The literature on contemporary peacebuilding is increasingly being framed by the liberal peace debate. Sometimes labelled “liberal interventionism” or “liberal internationalism”, the authors under review concur that the liberal peace paradigm is the dominant form of internationally-supported peacebuilding. The liberal peace debate is linked to the wider debate surrounding democratic peace theory, as defined by authors such as Bruce Russett or John Oneal. Liberal peace refers here to the idea that certain kinds of society will tend to be more peaceful, both in their domestic affairs and in their international relations, than “illiberal” states. Hence, liberal peacebuilding implies not just managing instability between states, the traditional focus of the IR discipline, but also to build peace within states on the basis of liberal democracy and market economics. Mirroring the democratic peace debate, the liberal peace encompasses socio-cultural norms associated with peacemaking, as well as the international and national structures instrumental to promoting the liberal peace. The liberal peace’s main components vary, but usually include democracy promotion, the rule of law and good governance, promotion of human rights, economic reform and privatisation. More than an absence of violence and war, a negative peace to use Galtung’s terminology, advocates of the liberal peace focus on social engineering meant to constitute the foundations for a stable society. The blurring and convergence of development and security – dubbed the “security-development nexus” – is at the roots of the liberal peace, in the process bringing together two previously distinct policy areas, and different sets of actors and agencies. The double dynamic of the radicalisation of the politics of development and the reproblematisation of security entails the transformation of societies to fit liberal norms and Western expectations. Then the main objective underlying liberal peace promotion is to create a “a self-sustaining peace within domestic, regional and international frameworks of liberal governance in which both overt and structural violence are removed and social, economic and political models conform to a mixture of liberal and neo-liberal international expectations in a globalized and transnational setting.” The process of taming “overt and structural violence” can in itself create or reinforce modes of cultural and social domination occurring within the everyday social habits, forms of order and social restraint produced by indirect, cultural mechanisms; what has been described as “symbolic violence” by Pierre Bourdieu. However, symbolic violence requires acceptance as legitimate by the subject to reach its aim – this is the process of misrecognition (méconnaissance):
“the process whereby power relations are perceived not for what they objectively are but in a form which renders them legitimate in the eyes of the beholder.” In the wake of the failure of international efforts to create and support liberal institutions, assumptions underlining international peacebuilding efforts are increasingly questioned, by internationals as well as by locals, thus acting as a force against the process of misrecognition. Critical approaches to liberal peacebuilding contribute, each in their own way, to understand processes of local resistance to international policies (as where there is power, there is resistance, according to Foucault’).

They are many variants of the liberal peace, and different authors have suggested typologies of “liberal peace” and of critiques of liberal peacebuilding. However, the starting point for many authors is, in the words of Mac Ginty, that “the most prominent pattern in contemporary in international supported peacemaking is the extent to which certain actors combine to produce a particular type of peace intervention: the liberal peace” (p. 20). This is a questionable assumption, as one could argue that the main actors promoting the “liberal peace” framework are hardly coherent either normatively or from a policy perspective. Nevertheless, the three books share a common willingness to critically engage with the liberal peacebuilding paradigm and map out alternatives to the liberal peace. However, the authors included in the review do not constitute a homogeneous group, and the aim of each critique varies. In fact, at the centre of the liberal peace debate lies a complex dichotomy between “critical scholars” and “problem solvers,” a dichotomy that is consciously acknowledged in each book, but whose complexity becomes apparent when the volumes are taken together. The “problem solvers” are believed to focus on performance issues, while the “critical scholars” are more inclined to question the values and assumptions underpinning the liberal peace. The “efficiency camp” seeks ways to improve the performance of liberal peacebuilding, analysing conditions on the ground that prevent the full realisation of this goal. However, the “emancipator ethos” of the critical literature rules out extensive external political coercion to promote peacebuilding (Tadjbakhsh, p. 2-3). On the security-development nexus for instance, problem solvers debate whether the merging of security and development concerns is the best way to achieve coherent and well-managed policy or if this “new agenda” entails sacrificing development to security needs, while critical security theorists posit that the development agenda has already been subordinated to Western security concerns and question the implications of the securitization and subordination of the development agenda. On democratisation issues, problem solvers will analyse sequencing of democratic transitions, while the critical perspective will look at the normative assumptions behind democratisation processes and the ideological underpinnings of democratisation. This division can take the form of a debate between “critical” and “uncritical” scholars, or “critical” and “hyper-critical” scholars, depending on your stand in the debate.

As it has been noted by others, the dichotomy between problem solving and critical theory is actually based on the work of Robert Cox, who argues in his seminal article “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory” that there are two broad purposes for theory. One is “to be a guide to help solve the problems posed within the terms of the particular perspective which was the point of departure”, while the other is more reflective upon the process of theorizing itself, focusing on the “perspective which gives rise to theorizing and its relation to
other perspectives in order to open up the possibility of choosing a different valid perspective from which the problematic becomes one of creating an alternative world”.

Hence, according to Cox, each of these purposes gives rise to a different kind of theory. Critical theorizing seeks out the sources of contradiction and conflict in practice and evaluates its potential to change into different patterns; whereas problem solving focuses on the action, and not on the actual limits of the system. However, problem solving and critical theory are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For Timothy Sinclair, “they can be understood to address different concerns or levels within one overall story.”

Thus, for Cox, “the strength of the one is the weakness of the other”. The current peacebuilding debate mirrors to a certain extent the wider IR debate on “soft” and “hard” versions of constructivism, whereby the hard constructivists are believed to question the international system and its normatively constituted practices, while those labelled “soft constructivists” show an interest in culture, identity and norms, but at the same time accept the general framework dictated by mainstream theories. Rather than pitting one perspective against the other, it might be more fruitful to understand the literature on the critique of the liberal peace as a constellation of distinctive approaches.

Interestingly enough, the debate between “critical theorists” and “problem solvers” has taken a whole new dimension through a very fruitful debate in the pages of the Review of International Studies. For Roland Paris, the claims that liberal peacebuilding has done more harm than good are “just as exaggerated as the rosy pro-liberalisation rhetoric that dominated the peacebuilding discourse in the early-to-mid-1990s,” noting in passing that there is a need to clarify and rebalance existing academic debates over the meaning, shortcomings and prospects of ‘liberal’ peacebuilding. In response to Paris’ article, Neil Cooper, Mandy Turner and Michael Pugh reiterate the centrality of the neoliberal component of the liberal peace project and criticise Paris’ incapacity to acknowledge the variety of critical perspective.

Additionally, David Chandler de compartmentalises the debate, noting a shared desire to critique the liberal peace leads to a set of assumptions and one-sided representations that portray Western policy interventions as too liberal and in the process constitutes a self-serving and fictional policy narrative while contributing to the adoption of an uncritical approach to power. As Roger Mac Ginty argues in his book, this dichotomy between problem solvers and critical thinkers is to a certain extent linked to the broadening of the “liberal peace” category, stretching its meaning to the limits. It is also arguably a feature of the evolution of the current liberal peace debate, and its progression beyond the limited group of scholars who promoted the debate in the 1990s, reaching new audiences, and in the process fostering new debates.

Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh’s Rethinking the Liberal Peace is unapologetically “hyper-critical,” explicitly taking sides in the “problem solvers” versus “critical thinkers” debate. The book is the result of a research collaboration between some of the most influential thinkers in the critical literature (Chandler, Lidén, Pugh, Mac Ginty, Richmond and Tadjbakhsh). It opens with a bold statement: “failures in the liberal peace project are not because of the efficiency problems related to the technicalities of its workings, but in the problematique [sic] assumptions and contradictions within the model itself and its claims of the pacifying effects of democratization and marketization.”
To Roland Paris’s and Timothy Sisk’s call for a “dilemma analysis” for peacebuilders to become more aware of the unintended consequences of their state-building efforts, Tadjbakhsh et al. oppose Oliver Richmond’s research agenda linked to the concept of “eirenism,” hence evaluating “outcomes of policies, theories and methods against their contribution to everyday needs, rights, culture and welfare” (pp. 6–7). As Tadjbakhsh notes, the concept of the “everyday” is often deployed in post-colonial or post-structural literatures in order to uncover structural or discursive forms of violence, and to emphasise resistance and solidarity in the face of forms of power, biopolitics, and governmentality (see also Lidén’s chapter in the book).

Building on Richmond’s previous work, the volume proposes to bring three contributions to the critical literature on liberal peacebuilding. First, it seeks to dismantle the image of the critical school as a homogeneous grouping of scholars, distinguishing the critique of liberalism from the critique of the hegemonic character of current international practices, while fleshing out the contributions of the critical theory to the peacebuilding literature. The first part of the book is specifically devoted to this aim. Second, it attempts to deepen our understanding of the challenges of democratization and marketization beyond a general critique of the liberal peace, which is the object of parts 2 (liberal democracy) and 3 (market liberalism), while part 4 is devoted to case studies. Finally, the third overarching goal of the book is to argue that the critical school, “even if it would not want to be confused with the problem-solving approach that proposes solutions, is also not a self-serving intellectual exercise, futile for pragmatists” (p. 6). In comparison with the other two aims, this specific goal represents a much more difficult exercise to accomplish, and, in my opinion, the objective has only been partially achieved, if only because some of the contributions are drawn into the same policy discourse as that used by the much-maligned “problem solvers”. For instance, one of the critical alternatives identified by Tadjbakhsh in chapter 1 is to devise “a better adapted approach with more local ownership and consent [which] would not only be more legitimate but also more effective” (p. 26), even if the local ownership discourse, along with concerns for effectiveness, are usually perceived as “problem solving” solutions. Nevertheless, the various contributions constitute a very coherent whole and, when taken together, represent a clear contribution to the peacebuilding debate.

One key argument emerging from the book is the analysis of how the liberal peace discourse acquires a specific meaning when concretized at the level of the non-Western state, an idea that is pivotal in David Chandler’s contribution (“The liberal peace: statebuilding, democracy and local ownership”), but also clearly expressed in the excellent chapters on case studies. For Hamieh and Mac Ginty, the Weberian notion of statehood does not translate well in the Lebanese context. The international actors found themselves facing the impossibility of carrying out “country ownership” policies, given the multiplicity of approaches and actors constituting a “competitive political market,” relying notably on the currency of perception (p. 191). Similarly, Shlash and Tom analyse the manipulation and complexity of the concepts of “political party” and “civil society” in the context of Iraq. The authors identify the limits of the “big bang” approach to economic and political reform, which contends that market-oriented reforms should be rapidly implemented before powerful and entrenched political actors can coalesce to block any significant change, a policy that echoes the
shock therapies of the 1990s in the countries of the former Soviet Union, but also Thomas P. M. Barnett’s thesis of the “big bang” that came to have a profound influence on neo-conservative circles in Washington.xxvi Moreover, Shlash and Tom’s chapter usefully ties in with Pugh’s excellent analysis of the political economy of peacebuilding, in the “market liberalism” section. The third case study is Tadjbakhsh’s insightful analysis of the necessarily hybrid justice system in Afghanistan. Based on an impressive number of interviews, the author shows the limits of international policies based on a local culture seen as “problematic” for being potentially hierarchical, non-secular, and inequitable, while traditional and customary systems remain the main legitimate source of the provision of local security, justice, rights, and welfare, as well as identity and historical continuity (p. 206). Interestingly, it appeared that Afghans were more interested in saving liberal peace by modifying it than the international community, which was seeking its abandonment as an exit strategy (p. 208). In the concluding chapter, Tadjbakhsh and Richmond, based on Lidén’s earlier work, sketch out a typology of the critical field, distinguishing different strands in the process: communitarians, social constructivists, international critical theorists and post-colonialists. The communitarian critique of liberal peacebuilding touches upon the legitimacy of liberal peace as a cultural project; the social constructivists question the construction of peace seen by many as a bureaucratic technical exercise and the failure to take into account the importance of social relations and trust; the international critical theorists can be divided into two main strands: a cosmopolitan strand which aims at developing universal international norms, institutions and law, and a more radical, Marxist-derived strand which questions such projects’ capacity for emancipation; and finally the post-colonialists question the Western genesis of liberal peace in theory and in practice. This is an innovative contribution, which has the potential to bring a welcomed dose of nuance to the current liberal peacebuilding debate. Tadjbakhsh and Richmond also suggest a post-liberal peace inspired by post-colonialism studies, where both the external and the local agenda are modified to recognize hybridity in both spaces. This entails recognising the presence of the global in the local and the local in the global, acknowledging the fact that external ideas and ideals can only become meaningful in their contingent local meaning, returning ‘agency’ to those who have so far been subject to and objects of intervention, and finally, proposing a departure from the top-down methods of statebuilding to return to the original conception of peacebuilding as a grassroots, bottom-up activity, engaging with societies, cultures and identities, going far beyond the institutions of statehood (p. 234). However, the authors do not fully acknowledge the current debate surrounding the notion of post-liberal peace, subject to different theorizations and interpretations in the field of critical theory, and especially between two contributors included in this book.xxxvii

Roger Mac Ginty’s latest book, *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace*, is also deliberately anchored in the critical perspective of peacebuilding, but at the same time the author tries to free himself from the dichotomy between critical scholars and problem solvers. Mac Ginty has been known over time as one of the leading voices of the critical perspective, and this book offers an interesting and very useful insight into the main themes, questions and recent developments in this area. However, as Mac Ginty acknowledges, the book “does not seek to rescue or condemn liberalism *per se*. Instead, it seeks a new understanding of how liberal internationalism operates, especially in its dealings with the local” (p. 7). This category of the “local” is not clearly defined by the author, conceptualised indistinctly as actors, networks or structures in the book. This is clearly problematic, especially in conjunction with the hybridisation
process which in itself complexifies our understanding of local-international relations in peacebuilding processes (see below).

The author questions head-on the values and assumptions underpinning the liberal peace, preferring the term “hybrid peace,” which allows him to underline at the same time the fragility of the liberal peace, which is not as coherent and dominant as some scholars assume (the liberal peace paradigm has “feet of clay” according to Mac Ginty), and the agency of local-level actors, which tend to be erased or neglected by many scholars. The author understands hybridity “as the composite forms of social thinking and practice that emerge as the result of the interaction of different groups, practices, and worldviews” (p. 8). Hence, it is a place – a space – where international and local actors form fusions and composites, conflict and cooperate, but always interact while so doing. The concept of hybridity enables a more subtle analysis of local–international relations, focusing on local actors’ ability “to resist, ignore, engage with, disengage from, and exploit the liberal peace” (pp. 10–11) and the prior hybridization of international actors and their attempt to influence already hybridized environments. This mutual hybridization process appears tricky to “uncover” for researchers wanting to follow Mac Ginty on this path. For instance, Mac Ginty notes that “liberal peace policies and their advocates are themselves the product of prior hybridization and attempt to influence already hybridized environments that have experienced civil war or authoritarianism. Further hybridization ensues as (the already hybrid) local and international interact, conflict, and cooperate” (p. 10). This mutual process of hybridisation is in itself a challenge to decipher for any researchers basing their work on empirical experience.

However, unlike some critical scholars, often lambasted for being too detached from fieldwork and the local realities of liberal peacebuilding, Mac Ginty’s analysis is grounded in careful fieldwork, drawing from five distinct and quite crucial case studies for liberal peacebuilding: Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Lebanon and Northern Ireland. While some of the results of Mac Ginty (and colleagues) have already been published in various scientific journals, the interest here is to have them talk to each other, especially when combined with three powerful theoretical chapters. Mac Ginty’s first chapter explores the liberal peace framework, looking at the evolution of the critical tradition in peace studies, liberalism (or the multiple liberalisms, as he asserts) in the context of peacebuilding, and closing with the main criticisms of the liberal peace explored by the critical tradition. The second and third chapters, on indigenous peacebuilding and hybridity, comprise the main theoretical contributions of the book. The chapter on indigenous peacebuilding looks at local, customary and traditional peacebuilding paradigms and addresses various central issues: the extent to which these paradigms are truly indigenous; the efficacy of traditional approaches given the massive dislocation caused by violent conflict; and the clash between the particularism of local approaches and the universal ambitions of liberalism. The chapter is quite innovative, although I perceived a certain theoretical ambiguity between the concepts of “indigenous” and “aboriginal” in many examples explored in this chapter. The chapter on hybridity is similarly innovative and leads the author to “reappraise studies of local agency and indigenous norms that have erred towards a romanticisation of the local” (p. 68). The main contribution of the author is to conceptualise hybridization as a result of the interplay of four factors: 1) the ability of liberal peace agents,
networks and structures to enforce compliance; 2) the incentivizing powers of liberal peace agents, networks and structures; 3) the ability of local actors to resist, ignore, or adapt liberal peace interventions; and 4) the ability of local actors, networks, and structures to present and maintain alternative forms of peacemaking. This specific interplay between international and local, understood in their previous hybridized forms, creates the space of the liberal peace (and, possibly, resistance to it). The last five chapters adopt a case study approach, with each chapter concentrating on a particular pillar of the liberal peace (security, state-building, free-market economics, governance, and the promotion of civil society) in a particular liberal peace locality. The new-found interest in the peacebuilding literature for the concept of hybridity, borrowed in that regard from colonial and postcolonial studies, clearly represents a theoretical contribution to the discipline. However, if one considers the author’s opening statement, “we are all hybrids”, it appears that additional work needs to be done to make hybridity a fully operational concept in the liberal peacebuilding literature, which does not belittle Mac Ginty’s contribution to the literature.

It is in *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding*, edited by Edward Newman, Roland Paris and Oliver Richmond, that the debate between problem solving and critical theory is the most prominent. The editors, themselves representative of the diversity of position between the two main “schools of thought” (p. 23, i.e. problem solving and critical theory), made a very interesting editorial decision in bringing together authors coming from both perspectives. The book is divided into two distinct parts: a more theoretical section (“themes”), and a second section devoted to case studies (“cases and experiences”). Different theoretical approaches are represented in the first section. At one end of the spectrum, Roland Paris criticises the scholars questioning the very foundations of peacebuilding, arguing that if the record of liberal peacebuilding is “mixed and full of disappointments,” such missions have, on the whole, “done considerably more good than harm” (p. 108). At the other end, Oliver Richmond notes that liberal peacebuilding is in a crisis that might be described in Kantian terms as “backsliding,” referring here to “a physical deterioration of peace during a peacebuilding process, or a retreat from the liberal peace framework itself on the part of international and local actors” (p. 55). Richmond argues convincingly that there are parallels to be made between the obstacles to liberal peacebuilding and Kant’s own perspective on the potential obstacles to the perpetual peace project. Richmond also analyses the limits of the Lockean model of social contract being promoted by the main actors of the liberal peace, where governance is exchanged for physical, material, social and cultural security and freedoms. The only way out is through a “new social contract,” based on a local-liberal hybrid form of peacebuilding.

For Michael Pugh, also anchored in the critical field, the model of political economy that interventionists take upon themselves to introduce to a “society of strangers” is inherently flawed. The author sheds new light on the role of welfare in everyday life. For the author, the political economy of welfare promoted by liberal peacebuilding actors involves “virtual empowerment” whereby “international peacebuilding actors transfer responsibility to societies without transferring control, the main objective being to maintain hierarchy” (p. 92). For Pugh a post-liberal peace requires a paradigm shift at two levels: continuous and equitable engagement with the diverse local cultural and welfare dynamics on the one hand, and restructuring or disempowerment of the
existing financial hegemony at a global level (p. 79). Edward Newman’s contribution is interestingly nuanced, balancing the strengths and weaknesses of the “problem-solving” and “critical” approaches. The author pinpoints the contentious aspects of certain problem-solving strategies, such as the promotion of local ownership or sequencing strategies, while providing a very interesting critique of the critical approaches, notably looking at the weakness of meta-theorizing. He concludes by suggesting three “ideal-type” visions of peacebuilding: transformatory, realist and liberal. Chandra Lekha Sriram’s contribution also defies easy categorization, looking at the risks inherent in embedding transitional justice strategies in liberal peacebuilding processes.

Mirroring the development of the critical field of liberal peacebuilding vis-à-vis the mainstream literature, one major strength of the book lies in the richness of its case studies, many of them based on solid fieldwork, and its deconstruction of simplified categories considered as “given” by many scholars. One striking feature is the coherence of most of the book’s case studies, looking at the difficult transposition of Western conceptions into non-Western – or to avoid cultural limitations, non-OECD – settings. There is a real sense of the diversity of the critical theory field throughout the book. Some, following Paris’s theoretical chapter, try to rescue the liberal peace, while others, following Richmond’s chapter, are looking for alternative paradigms of peacebuilding. For instance, the “institutionalization before liberalization” strategy, a key contribution to the literature made by Paris, xxix is supported by Salih’s analysis, but rejected by Sriram (p. 120) and criticized by Newman (p. 31). The concept of “indigenous peacebuilding”, a key feature of Mac Ginty’s work reviewed above, is supported by Sriram, but doubted by Taylor (p. 159). In the eclectic group of “critical scholars”, looking at the everyday and liberation from current frameworks, we can also detect a very distinct group of scholars influenced by Gramscian analysis (Taylor and Pugh for instance). In this regard, the book provides an interesting and in-depth glimpse into critical debates on liberal peacebuilding. I was personally struck by the complementarity of many contributions in the book, especially the case studies, despite the theoretical division between problem solvers and critical thinkers, reinforced by the authors in the theoretical section.

As this book review demonstrates, the liberal peacebuilding debate is far from moribund, and many research avenues have been hinted at in recent years. Some scholars suggest an alternative of an agenda based on resilience and human security. xxx Others focus on hybridisation processes as a way to capture the complexity of the interaction between internal and external actors in peacebuilding contexts, xxxi a discussion that is linked to a certain extent to the literature on the everyday and eirenism. Finally, there is also a group of authors looking at the political sociology of the state and state formation behind specific peacebuilding and statebuilding approaches. xxxii All these research agendas contribute to highlight the limits of a clear-cut division between policy-relevance and critical studies. xxxiii As John Moolakkattu notes, Cox’s distinction “simplifies the theoretical project along the lines of those who are interested in knowledge for the sake of reinforcing the existing order and those who seek knowledge for transformation, forcing every conceivable theory to identify itself with either of these two streams”. As he concludes, “in these days of hybridism, such neat categories may not be able to capture the richness and full implications
of individual theories”. xxxiv Not unlike IR theory, the potential for bringing together various approaches on liberal peacebuilding should not be overlooked.

4 For instance, Fareed Zakaria, in a somewhat mainstream study of “illiberal” democracy promotion, looks at how democracy and illiberalism are correlated, and how the democratic peace is actually the liberal peace. Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2003).
12 David Chandler, “The Uncritical Critique of Liberal Peace”, Review of International Studies 36/51 (2010), 137–155; See also the conclusion by Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Oliver Richmond in S. Tadjbakhsh, ed. Rethinking the Liberal Peace.


