

# The state and the securitization of civil society organizations in Nigeria

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**The State and the Securitization of Civil Society Organizations in Nigeria**

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## **Abstract**

While debates on the effects of the post-9/11 counter-terrorism measures (CTMs) on civil society organizations (CSOs) exist, there is a paucity of data on how CTMs are shaping the spaces and actors of CSOs in Nigeria. Using a mixed-methods design, this article analyses CSOs' perceptions on the effects of counter-terrorism financing measures, the counter-measures that CSOs are taking, and the government's views on the security threat posed by CSOs. The findings show that although CTMs were not as constraining, it appears to increase the administrative cost of CSOs and disadvantaged the less prominent CSOs forcing them to close down or merge with more prominent CSOs. Besides, the result shows the state's increasing interest in the activities of CSOs on the grounds of national security imperatives. Thus, I argue CTMs are evolving, and thus CSOs will experience increased financial regulations. Also, CTMs expansion will threaten CSOs' sustainability and polarize them.

**Keywords:** closing of civic space, de-risking, Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West African Province, combating terrorist financing, Recommendation eight regulations

## **Introduction**

The Australian Transaction and Reports Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), an organization charged with the responsibility of preventing and curbing terrorism financing, reported that it had identified links between nonprofit organizations and foreign terrorist group such as the Islamic State in Australia (Misra, 2018). Similarly, in September 2016, as part of its counterterrorism efforts, the Egyptian government froze the personal assets of five human rights activists and three Civil Society Organizations<sup>1</sup>(CSOs), including the Hisham Mubarak Law Center, the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, and the Egyptian Center for the Right to Education. Furthermore, the Egyptian government, through the Ministry of Social Solidarity, froze the bank accounts of other CSOs and subsequently appropriated these funds to support other state-co-opted CSOs (Brenchemacher, 2017).

The AUSTRAC report and the actions of the Egyptian government highlight attempts by states to establish and enforce sweeping antiterrorism financing laws. As part of post-9/11 global counterterrorism efforts, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), with the support of the United Nations and other international financial institutions, directed state actors and private financial organizations to adopt a risk-based, proportionate strategy in vetting the financial transactions of CSOs (Bolleyer and Gauja, 2017). The perception that CSOs are at high risk of infiltration and exploitation by terrorist groups informed the embrace and deployment of counterterrorism measures (CTMs) that regulated CSOs' access to foreign aid in different political contexts (Letts 2018, Watson and Burles, 2018; Howell and Lind 2010). However, the enforcement of the CTMs led to the securitization of

foreign aid which negatively affected the operationality of CSOs, closed civic spaces and transformed voluntary associational life (Dupuy and Prakash, 2018; Howell and Lind, 2010; Fowler and Sen, 2010; Sidel, 2010). In this article securitization is understood as “an articulated assemblage of practices where heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actors, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (sensations, thoughts) about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor's reason for choices and act by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy must be undertaken immediately to block its development” (Balzacq, 2011, p. 3).<sup>2</sup>

In Nigeria, the rise of jihadist terrorist groups: Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West African Province (ISWAP); and the rhetoric that CSOs serve as conduits for the transfer funds for terrorist groups, have provided a pretext for the establishment of CTMs. These include the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) 2011 (as amended) and the 2011 Money Laundering Prohibition Act (MLPA) (as amended). Parts of these laws seek to regulate the finances of CSOs. For instance, Section 13, subsection one, two and three of TPA, and Sections five, six, ten, thirteen and sixteen of MLPA authorize the Nigerian government, through financial institutions, to establish surveillance mechanisms in vetting and reporting all transactions of non-financial organizations to the Financial Intelligence Unit of the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC).

However, despite the debate on the intersections between CTMs and CSOs, there is a dearth of systematic study on the effects of counterterrorism measures on CSOs. Fowler and Sen (2010: 3) advocate the need to balance the debate on the securitization of aid in the context of CTMs with empirical studies, as "it provides a more finely grained complement to theoretical and macro-level analyses of the

incorporation of foreign aid into international security agendas." In response, the present study poses the following critical questions: How has the enforcement of CTMs securitised foreign aid for CSOs? Which types of CSOs are more likely to report financial constraints and why? What are the attendant adverse effects of CTMs on CSOs' operational capacities and how have CSOs responded? Using a mixed method design, I address the preceding questions by examining the perceptions of CSOs staff and executives on the effects of counterterrorism financing on their operations in Nigeria, the counter-measures that CSOs are taking, and the perspectives of the government on the security threat posed by CSOs. Nigeria is an important case study because the history of state-CSOs relations has been defined by political activism, which contributed to the fall of military rule. Hence, it is crucial to understand how CSOs make sense of and respond to CTMs that are evocative of military despotism. Moreover, the study builds on extant studies on how contextual factors influence the diverse manifestations of the post 9/11 global CTMs, thereby underscoring how CTMs are changing state-CSOs relations globally.

This study shows that, although counterterrorism financing laws were not too onerous in Nigeria, they appear to increase the administrative cost of CSOs and significantly nudge the smaller organizations towards merging with more prominent organizations. Human rights CSOs perceived higher administrative cost and experienced implementation gaps, and women's organisations also had higher perceptions that CTMs created financial difficulty, in part because women organisation engage in human rights advocacy for women and girls in Nigeria. Thus may be more "harassed" by government, and subject to more state control, due to the nature of their work. Further, the result underscores the state's increasing interest in

the finances and activities of CSOs on grounds of national security. Hence, I argue that CTMs are evolving and are incrementally placing restraints on CSOs. We may infer that, as CTMs gain ground in Nigeria, CSOs might experience increased regulations on access to foreign donor funds and a possible increase in operational costs. This may lead to an increase in the cooption of CSOs by the government or may even force some CSOs to close down operations. Also, the expansion of CTMs will threaten CSOs' sustainability and polarise them because of the weakening of their internal cohesion. This will make a collective resistance to CTMs difficult. The implication is that the prospects of CSOs in resisting illiberal policies of civilian governments would evaporate,

This article makes a distinctive contribution to the literature through a systematic study of the securitization of aid as part of CTMs, and its effects on the operational capacity of CSOs. It advances the debate on the diverse implications of global CTMs established after 9/11 and aids our understanding of the nebulous margins between security and development.

### **State of the Art: The Securitization of Aid and Civil Society Organizations**

During the 1980s and the early 1990s, Western governments and foreign donors viewed and engaged CSOs in promoting civil liberties, democratic ideals and delivery of critical services, particularly in developing countries (Dupuy et al., 2016). International development agencies saw CSOs “as crucial factors for social, economic and political development in the Global South” (Brass, 2020, 2). According to Lester Salamon, this was a period of associational revolution. However, the 1990s signalled the beginning of the shrinking of civic space due to the rise in the restrictions of

CSOs. Several factors account for the closing of CSOs' operational space. First were internal challenges such as CSOs' inability to operate independently of foreign donors' influence, lack of accountability to local communities and transparency in donor funds utilization. This created an excuse for government interference by regulating the sector (Krawczyk 2017, 2021; Dupuy and Prakesh, 2020; Watson & Burles, 2018). Second, governments in the Global South and Communist states saw Western support of CSOs as a threat to their national sovereignty or their grip on power (Krawczyk 2020, Rutzen, 2015). Third, there was a shift in donor support from CSOs to governments of the host country. In part, this was due to international development agencies' view about CSOs unsatisfactory performance in the implementation of development programmes (Krawczyk Rutzen 2015).

The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US was a watershed moment, as it reinforced the pre-existing criticisms of the operations of CSOs. Howell et al. 2008 stated that it "constituted a historical moment, a point of convergence and juncture where these growing threads of disquiet (about CSOs' activities) came together. Particularly, there were claims that the inherent lack of transparency and probity of CSOs made them vulnerable to being used by terrorists to channel funds (Rutzens, 2015). According to Hayes (2017) and Mackintosh and Duplat (2013), the perceived culpability of CSOs influenced the establishment of Recommendation 8 by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The FATF legal instrument directs states and private organizations to domesticate and enforce laws that prevent terrorist groups' use of CSOs to transfer funds through bank channels. Hence, state actors established and enforced laws and policies that effectively securitized foreign funding for CSOs. The securitization of CSOs influenced the decisions of international development agencies to change their policies, thereby leading to declining support for CSOs and the redirection of

assistance in a way that aligned with the agenda of their home governments' security objectives (Dupuy & Prakash, 2018). In the US, UK, Australia and Russia, studies have shown that CTMs had adverse effects on the operations of CSOs (Watson & Burles 2018; Brechenmacher, 2017). For example, Hayes (2017:1) stated: "Civic engagement became almost impossible. CSOs may have their registrations withdrawn, or bank accounts frozen. Bans on foreign financing are becoming increasingly common. Some countries have introduced complicated as well as time and resource-consuming administrative processes. This situation thwarts the work of CSOs all over the world and limits their independence" . According to Dupuy and Prakesh (2020), in Africa, many of the legal financial restrictions were aimed at closing the political and economic spaces available for CSOs to operate efficiently.

However, the effects of these new security measures on the operations of CSOs vary. In the US and the UK, the CSOs that faced strict government regulation were Muslim Charities and communities and other minority groups. In most cases, these organizations had their assets frozen by the Treasury Secretary (Sidel, 2010). For instance, in the UK, the narrative of protectionism was constructed to justify the extra burdens or requirements placed on CSOs, specifically those organizations believed by the state to be vulnerable to terrorist abuse (Howell and Lind, 2010). Furthermore, the fears of the Russian government over the growth of CSOs due to increase in foreign donor funding led to the establishment of NGO laws (Federal Law No. 18-FZ) and the Foreign Agent Law (Federal Law No. 121 FZ) in 2006 and 2012 respectively (Watson & Burles, 2018). These laws placed administrative burdens on CSOs that received foreign funding. It further de-legitimized these CSOs before the Russian public due to the government mandates that all CSOs receiving foreign funds should label themselves as “foreign agents” in all official communications (Skokova,

at al., 2018).

In aid recipient countries such as Afghanistan, India, Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya and Uganda, the narrative that CSOs are a source of terrorist financing contributed to the establishment of state-level CTMs that regulate CSOs finances. Dupuy & Prakash (2018, 2020) claim that it contributed to changing foreign donors' attitudes towards CSOs in aid recipient countries, as they aligned their policy with that of the government of recipient countries. Fisher and Anderson (2015) argue that these governments influenced donors to view opposition groups as "national security threats" to their regimes and donors' interests, thus contributing to the securitization of development and aid policy. The re-alignment of foreign donors to government agendas due to CTMs gave states leverage to deploy aid strategically (Njoku, 2018; Fowler and Sen, 2010). According to Howell (2014), governments of aid recipient countries often utilize aid tactically to co-opt cooperative CSOs and repress those considered as terrorism supporters or those engaging in political activism (Watson & Burles, 2018). This seems to have been the case in Afghanistan and India (Howell & Lind, 2010).

Similarly, in Ethiopia and Egypt, the state banned human rights, advocacy and development CSOs from receiving foreign funds through a series of CSO regulatory laws. Thus, many CSOs were forced to shut down their operations, while others moved away from human rights advocacy to social service provision (Dupuy et al., 2014; Brechenmacher, 2017). In Kenya and Uganda, the state used the narrative of counterterrorism to repress key opposition and human rights CSOs. In the case of Kenya, however, the government repressed Muslim and human rights CSOs but supported Christian groups. Foreign donors were funding CSOs through the state-controlled Governance, Justice, Law and Order programme (GJLO) although only

favoured CSOs were assisted (Howell & Lind, 2010).

In West Africa and Nigeria in particular, there is a paucity of studies regarding the securitization of foreign aid for CSOs due to the enforcement of CTMs. Furthermore, though many debates have focused on the theoretical analysis regarding the link between CTMs and CSOs, no distinct pattern is identified in the literature (Stevens, 2010). This article responds to Van der Borgh and Terwindt's (2012:1066) charge that 'to understand the actual impact of these restrictions (CTMs) on NGOs, it is important to distinguish between the very different challenges and threats that specific civil society organizations are facing in different political contexts and the way in which these affect their operations.' Thus, the article examines CSOs' perceptions of the state's counter-terrorism financing regulations, government's rationale for implementing CTMs, the responses of CSOs, and the implications of the CTMs.

### **Civil Society Organizations, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Financing Laws in Nigeria**

The history of state-CSOs relations in Nigeria has been defined by contestations on socio-political and economic issues from the 1980s to the 1990s, particularly during military rule. Scholars attribute the fall of military dictatorship to CSOs' active civic defiance. However, after the return to civilian rule, the political activism that defined CSOs in Nigeria declined (Aiyede, 2004). Also, following the rise of terrorism by Boko Haram and ISWAP, CSOs were vocal in denouncing terrorism and were mitigating the effects of terrorism and counter-terrorism operations through service provision and advocacy in Northeast Nigeria,

where counter-terrorism operations are ongoing. However, the narrative that terrorist groups fund their organizations by using CSOs led to government suspicion of many CSOs operating in the North-East. Also, the advocacy work of CSOs attracted government's antagonism; they claim that such actions by CSOs are supportive of terrorist groups and put the country in a bad light internationally (Njoku 2017, 2019). Thus, in response to terrorist threats, the Nigerian government enacted a series of counter-terrorism financing laws to curb the activities of terrorists (TPA and MLPA). These laws empowered the government and financial institutions to surveil the transactions of CSOs and other non-financial organizations. Aspects of the law mandate banks to disclose to the government certain transactions, especially those above \$1000. The law also requires CSOs to submit their financial activities. Thus, it would be interesting to understand state-CSOs relations following the enforcement of CTMs that are gradually becoming evocative of military despotism in Nigeria's historical trajectory. This will advance extant discourses on how domestic socio-political factors influence the diverse manifestations of CTMs.

Therefore, this study examines the perceptions of CSO programme officers and executives on the effects of CTMs, their responses, and government's perception of the security threat posed by CSOs.

## **Methods**

A concurrent triangulation mixed methods design, which is comprised of quantitative and qualitative data, was adopted for this study. Both types of data were used to enrich the results, provide more in-depth insights into the research questions, and ensure the reliability and validity of the study. The quantitative data provides empirical evidence on CSOs' perceptions of the impact of CTMs on their operations

and their views on government rationale for enforcing CTMs. It also provides evidence on CSOs' responses to CTMs and the type or size of CSOs that was more likely to be affected by CTMs. The qualitative data buttressed the quantitative data findings and advanced our understanding of the government's perception of the threats posed by CSOs. The qualitative data also provided information on variances in the impact of CTMs on CSOs by types or sizes.

### ***Sample Size and Sampling Technique***

The study population include programme officers of CSOs that engage in capacity building, technical assistance and advocacy in North-east Nigeria. I identified 445 programme officers from the records of 26 CSOs included in the study. In addition, ten CSO executives from the 26 selected CSOs and six government officials<sup>3</sup> were purposively selected because of their knowledge, engagement or confrontations with the government on counter-terrorism programmes. The six government officials include four senior military officers, one counter-terrorism officer in the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), and one Foreign Service Officer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The main justification for selecting these government officials is that they are high ranking officers who, at the time of the fieldwork, were still involved in the formulation of counter-terrorism policy and had led field operations for years in the North-east. Moreover, interviewing the ONSA official is essential as the TPA Act of 2011 (as amended) empowered the ONSA to coordinate counter-terrorism operations in Nigeria.

A survey design method was adopted and a stratified sampling technique utilized. The unit of stratification is the organization. A sample size of 211 out of the 445 CSO programme officers was statistically determined using Taro Yamane

technique (Yamane 1973). Proportional sampling was then employed to ascertain the precise copies of questionnaire administered to programme officers of youth/children, women, faith-based and human rights CSOs. However, 205 copies of the questionnaire were completed and analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics. The results show that 33 respondents, or 16.1 %, were from youth/children CSOs, 39 (19.0%) from women CSOs, 64 (31.2%) from faith-based CSOs, and 69 (33.7%) were from human rights CSOs. Also, 57.1% and 42.9 % of respondents were male and female, respectively. Additionally, 68 participants were from small CSOs<sup>4</sup> while 137 participants were from big CSOs. The sizes of CSOs were measured in terms of the number of branches: single branch classified as small; multi-branch is classified as big.

The purposive sampling technique was used in selecting respondents for interviews. The need to get the perspective of individuals working in CSOs that engaged in humanitarian, development, advocacy and peacebuilding services in North-eastern Nigeria also informed the participants' purposive selection. The technique helped the researcher to identify ten CSOs executives with aid delivery and advocacy projects in the North-east and made it possible to locate those with information on experiences with CTMs in Nigeria. Similarly, the approach also helped select six key government officials in charge of formulating and enforcing CTMs.

### ***Data Collection***

The study obtained data from both primary and secondary sources. A questionnaire was used in collecting data from CSOs programme officers (not executives).

While four respondents emailed their copies of the questionnaire, 201 were collected in person. In-depth interviews were conducted with executives of CSOs and government officials, including security agents involved in CTMs, between December 2014 and November 2015. Primary data collection focused on the securitization of CSOs by states as part of CTMs. Government documents, reports and relevant literature were sources of secondary data. The collection of secondary data took place between December 2014 and December 2018.

### ***Measures***

The survey instruments were designed to gather information on prevailing issues regarding CTMs and CSOs as reviewed from relevant literature (Howell and Lind, 2010) and related research instruments developed by the Charity and Security Network in 2013. The respondents were asked to rank their responses on the overall impact of CTMs on their operations in North-eastern Nigeria on a nominal scale (Yes = 1; No = 2), in response to the following statements: CTMs have increased your operational cost; experienced constraints during financial transactions with banks due to CTMs concerns; CTMs have led to a loss of financial resources. Moreover, respondents were asked to rank their responses of specific CTMs that are affecting their operations in the North-east in a nominal scale of Yes= 1; No = 2, such as delays in opening bank accounts, demands for more documentation in processing withdrawals from accounts as part of the enforcement of CTMs, delays in international transfers from donor organizations abroad due to terrorism concerns;

denial of access to transferred funds, denial of access to bank accounts, and closure of bank accounts.

Also, respondents were asked to rank their responses when asked if the implementation of CTMs has made them halt the implementation of their programmes in North-eastern, Nigeria. The Linkert scale was used to rank their responses ranging from "1 = not at all" to "5 = very often". Furthermore, the respondents were also asked to rank their responses on the rationale behind government increasing interest in their activities in North-eastern Nigeria. These include questions such as the government believes that CSOs provide moral support to groups engaged in terrorist acts; the government believes that CSOs provide financial support to groups engaged in terrorist acts; the government believes that CSOs are an ideological root for groups engaged in terrorist acts, and the government believes CSOs are a recruitment ground for terrorist groups. The Linkert scale was used to rank their responses ranging from "1 = undecided" to "5 = strongly agree". Lastly, the respondents were asked to rank their responses on their organizations' efforts in influencing the government to amend or change their CTMs. These comprised of questions such as, you lobbied the government to change or amend some of its CTMs; your organization testified before legislative committees on the effects of CTMs on your operations; your organization has taken the government to court to clarify certain provisions in terrorism laws. The Linkert scale was also used to rank their responses ranging from "1 = undecided" to "5 = strongly agree."

### *Data Analysis*

The quantitative data were analyzed using descriptive statistics such as frequency counts, percentages, and inferential statistics using cross-tabulation and Pearson chi-square. Alpha values of less than 0.05 were used to determine whether there were significant differences in responses by organization types. The analysis was performed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences. Qualitative methodology included content analysis to generate themes such as limitations/regulation of CSOs' access to foreign funds and its implications on CSOs operational capacity, government reasons for regulating CSOs finances, and the responses of CSOs to government's CTMs. The themes served as the framework for the presentation of findings from primary and secondary data.

### **Findings**

#### *The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Financing Regulations: Increase in Administrative Costs, Financial Constraints and Loss of Resources*

**[Table 1 Here]**

As shown in Table 1, 49.3% of respondents agreed that CTMs increased cost of operations. Programme officers of human rights CSOs (76.8%) were significantly more likely to state that CTMs increased administrative costs compared to those of faith-based (40.6%) and youth/children CSOS (18.2%). However, there was no significant difference in the perception that CTMs increased the cost of operation based on the size of CSOs ( $p>0.05$ ). Furthermore, 31.2% of

respondents affirmed that CTMs led to increasing financial constraints. There was no difference in perception that CTMs led to an increase in financial constraints by CSOs' type and size. Regarding loss of resources, only 24.4% of the respondents agreed that CTMs led to a loss of resources. Programme officers from women CSOs (41.0%) and multi-branch CSOs (29.9%) were significantly more likely to assert that CTMs led to a loss of resources.

This was also buttressed in the qualitative data, as five interviewed human rights CSOs executives (HRCSOs) and a faith-based CSO focused on humanitarianism stated that the practices of the government had created gaps in effective and timely project implementations. They believed that these practices or demands from the state created an increase in administrative costs. For instance, HRCSO 3 stated that due to government CTMs the administration of their organizations "is a little more demanding than it was previously."<sup>5</sup> Executives of faith-based CSO and HRCSO 5 said that state's refusal to provide security for their field operations in the North-east and the high cost of transportation of both material and human resources increased their administrative costs.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, an executive of a development-focused CSO also stated that "the truth is that there are no security covers, so people (CSOs) do not go to those conflict areas."<sup>7</sup> HRCSO 5 stated that due to the increase in administrative costs, they had to join multi-branch CSOs in order to survive.<sup>8</sup>

*The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Financing Regulations: Restriction of Access to Foreign Funds*

**[Table 2 (a) here]**

Table 2(a) and 2(b) summarizes CSO programme officers responses to specific questions on areas where they have experienced financial constraints due to the implementation of CTMs. First, 74.6% of the 205 respondents reported that they did not experience any. There was no significant difference in responses to the view that CTMs led to delays in opening bank accounts by organization size and type (P-value>0.05). Similarly, the majority of the participants (70.7%) stated that they had not experienced banks demanding more information during financial transactions, again with no significant difference by organization type or size (P-value>0.05). Only 23.9% of the respondents agreed that CTMs have led to delay in the international transfer of funds, but there was no difference in responses by CSOs' size and type (P-value>0.05).

**[Table 2 (b) here]**

Table 2 (b) summarizes three areas in which programme officers of CSOs have experienced pressures. First, 15.1% of the respondents agreed that they had experienced denial of transferred funds, while 84.9 % disagreed. Specifically, 30.8% of the respondents in women CSOs agreed, compared to only 4.3% of the respondents belonging to human rights CSOs. Respondents who work in multi-branch CSOs were significantly more likely to agree that CTMs led to the denial of access to transferred funds (P-value <0.05).

The analysis also revealed that 15.6% all participants agreed that CTM led to the denial of access to accounts while 14.2% of participants agreed that it led to closure of accounts. Respondents who work with multi-branch CSOs and those who work with women CSOs were significantly more likely to assert that CTMs led to the denial of access to bank accounts and closure of bank accounts (P-value>0.05).

Furthermore, the findings from the interviews with executives of CSOs on financial restrictions corroborated the analysis above. Specifically, an executive of HRCSO 1, when asked about the challenges he experienced in the enforcement of CTMs, responded : "the only one that I know is international funding.

Unlike before it is easier to write a proposal and get money, but now you have to go through a lot of processes...you must get clearance or approval or be certified by the government. These are additional constraints that were not there before."<sup>9</sup>.

However, HRCSO 2 and a development-focused CSOs executive said that, although the new regulations created financial constraints, they were given access to their funds as soon as they were able to meet up with the state's directives.

Explicitly, HRCSO 2 stated that "Yes we used to have (financial constraints).

Some few months back, we had directives from the EFCC that every organization must disclose its sources of funding; when we did what was required of us; we were allowed to continue our operations. But within that period there was a deadline so any organizations that were unable to meet that deadline they had to instruct the bank to freeze the account."<sup>10</sup> HRCSO 3 identified the MLPA of

2011 (as amended) as one of the major CTMs that caused financial restrains. He stated thus: "generally the money-laundering Act is the most visible provision.

Over time the use of financial institutions has become more restricted and more regulated."<sup>11</sup> I probed further to understand how MLPA affected his organization;

he re-affirmed the views of HRCSOs 1 & 2 by stating that “you have to give a lot more documentation when you are making transfers. Sometimes inflows (funds) come in, and you are required to provide a series of documentation before it can be transferred into your account.”<sup>12</sup> However, HRCSO 3 gave an account of how these laws also extend beyond the organization’s bank accounts to their private accounts. Explicitly he stated that “I recalled an incident where a company I transacted with abroad needed to pay me and they transferred the money and it came into Access Bank, and then they (Bank) decided that the money was questionable and without consulting me they returned the money to the sender. It was only when they (organization) received the money they alerted me that the money failed to hit my account, as I speak to you I have not been able to recover the money because they say it has been flagged as a questionable transfer.”<sup>13</sup>

In addition, I sought to know if the government has frozen the accounts of these CSOs as part of CTMs. All the executives of the CSOs interviewed reported that the government had not frozen their accounts. However, HRCSO 4 recounted that the government had been monitoring their accounts, which explains the demands for documentation. According to him, “There is a requirement by banks to declare sources of funds so if funds are transferred from donors, we inform them. It is EFCC that is enforcing that regulations and the banks had to inform them. There are some CSOs that had that experiences (constraints in access to funds); a particular CSOs went to withdraw money, and he was told to fill a certain form and explain certain things. That is still within the level of monitoring account.”<sup>14</sup>

**[Table 3 here]**

I also probed to understand if the delays and difficulty reported by some CSOs programme officers and executives have any impact on their ability to implement their programmes. Of the 205 programme officers surveyed, 38.5% reported that the implementation of CTMs had made them halt the implementation of their programmes occasionally. However, programme officers of HRCSOs were significantly more likely to assert that their activities were hindered by the implementation of CTMs, with 24.6% and 34.8% of HRCSOs stating that they occasionally and often halted the implementation of their programmes due to CTMs. These HRCSOs provide advocacy services regarding justice for victims of terrorism and counterterrorism operations, for vulnerable individuals and terrorist suspects illegally incarcerated in government detention centres. Youth/children CSOs were the least affected, with 57.6 % of their workers affirming that they did not halt the implementation of their programmes due to CTMs. Likewise, single-branch CSOs (51.5%) were significantly more likely to affirm that CTMs made them halt their programme implementation compared to multi-branch CSOs (32.1%) (P-value<0.05).

Additionally, interviewed executives of HRCSOs and women who focused on humanitarian development stated that due to the breakdown of law and order in the North-east, the cost of operations became expensive. Hence, they lacked the needed funds to cover the high cost of transportation and hire private security, as the government did not provide security for CSOs operating in the North-east. Interestingly, executives of youth/children and HRCSOs stated that the complexities involved in accessing foreign aid influenced their use of personal funds in carrying out urgent projects in lieu of funds awaiting government clearance. However, private funds were not enough, and many were thus forced to terminate on-going projects.

Overall, the results of the survey showed that securitization of foreign funding for CSOs was not as constraining as we would expect. However, it appears that HRCSOs and women CSOs experienced administrative or financial constraints, respectively, compared to other types of CSOs. Also, while CTMs contributed the administrative and financial challenges experienced by HRCSOs and women CSOs other factors such as lack of private security personnel to provide protection for CSOs during field operations and the high cost of transportation to the North-east were major challenges reported. The results are evocative of those of Njoku (2017) who found that 52% and 40% of CSOs in Nigeria reported being denied access to information and being denied access to victims of counter-terrorism operations respectively; and 36% of CSOs stated that occasionally government closed down their programmes. Also, women and human rights groups' financial constraints were traced to their humanitarian and advocacy for women and girls in the North-east. Because women CSOs often report cases of sexual violence and other human rights violations committed by counterterrorism security agents to international governmental and non-governmental organizations, they are at odds with the government. The government believes that such reports tarnish its image globally and impinges on access to foreign military aid (Njoku, 2020a; 2020b; 2019)

The visibility of multi-branch CSOs may have influenced why they are closely monitored by the state. This may partly explain the differences in their experiences of slight financial constraints when compared to the experiences of single-branch CSOs. . However, while multi-branch CSOs were able to meet up with these state's regulations and continue operating, some single-branch CSOs had to halt their programmes. Though CTMs contributed to the above challenges, scholars have argued that the loss of confidence of foreign donors in funding single-branch or less

prominent CSOs due to terrorism concerns may have also played a part (Howell and Lind, 2010).

### ***The Nigerian government and Counter-terrorism Enforcement***

Senior government officials, including security operatives involved in policymaking and enforcement, confirmed the views held by CSOs. Officers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Office of National Security Adviser (ONSA) stated that most CSOs are not objectively stating government rationale for regulating the sector. The ONSA counter-terrorism officer said the state had reports of some international non-governmental organizations (I-NGO), specifically Muslim Trusts and Charity Foundations which were involved in funding Boko Haram and other terrorist groups in Africa.<sup>15</sup> The MFA officer reiterated that government CTMs targeted CSO finances because suspicious INGOs were funding CSOs to challenge the Nigerian government and frustrate laudable counter-terrorist efforts of the state.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, foreign financing was a national security issue.

Another rationale given by government representatives for weakening CSOs' capacity was that some organizations were making efforts to destabilize government CTMs in the North-east. Explicitly, senior army officers involved in the planning of CTMs said that while CSOs provided services, some wanted to destabilize CTM programmes. In the words of an officer, "we must also define what is being played out by some of these CSOs as currently constituted.

...Some of their interests tend to undermine the conduct of operations. So, it was the radicals that were causing the problem."<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, the MFA officer stated

that "there are some CSOs criticising the actions of the Nigerian Army as genocide and do not [get] to see the negative acts of the terrorist groups... Always portraying the Nigerian army in a bad light."<sup>18</sup>

Therefore, the government believes that the advocacy actions of some CSOs are inimical to the success of its CTMs. Recently, Adesomoju (2018: 1) reported that "the Federal Government has begun the profiling of about 100 NGOs, with the aim of de-registering those of them that have "deviated" from their mandate. The former Director of Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit...said...the profiling was necessary given the emerging threat of 'nonprofit organisations' being used as veritable tools to launder money and finance terrorism' in Nigeria and other West African countries." However, how do CSOs make sense of the perception that they are channels for terrorist proliferation in Nigeria? This is discussed in the next section.

### ***Responses of Civil Society Organizations to Government Counterterrorism***

#### ***Measures***

In order to understand the state's increasing interest in CSOs finances, I examined the perception of CSOs' programme officers and executives on the rationale behind the establishment of financial regulatory measures as part of CTMs.

**[Table 4 (a) here]**

As shown in Table 4 (a), 23.9% agreed that the state believed that their organization provided material or moral support to terrorists, although there was significant variation by organization type. Programme officers of women (38.5%) and faith-based CSOs (32.8%) were significantly more likely to agree that government believed that their organizations provided material and moral support to terrorists compared to those of youth/children (15.2%) and human rights CSOs (11.5%) (P-value<0.05). Also, 23% agreed that the state believed that they provided financial support to terrorists with significant variation by CSO type and size. Programme officers in multi-branch CSOs (27.7%) and those of women (35.9%) and faith-based CSOs (32.8%) were significantly more likely to state that the government believed that they provided financial support for terrorists.

**[Table 4 (b) here]**

As shown in Table 4 (b), 29.8% of respondents agreed that the state believed that CSOs constituted an ideological root for terrorism, although there is significant variation by CSOs size and types. Respondents from women (48.7%) and faith-based CSO (39.1%) were more likely to share the view that government saw CSOs as ideological roots for terrorism. Similarly, workers in multi-branch CSOs (38%) compared to single-branch CSOs (13.3%) shared the view that the government saw CSOs as ideological roots for terrorism (P-value <0.05). Moreover, 19.5 % of

respondents agreed that the government CSOs are a recruitment ground for terrorist.

Perhaps, the responses of women and faith-based groups may not come as a surprise, as there is emerging literature on the increasing roles of women and girls in terrorist acts. Also, women groups and activism have increased in Northeastern Nigeria (Nwangwu and Ezeibe, 2019; ICG, 2016). This may have influenced the state's increasing interest in women's and girls' activities in terrorist zones. Besides, the results on faith-based CSOs resonated with conclusions of scholars in other political contexts that governments treated Muslim groups as suspect communities (Sidel, 2010; Howell and Lind, 2010). However, my analysis did not differentiate different types of faith-based CSOs. Thus, further research could explain which faith-based CSOs are likely to be perceived by the government as providing material support to terrorism in Nigeria.

**[Table 5 here]**

Another pertinent focus of this article is to understand efforts made by CSOs to influence the government into changing or amending its counter-terrorism financing laws that they believe impose a higher administrative cost. As presented in Table 5, a vast majority of CSOs (90.7%) had not lobbied the government, 89.8% had not testified before the legislative committee over CTMs, and 89.8% affirmed that their CSOs had not taken the government to court. Nevertheless, women and faith-based organizations and multi-branch CSOs were more likely to have sued the government compared to those from youth/children and human rights or single-branch organizations

(P-value<0.05).

Moreover, the executives of youth/children and women CSOs doing peace-building, humanitarianism and development work stated that they had not sought to influence the government into changing/amending CTMs. This result is also expected, as the majority of CSOs reported not experiencing financial constraints from the state's CTMs. However, two HRC SO executives said they have continued to hold government accountable over CTMs and voiced the need for government to respect the human rights of vulnerable groups.<sup>19</sup>

## **Discussion**

What do these findings tell us about how the implementation of CTMs has securitized or is securitizing foreign aid to CSOs in Nigeria? First, even though CTMs that regulate CSOs' finances were not as constraining as we would have expected, CTMs appear to have increased the administrative cost of CSOs and significantly disadvantaged the single-branch or less prominent CSOs. Human rights CSOs reported higher organizational costs and faced difficulties in implementing their programmes due to government antagonism towards their political activism.

Similarly, women groups also faced financial problems, in part due to their advocacy efforts for vulnerable women and girls whose rights have been violated by security agents in counter-terrorism operations in the North-east. The results also show the state's increasing interest in the finances and activities of CSOs on the grounds of national security imperatives. The CTM laws are evolving and incrementally placing restraints on CSOs, although not as much as observed in other aid recipient countries in Africa such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Brenchemacher, 2017; Dupuy et al., 2014).

Specific indicators show increasing securitization of foreign funding for

CSOs. These include the requirements by the EFCC and the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) requesting that financial institutions should monitor and reports the transactions of CSOs and the re-registration of CSOs with the EFCC, despite their due registration with the Corporate Affairs Commission. They are also directed by the EFCC to undergo expensive audits and report on financial activities. In 2020, the Nigerian government, through the Central Bank of Nigeria, froze the bank accounts of 20 protesters on account of suspected terrorist financing. These 20 persons were among a large number of Nigerian youths campaigning against police brutality which was tagged "EndSARS"-End Special Anti-Robbery Squad (Punch, 2020). All this points to the increasing securitization of foreign aid to CSOs.

Supporting the preceding interpretations, the Charity Finance Group (2018) reported the increasing financial difficulties that charities in the UK face due to bank de-risking policies in compliance with CTMs. Counter-terrorism financing laws have also created financial burdens and administrative difficulties on CSOs in the US, Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya, and Uganda (Brechenmacher, 2017; Dupuy et al., 2014; Sidel, 2010; Howell and Lind, 2010).

Furthermore, as regards the responses of CSOs to CTMs, the Nigerian case advances extant arguments on CSOs' lack of collective resistance to CTMs. Explicitly, in the US, UK, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, India, and Afghanistan, mainstream CSOs were reticent to CTMs because it did not affect them; only human rights and Muslim CSOs resisted repressive CTMs (Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire, 2010; Howell and Lind, 2010; Sidel, 2010, Stevens and Jailobaeva 2010).

Moreover, Nigerian CSOs lack of challenge to government's

CTMs differ from some African countries. For instance, in Egypt and Kenya, some CSOs respectively sued the state and protested against CTMs (Brechenmacher, 2017; Howell, 2014; Howell and Lind, 2010). The lack of collective and active resistance to CTMs in Nigeria is traced to the weakening of civil activism in Nigeria. Aiyede (2004) and Obadare (2004) contend that since the return to civil rule in 1999 in Nigeria, the political advocacy nature that once defined CSOs during military rule has waned.

### **Conclusion: Further reflections on the impact of CTMs on CSOs in Nigeria**

#### **Since 2001**

This article analyzes CSOs' views on the effects of state CTMs in Nigeria, the government's reason for CTMs, CSOs' responses, and implications of CTMs. Fears by some members of the Nigerian legislature that CTMs will give the executive inordinate power caused a delay in passing CTM laws, frustrating several attempts by the executive between 2005 and 2010. However, in 2011, after CTMs were established, CSOs began to report increasing government influence on their operations such as restriction of access to information and victims of counter-terrorism, and forceful amendment of CSOs programmes. The governments controlled the realm of the political and nonpolitical in the context of counter-terrorism in Nigeria (Njoku, 2017, 2020c). Although CSOs in Nigeria reported less financial constraint compared to other countries in Africa, this study shows that government interest in CSOs' finances is growing. Government's cognizance of CSOs' history of activism and the fact that Nigeria's CTMs are relatively new, might explain the low level of constraints that CSOs are experiencing. However, recent

events show that CTMs are evolving. This includes the amendment of the TPA of 2011 in 2013. The amendment expanded the regulations of the finances of non-financial organizations and punishment for terrorist financiers or those providing material support. The Financial Intelligence Unit – previously under EFCC – was made autonomous, empowered and renamed (NFIU) to effectively enforce TPA and MLPA of 2011 (as amended).

Meanwhile, a former director of NFIU labeled some CSOs as deviants and terrorist financiers in Africa and vowed to de-register many of them. There is an NGO regulatory bill in the legislature. If passed into law, it will place significant restrictions on all foreign funding for CSOs in Nigeria. Also, in 2019, the Nigerian senate adopted a motion aimed at monitoring how CSOs utilizes foreign fund (*Punch*, 2019). Finally, in 2019, the Presidency established a new Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development, and proposed the establishment of a central coordinating body for international humanitarian responses in order to check allegations of fund diversion (Ojeme 2019). Hence, as CTMs consolidate in Nigeria, CSOs will face intense restriction on access to foreign funds and many less prominent or community-based CSOs operating in the Northeast will shut down their operations.



Table 1 Effects of CTMs on CSOs' administrative cost, finances and resources by organisational types and sizes

Variables	CTMs have increase administrative Cost				CTMs have increase financial constraints				CTMs have led to loss of resources			
	Yes		No		Yes		No		Yes		No	
	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.
All participants	N=101	49.3	N=104	50.7	N=64	31.2	N=141	68.8	N=50	24.4	N=155	75.6
<b>Organization type</b>												
Youth/children	6	18.2	27	81.8	6	18.2	27	81.8	3	9.1	30	90.9
Women	16	41.0	23	59.0	15	38.5	24	61.5	16	41.0	23	59.0
Faith-based	26	40.6	38	59.4	22	34.4	42	29.8	19	29.7	45	70.3
Human rights	53	76.8	616	23.2	21	30.4	48	69.6	12	17.4	57	82.6
p-values	<0.001				0.275				0.005			
<b>Organisational size</b>												
Single-branch CSOs	35	51.5	33	48.5	23	33.8	45	66.2	9	13.2	59	86.8
Multi-branch CSOs	66	48.2	71	51.8	41	29.9	96	70.1	41	29.9	96	70.1
P-values	0.657				0.571				0.009			

Table 2 (a): Restrictions of CSOs access to foreign funds by organisational types and sizes

Variables	Delays in opening bank accounts				Demanding more information				Delay in international transfer			
	Yes		No		Yes		No		Yes		No	
	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.
<b>All participants</b>	N=52	25.4	N=153	74.6	N=60	29.3	N=145	70.7	N=49	23.9	N=156	76.1
<b>Organizational type</b>												
Youth/children	4	12.1	29	87.9	5	15.2	28	84.8	4	12.1	29	87.9
Women	9	23.1	30	76.9	12	30.8	27	69.2	12	30.8	27	69.2
Faith-based	21	32.8	43	67.2	23	35.9	41	64.1	20	31.3	44	68.8
Human rights	18	26.1	51	73.9	20	29.0	49	71.0	13	18.8	56	81.2
p-values	0.168				0.204				0.094			
<b>Organisational size</b>												
Single-branch CSOs	21	30.9	47	69.1	22	34.4	46	67.6	17	25.0	51	75.0
Multi-branch CSOs	31	22.6	106	77.4	38	27.7	99	72.3	32	23.4	105	76.6
P-values	0.201				0.494				0.795			

Table 2 (b): Restrictions of CSOs access to foreign funds by organisational types and size

Variables	Denial of access to transferred funds				Denial of access to accounts				Closure of accounts			
	Yes		No		Yes		No		Yes		No	
	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.
<b>All participants</b>	N=31	15.1	N=174	84.9	N=32	15.6	N=173	84.4	N=29	14.19	N=176	85.9
<b>Organization type</b>												
<b>Youth/children</b>	0	0.0	33	100.0	1	3.0	32	97.0	1	3.8	32	97.0
<b>Women</b>	12	30.8	27	69.2	14	35.9	25	64.1	12	30.8	27	69.2
<b>Faith-based</b>	16	25.0	48	75.0	16	25.0	48	75.0	16	25.0	48	75.0
<b>Human rights</b>	3	4.3	66	95.7	1	1.4	68	98.6	0	0.0	69	100.0
<b>P-values</b>	0.000				0.000				0.000			
<b>Size of organisations</b>												
<b>Single-branch CSOs</b>	4	5.9	64	94.1	1	1.5	67	98.5	1	1.5	67	98.5
<b>Multi-branch CSOs</b>	27	19.7	110	80.3	31	15.6	106	77.4	28	20.4	109	76.6
<b>P-values</b>	0.009				0.000				0.000			

Table 3: Effects of CTMs on CSOs' operations by organisational types and size

Variable	The implementation of CTMs have made you halt the implementations of your programmes										P-value
	Not at all		Not often		Occasionally		Often		Very often		
	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	
<b>All participants</b>	N=29	14.1	N=77	37.6	N=79	38.5	N=19	9.3	N=1	0.5	
<b>Organization type</b>											
<b>Youth/children</b>	3	9.1	19	57.6	10	30.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	0.000
<b>Women</b>	6	15.4	14	35.9	19	48.7	0	0.0	0	0.0	
<b>Faith-based</b>	8	12.5	29	45.3	26	40.6	1	1.6	0	0.0	
<b>Human rights</b>	12	17.4	15	21.7	24	34.8	17	24.6	1	1.4	
<b>Size of organisations</b>											0.015
<b>Single-branch CSOs</b>	7	10.3	23	33.8	35	51.5	2	2.9	1	1.5	
<b>Multi-branch CSOs</b>	22	16.1	54	39.4	44	32.1	17	12.4	0	0.0	

Table 4 (a): CSOs perceptions on the rationale behind government CTMs by organisational types and size

Variables	Government believe that your organisation provide material or moral support to terrorists										Government believe that you provide financial support to terrorist									
	Undecided		Strongly disagree		Disagree		Agree		Strongly agree		Undecided		Strongly disagree		Disagree		Agree		Strongly agree	
	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.
<b>All participants</b>	N=13	6.3	N=112	54.6	N=31	15.1	N=46	22.4	N=3	1.5	N=15	7.3	N=112	54.6	N=31	15.1	N=45	22.0	N=2	1.0
<b>Organization type</b>	1	3.0	15	45.5	12	36.4	5	15.2	0	0.0	1	3.0	13	39.4	11	33.3	8	24.2	0	0.0
<b>Youth/children</b>																				
<b>Women</b>	1	2.6	20	51.3	3	7.7	15	38.5	0	0.0	1	2.6	20	51.3	4	10.3	14	35.9	0	0.0
<b>Faith-based</b>	5	7.8	26	40.6	12	18.8	21	32.8	0	0.0	5	7.8	28	43.8	10	15.6	21	32.8	0	0.0
<b>Human rights</b>	6	8.7	51	73.9	4	5.8	5	7.2	3	4.3	8	11.6	51	73.9	6	8.7	2	2.9	2	2.9
<b>P-values</b>	0.000										0.000									
<b>Size of organisations</b>																				
<b>Single-branch CSOs</b>	1	1.5	39	57.4	15	22.1	12	17.6	1	1.5	2	2.9	45	66.2	14	20.6	7	10.3	0	0.0
<b>Multi-branch CSOs</b>	12	8.8	73	53.3	16	11.7	34	24.8	2	1.5	13	9.5	67	48.9	17	12.4	38	27.7	2	1.5
<b>P-values</b>	0.084										0.006									

Table 4 (b): CSOs perceptions on the rationale behind government CTMs by organisational types and size

Variables	Government believe that your organisation is an ideological roots for terrorism										Government believe that you organisation is a recruitment ground for terrorist									
	Undecided		Strongly disagree		Disagree		Agree		Strongly agree		Undecided		Strongly disagree		Disagree		Agree		Strongly agree	
	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.
<b>All participants</b>	N=14	6.8	N=90	43.9	N=40	19.5	N=58	28.3	N= 3	1.5	N=15	7.3	N=117	57.1	N=33	16.1	N=34	16.6	N=6	2.9
<b>Organization type</b>																				
<b>Youth/children</b>	1	3.0	6	18.2	15	45.5	11	33.3	0	0.0	1	3.0	13	39.4	17	51.5	2	6.1	0	0.0
<b>Women</b>	1	2.6	13	33.3	6	15.4	19	48.7	0	0.0	1	2.6	21	53.8	1	2.6	16	41.0	0	0.0
<b>Faith-based</b>	3	4.7	18	28.1	17	26.6	25	39.1	1	1.6	3	4.7	30	46.9	14	21.9	16	25.0	1	1.6
<b>Human rights</b>	9	13.0	53	76.8	2	2.9	3	4.3	2	2.9	10	14.5	53	76.8	1	1.4	0	0.0	5	7.2
<b>P-values</b>	0.000										0.000									
<b>Size of organisations</b>																				
<b>Single-branch CSOs</b>	2	2.9	36	52.9	21	30.9	8	11.8	1	1.5	2	2.9	46	67.6	15	22.1	1	1.5	4	5.9
<b>Multi-branch CSOs</b>	12	8.8	54	59.4	19	13.9	50	36.5	2	1.5	13	9.5	71	51.8	18	13.1	33	24.1	2	1.5

<b>P-values</b>	0.000	0.000
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Table 5 Responses of CSOs to CTMs by organisational types and size

Variables	Organisation lobbied the government						Organisations testified before legislative committee						Your organisation have taken government to court					
	Undecided		Agree		Disagree		Undecided		Agree		Disagree		Undecided		Agree		Disagree	
	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.	Freq.	Per.
<b>All participants</b>	N=10	4.9	N=9	4.4	N=186	90.7	N=13	6.3	N=8	3.9	N=184	89.8	N=13	6.3	N=8	3.9	N=184	89.8
<b>Organization type</b>																		
Youth/children	2	6.1	1	3.0	30	90.9	2	6.1	1	3.0	30	90.9	0	0.0	0	0.0	33	100.0
Women	2	5.1	0	0.0	37	94.9	3	7.7	0	0.0	36	92.3	0	0.0	5	12.8	34	87.2
Faith-based	1	1.6	4	6.3	59	92.2	2	3.1	1	1.6	61	95.3	6	9.4	3	4.7	55	85.9
Human rights	5	7.2	4	5.8	60	87.0	6	8.7	6	8.7	57	82.6	7	10.1	0	0.0	62	89.9
P-values	0.519						0.176						0.003					
<b>Size of organisations</b>																		
Single-branch CSOs	3	4.4	5	7.4	60	88.2	4	5.9	5	7.4	59	86.8	9	13.2	0	0.0	59	86.8
Multi-branch CSOs	7	5.1	4	2.9	126	92.0	9	6.6	3	2.2	125	91.2	4	2.9	8	5.8	125	91.2
P-values	0.341						0.198						0.003					

### **Author(s)' Note"**

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**Biography:**

*Emeka Thaddues Njoku* holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria. His research focuses on the intersection of civil society organizations and security governance, particularly post-9/11 international and state-level counter-terrorism policies and practices.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> This study subscribes to the conceptualization of civil society as “arena where people deliberate upon and organise around shared, collective purposes [and] includes associational forms such as trade unions, social movements, virtual networks, campaigns, coalitions, faith groups, direct action group, peace groups, human rights organisations” Howell & Lind, 2010a, 2010b, p. 3).

<sup>2</sup> Securitisation theorists are divided between two schools of thought, the philosophical or Copenhagen and sociological schools. The philosophical school privileges the illocutionary speech act in the intersubjective construction of security threats of a referent object. Through the power of words, threats are manufactured and entrenched. In the words of Weaver (1995:55), security or security threat is essentially a speech act, “by saying security something is done”. The sociological school, on the other hand, contend that the illocutionary speech act in the construction of security threats should also be seen as a pragmatic process involving both the securitising actor and the audience in the construction of security threats. (Balzacq 2011). Further the sociological school argue that although speech act rationalizes how security matters emerge, the progression of security threats is expedited by “practical actions than by discursive politics”. This study is oriented towards the sociological school (Balzacq 2010:1).

<sup>3</sup> This forms a part of a larger dataset of 29 interviewed respondents (15 Government official and 14 CSOs executives).

<sup>4</sup> Size of CSOs measured in terms of the number of branches: one branch classified as small; more than one branch classified as big.

<sup>5</sup> Interview, HRC SO 3 Lagos; February 17, 2015

<sup>6</sup> Interview, executive of a faith-based CSOs, Abuja, March 10 2015; Interview with

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HRC SO 5, Lagos; February 20, 2015

<sup>7</sup> Interview, Development CSOs, Abuja, March 10 2015

<sup>8</sup> Interview with HRC SO5, Lagos; February 20, 2015

<sup>9</sup> Interview, HRC SO1 Lagos; February 23 2015

<sup>10</sup> Interview, HRC SO 2 Abuja, March 10 2015

<sup>11</sup> Interview, HRC SO 3 Lagos; February 17, 2015

<sup>12</sup> Interview, HRC SO1 Lagos; February 23 2015; Interview, HRC SO 2 Abuja, March 10 2015

<sup>13</sup> Interview, HRC SO 3 Lagos; February 17, 2015

<sup>14</sup> Interview, HRC SO4, Lagos, February 17 2015

<sup>15</sup> Interview, Counter-terrorism Officer, Office of the National Security Advisers (NSA) of the Nigerian Government Abuja, 27th March 2015

<sup>16</sup> Interview, Foreign Service Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nigeria (Abuja; 21st March 2015),

<sup>17</sup> Interview, four Senior military officers of the Nigerian Army and Navy in charge of defence policy formulation (Abuja; 9th March 2015)

<sup>18</sup> Interview, Foreign Service Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nigeria (Abuja; 21st March 2015)

<sup>19</sup> Interview, Executive Director that promotes women rights (Lagos, 20 February 2015); Interview, Coordinator CSO focused on Human rights Advocacy (Lagos, February 17 2015).

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