitment in terms of troops and police since the set-up of the mission. Second, greater importance is given to human rights with Security Council resolutions, placing these issues at the heart of the UN’s presence in Haiti. At the same time, MINUSTAH came to be criticized locally and internationally precisely for its tendency to focus too much on security (through the securitization of social issues) and its track record on human rights.

MINUSTAH’s presence and mandate can be broken down into three parts. In the first phase (from 2004 to 2006), the mission focused exclusively on restoring stability following Aristide’s exile and on providing security for the 2006 elections. The second phase (from 2006 to 2010) was characterized by a focus on securing difficult neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince as well as on security sector reform (SSR). This phase also involved reconciliation and political dialogue in preparation for the 2010 parliamentary and presidential elections. The third phase started with the 2010 earthquake with the security agenda back at the top of the priority list, along with support of recovery and reconstruction programs. The third phase was drawing to a close at the end of 2013 accompanied by debates over how to support an effective transition to a post-MINUSTAH Haiti.

During the first years of MINUSTAH’s deployment, SSR, although pivotal to the mission’s initial mandate, was overshadowed by the “stabilization” agenda, with MINUSTAH focusing on the restoration of the Haitian state’s effective authority and the preparation for the 2006 elections. The fact that Haiti was still undergoing a violent transition and was not in a post-conflict situation played a role in delaying the implementation of SSR activities. In this context, a multinational interim force led by the United States, Canada, and France with 3,600 troops had preceded MINUSTAH with a mandate to restore a modicum of stability in the highly volatile situation following the forced exile of Aristide in February 2004. A year later, the UN had established its presence throughout the country, although the security situation in Port-au-Prince was still tense. The UN securitization policy was then carried out through three specific channels: the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former members of the Haitian military forces; the neutralization of urban gangs and their incorporation into DDR programs; and a purging of the Haitian national police. However, none of these goals was fully achieved.

Elections were another key component of MINUSTAH’s mandate. On 7 February 2006, René Préval was elected, but amidst familiar allegations of fraud.

After 2006, the renewal of MINUSTAH’s mandate included a reinforcement of its SSR agenda, and the UN mission therefore supported police, judicial, and penitentiary reform, albeit on largely separate tracks. The security environment remained unstable,
though one of MINUSTAH’s most important contributions was to serve as a deterrent to further armed gang violence, political turbulence, major civil unrest, and drug trafficking.\textsuperscript{11}

As of 2010, the post-earthquake agenda concentrated on the security of displaced persons, support for national elections and the establishment of a government that could accelerate reconstruction. MINUSTAH has also promoted a rule of law compact with the Haitian authorities, the private sector, and other international actors to integrate the stabilization and economic development agendas. However, this initiative was dogged by political bickering between the executive and the parliament.\textsuperscript{12} Another impediment to SSR has been the lack of effective coordination between different donor countries (a recurring theme in Haiti). This led MINUSTAH’s then Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Edmond Mullet, to state that “the Haiti National Police [HNP] is an example of the international community’s failure to work in concert.”\textsuperscript{13} Since 2004 police reform has followed a relatively narrow and technical agenda that emphasized training and vetting—an approach challenged by structural constraints and realities on the ground.\textsuperscript{14} As a consequence, despite many achievements, an overarching vision of SSR that would integrate state-building and security sector reform was absent within MINUSTAH.\textsuperscript{15} This set the UN on a course that reinforced the dynamics that had caused social tensions in the first place.

\section*{Achievements and Limitations}

\subsection*{MINUSTAH and the Haitian state}

MINUSTAH took over from a succession of UN missions—UNMIH (chapter 45), UNSMIH (chapter 46), UNTMIH (chapter 49), MIPONUH (chapter 50) and MICAH, which had been deployed in Haiti inter alia to help the development of the \textit{Police Nationale d’Haïti} (Haitian National Police—HNP), as well as to reinforce prison and judicial reform with the aim of creating conditions to allow the development of stable politics in the country. Each of these missions contributed to stabilizing Haiti following the Duvalier era (1957–86) as well as to the state-building process. The struggle between Haiti’s impoverished majority and the wealthy few was at the center of Haitian politics before and after independence, and politics has constantly been orchestrated by “predatory elites.” Diverse international influences have combined with local structures of power to create hybrid governance structures and it is thus difficult to neatly separate international and local factors in the state-building process.\textsuperscript{16} Security institutions have traditionally played a crucial role in Haitian politics as agents of governance, especially before the Duvalier era. Paramilitary groups were also instrumental in the quest for power in Haiti: from the \textit{tonton macoutes} under François Duvalier, to the \textit{attachés} in the immediate post-Duvalier era or the pro-Aristide \textit{Chimères} (or chimè), and anti-Aristide renegade military officers (under the banners
of the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti and the Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Haiti). In this context, externally-led SSR policies were fraught with risk, having to walk the fine line between strengthening security institutions in a state-building context and attempting to disarm paramilitary groups pursuing their own political agendas. As a consequence, the insistence by UNMIH on the inclusion of former Forces Armées d’Haïti (Haitian Armed Forces—FADH) personnel in the new police force resulted in the force lacking legitimacy among large parts of the population. These circumstances contributed to the 2004 crisis, with former army officers playing a role in the coup against Aristide. Similarly, while MINUSTAH contributed to the establishment of security following the 2004 crisis and helped organize the elections in 2006, it also reinforced the logic of confrontation at play in Haitian politics (MINUSTAH continued the earlier UNMIH policy of incorporating ex-army paramilitaries in the police force).

In a context of social struggle between Haiti’s impoverished majority and the wealthy few, a struggle exacerbated by Aristide’s controversial “exile” and a transitional government perceived as siding with the elite, MINUSTAH’s approach to strengthening security institutions and its disarming of “rebels” could be seen as partisan and a continuation of past policies. The Latortue government (2004–6) and its domestic and foreign supporters (including the United Nations) opted for a military solution to address what was fundamentally a social, economic, and cultural problem. While MINUSTAH hesitantly challenged the presence of the disbanded Haitian army in a few localities, it used significantly more repressive means to curb the power of the pro-Aristide Chimères (“chimeras”) in Cité Soleil. In the first twenty-two months following Aristide’s forced departure, an estimated 8,000 people were murdered and 35,000 women were sexually assaulted. Identified perpetrators included criminals from pro- and anti-Aristide groups, the national police—and UN peacekeepers as well. In “Operation Baghdad,” the name given to the ghetto uprising by the interim government in an attempt to label the people fighting as terrorists, MINUSTAH and the police proceeded to “clean” the “difficult” urban areas of Cité Soleil (or Cité Soley) and Bel Air in Port-au-Prince. These actions by MINUSTAH were in line with the requirements of the UN Security Council, and especially Resolution 1743 (2007) which demanded strong measures against the “armed gangs.”

However, the joint MINUSTAH-Latortue government approach was to equate all Chimères or “armed gangs” with pro-Aristide Chimères, and then these Chimères with bandits. UN forays in these areas to fight “bandits” led to 100 wounded in October 2005 and between 170 and 205 in December 2005. Half of these persons were women and children which, for the SRSG Edmond Mullet, amounted to mere “collateral damage.” As Robert Muggah noted, the end result was that these muscular enforcement-led operations “appeared in some cases both to disperse and simultaneously to radicalise youth and so-called gangs.” There is no denying that insecurity became a major social issue in Haiti after the departure of Aristide. This led on from political violence targeting the interim government, the police and MINUSTAH into more random acts of violent crime and undoubtedly MINUSTAH/PNH operations managed to bring stability
in these areas. However, to look at the *Chimères* phenomenon and the post-2004 surge of violence solely through a security lens appeared misguided, as security issues were intertwined with equally important political and economic grievances. In this context, MINUSTAH was accused of responding only to the symptoms of violence rather than to its causes. In the end, while the operation was relatively successful in restoring a climate of security, it also contributed (intentionally or not) to the state-building process, tilting the balance of power in favor of certain groups in the competition for control of the Haitian state.

**The UN indicted: the cholera crisis and sexual misconduct**

Since its establishment in June 2004, the UN’s presence in Haiti has “at times been problematic, even divisive,” as one observer put it. Many Haitian interviewed felt that it was a return to international occupation under a new guise (a complaint to a certain extent recognized by international officials following the earthquake of 2010). At the same time and throughout the evolution of the mission, many prominent international officials voiced their opposition to the security emphasis of MINUSTAH, feeling that the mission should reorient itself towards a more developmental agenda.

A string of sexual scandals afflicting the military components of MINUSTAH fuelled the anti-UN sentiment. In 2007, 111 Sri Lankan soldiers were repatriated after allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse of minors. In January 2011, Pakistani troops were accused of the rape of a boy in Gonaïves and of having sexual relations with minors in the capital; three of them were later found guilty of sexual exploitation and abuse and were condemned to a one-year jail sentence. In July 2011, Uruguayan troops were accused of sexually assaulting a young man in the southern town of Port-Salut (while only being charged with “coercion” offences). There was an “amplification factor” at work, with each scandal building on the narrative of occupation in Haiti and feeding latent hostility towards international troops in certain segments of the society (especially in highly politicized student circles in Port-au-Prince). This “legitimacy issue” was further increased by a number of public relations fiascos following the 2010 earthquake, such as the hiring of two vessels to accommodate UN staffers (echoing a similar situation which affected the UN presence in Timor-Leste in 1999). MINUSTAH became a convenient scapegoat for everything that went wrong in Haiti (and for the inaction of the Haitian government), echoing what has been dubbed the “legitimacy dilemma” where the actions of international staff in situations of authority are used against them.

Local support for the UN mission, while never high, decreased dramatically after the outbreak of cholera in October 2010, and allegations of sexual assaults and attempted homicide. A few months after the 2010 earthquake there was a cholera outbreak which began in Mirebalais, in the Artibonite region, killing more than 8,000 people and affecting over 670,000. While the origin of the outbreak was debated most Haitians were convinced that the pathogen was introduced by peacekeepers from the UN Nepali
As one Haitian official put it: “MINUSTAH is a houngan (vodou priest), and behind the houngan hides the cholera.” MINUSTAH and the cholera are also often presented as “Marrasa” (twins in Haitian vodou). In this atmosphere, within weeks after the first cases there was stoning of UN vehicles and clashes, some fatal, between locals and UN forces. Similarly, following the news of the sexual scandals, protests spread around Haiti, as people took to the streets demanding that the United Nations leave the country.

This situation put the Brazilian leadership in a difficult position. While Brazil’s engagement was partly meant to enhance the country’s profile as it was campaigning for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, local resistance on the ground led the government to reassess its position on Haiti. As the senior advisor to the Brazilian government, Marcel Biato, noted, “in the eyes of the local population, a liberating army can quickly become an occupation force.” Brazilian troops certainly played a crucial role in the securitization of the difficult neighborhoods of Bel Air and Cité Soleil, but this engagement also came at a price, financial and political.

While the engagement in MINUSTAH cost over R$1 billion to Brazilian taxpayers it also became increasingly unpopular within Brazil itself. In November 2011, a conference was convened in São Paulo (Brazil) against the “occupation” of Haiti, with the participation from over 600 members of trade unions, social movements, political parties, and other organizations. A letter to the Brazilian president was also signed by a number of legislators in 2011, stating that “we must end Brazil’s participation in a military operation that is repudiated by the vast majority of the Haitian people […] this occupation has only deepened the plight of the people and has denied them their sovereignty.” Brazil’s defense minister, Celso Amorim, seemed to acknowledge the discontent when he declared in 2011 that he “supports the withdrawal of Brazilian troops from Haiti.” Yet how an exit strategy will materialize remains to be seen.

Alternatives to the securitization approach in Haiti

In MINUSTAH’s initial approach securitization was predominant but it was not the only strategy. An example of an alternative approach was the “integrated security and development program” in the Bel Air district undertaken by Viva Rio, a Brazilian NGO. The program aimed at engaging communities in an informal way and bringing “gangs” into a dynamic process of dialogue between themselves, and with the police and MINUSTAH. Another example was the community violence reduction (CVR) program, a separate section of MINUSTAH established in 2007 as an attempt to do things differently in Haiti. The program aimed to create economic and social opportunities with a view to diverting gang members from violence. As the CVR team leader put it, “we realised that the DDR strategy was ill-adapted to the context, that local dynamics were more complex. […] If the other sections will deal with the state, this section will focus on the community-level.”
Another CVR official was even more critical: “each time the military officers ‘screw up’, we have to pick up the pieces. […] We constantly have to stabilise a situation previously destabilised by military units.” It might be too soon to see it as a “model for future interventions” — and one also needs to be careful with “one size fits all” mindsets — but these initiatives represent an interesting evolution in the security landscape in Haiti.

**CONCLUSION: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF INTERVENTION**

Haiti’s lack of proper sewage and sanitation systems, exacerbated by the 2010 earthquake have been labeled a “perfect storm” for the outbreak of the massive epidemic of cholera. This has been used by the UN to absolve itself from responsibility for the outbreak of cholera while facing a pending multimillion-dollar lawsuit. In the meantime, one could also use the cholera outbreak as a “perfect storm” analogy to understand the nature of local resistance to MINUSTAH, unveiling the limits of its securitization policy and of the international role in “strengthening” what has always been a highly politicized Haitian security sector. Similarly, debates surrounding the cholera outbreak shed new light on the “unintended consequences” of peacekeeping. Beyond the evaluation of outside interventions through “lessons learned” papers, the detrimental aspects of international presences, including the impact on local economies and structures of governance, also require attention. Haiti’s cholera crisis put this agenda at the forefront of debates.

In this context, a proper recognition of the social and political aspects of peace consolidation in Haiti must prevail over technocratic approaches. MINUSTAH has undoubtedly contributed to the “stabilization” of Haiti, even if at times in a politically partisan way. Had it not been for the UN’s presence, the transitional government would probably have been engulfed in the 2004–6 surge of violence. However, international and local actors must move beyond “stabilization” discourses and address structural violence. This requires a comprehensive overview of the intended and unintended impacts of international policies. What the UN may have failed to recognize in its successive Haitian missions, and perhaps most tellingly with MINUSTAH, is that international influences have historically been integral to Haiti’s political processes.

**Notes**


22. However, the term was later adopted by the demonstrators themselves. See: Henriette Lunde, *The Violent Lifeworlds of Young Haitians Gangs as Livelihood in a Port-au-Prince Ghetto*, Haiti Youth Project, Fafo paper 2012, no. 3 (2012), 16–17.
29. As Kevin Kennedy, Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General noted in a personal interview, it might be an occupation, but “with a lesser case ‘o.” Interview with Kevin Kennedy, MINUSTAH D-SRSG, 2 February 2011, Port-au-Prince.
36. Interestingly, certain human rights groups distinguished “the UN” (which they generally held in high esteem) from MINUSTAH (which they did not). Interview with Antonal Mortimé, Executive Secretary, Plate-forme des Organisations Haïtiennes des Droits Humains, Port-au-Prince, 6 December 2011; Pierre Espérance, Executive Director, RNDDH, Port-au-Prince, 1 December 2011.
38. For a good account of the debate around the origin of the epidemic, see: Lundahl, *The Political Economy of Disaster*, 195–199.
40. Interview with Louis Riccardo Chachoute, Adviser to the Ministry of Justice, Port-au-Prince, 8 December 2011.
41. Interview with Pedro Braum, Viva Rio, Port-au-Prince, 3 February 2011.
42. Farmer, Haiti After the Earthquake, 196; Coughlin, "WikiLeaks Haiti."
43. Marcel Biato, "Brazil’s Mission in Haiti," in Jorge Heine and Andrew Thompson (eds.), Fixing Haiti, 194; An opinion corroborated by the Head of the Brazilian contingent within MINUSTAH. Interview with Luiz Eduardo Ramos Pereira, Force Commander of MINUSTAH, 5 December 2011.
44. In January 2006, Brazilian MINUSTAH’s Force commander, Lieutenant General Urano Teixeira da Matta, committed suicide in his hotel room in Port-au-Prince. According to a document released by Wikileaks, Dominican Republic President, Leonel Fernandez, expressed skepticism about the official report, and hinted that suicide was invoked in order to protect the mission from domestic criticism, and that the General may have been killed by a paramilitary group. See “Dominican President Receives State DAS for Caribbean,” Aftenposten, 17 January 2011.
46. Alex Sanchez, “Endgame for Brazil’s Role in MINUSTAH?,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 29 August 2011. See also Amélie Gauthier and Sarah John de Sousa, Brazil in Haiti: Debate over the Peacekeeping Mission, FRIDE Comment, November 2006.
47. Sanchez, “Endgame for Brazil’s Role in MINUSTAH?”
51. Interview with Stephanie Ziebell, Monitoring & Evaluation Unit Team Leader, Community Violence Reduction Section, MINUSTAH, Port-au-Prince, 8 December 2011 (interview translated from French).
52. Interview with Dieusibon Pierre-Mérité, CVR Officer, Community Violence Reduction Section, MINUSTAH, Port-au-Prince, 8 December 2011; and Jacques Juvigny, CVR Officer, Community Violence Reduction Section, MINUSTAH, Port-au-Prince, 8 December 2011 (interviews translated from French).
55. Interview with Frantz Duval, Editor-in-chief, Le Nouvelliste, Port-au-Prince, 2 February 2011.
56. Fatton Jr., The Roots of Haitian Despotism, 41.
57. As the former Chief of the Political Affairs and Planning Section for the MINUSTAH, Gerard Le Chevallier, noted that “short-term operations will not be sufficient to address the many challenges in Haiti.” Le Chevallier, “The ‘MINUSTAH Experience?’” in Jorge Heine and Andrew Thompson (eds.), Fixing Haiti, 118.