We are like American robins

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter (peer-reviewed) › peer-review

Standard

We are like American robins. / Sullivan-Bissett, Ema.

Epistemic duties: new arguments, new angles. ed. / Kevin McCain; Scott Stapleford. 1st. ed. New York : Routledge, 2020. p. 94-110 (Routledge Studies in Epistemology).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter (peer-reviewed) › peer-review

Harvard

Sullivan-Bissett, E 2020, We are like American robins. in K McCain & S Stapleford (eds), Epistemic duties: new arguments, new angles. 1st edn, Routledge Studies in Epistemology, Routledge, New York, pp. 94-110. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429030215-8

APA

Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2020). We are like American robins. In K. McCain, & S. Stapleford (Eds.), Epistemic duties: new arguments, new angles (1st ed., pp. 94-110). (Routledge Studies in Epistemology). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429030215-8

Vancouver

Sullivan-Bissett E. We are like American robins. In McCain K, Stapleford S, editors, Epistemic duties: new arguments, new angles. 1st ed. New York: Routledge. 2020. p. 94-110. (Routledge Studies in Epistemology). https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429030215-8

Author

Sullivan-Bissett, Ema. / We are like American robins. Epistemic duties: new arguments, new angles. editor / Kevin McCain ; Scott Stapleford. 1st. ed. New York : Routledge, 2020. pp. 94-110 (Routledge Studies in Epistemology).

Bibtex

@inbook{d1b27e895abb44afa3fd4e36d368b925,
title = "We are like American robins",
abstract = "This chapter constructs and considers arguments for the commonly held idea that we have specifically epistemic duties relating to what we believe. It is argued that epistemic duties cannot be generated by appeal to belief{\textquoteright}s standard of correctness, normativism about belief, or the rational nature of human believers. The chapter overviews a biological account of belief on which there are only standards derived from biological norms, which do not generate duties to follow the pronouncements of those standards. Finally, the chapter turns to arguments which claim that the existence of epistemic duties is supported by inference to the best explanation. It is argued that the biological account of belief can accommodate the explananda these arguments appeal to without letting duties in. The conclusion reached is that we are yet to be given a reason for thinking that there are irreducible distinctly epistemic duties. Rather if we ought to do anything epistemically, this is only in the sense that an American robin ought to build a nest.",
keywords = "Epistemic duties, Epistemic obligations, Biological function, Reasons to believe",
author = "Ema Sullivan-Bissett",
year = "2020",
month = oct,
day = "11",
doi = "10.4324/9780429030215-8",
language = "English",
isbn = "9780367141103",
series = "Routledge Studies in Epistemology",
publisher = "Routledge",
pages = "94--110",
editor = "Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford",
booktitle = "Epistemic duties",
edition = "1st",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - We are like American robins

AU - Sullivan-Bissett, Ema

PY - 2020/10/11

Y1 - 2020/10/11

N2 - This chapter constructs and considers arguments for the commonly held idea that we have specifically epistemic duties relating to what we believe. It is argued that epistemic duties cannot be generated by appeal to belief’s standard of correctness, normativism about belief, or the rational nature of human believers. The chapter overviews a biological account of belief on which there are only standards derived from biological norms, which do not generate duties to follow the pronouncements of those standards. Finally, the chapter turns to arguments which claim that the existence of epistemic duties is supported by inference to the best explanation. It is argued that the biological account of belief can accommodate the explananda these arguments appeal to without letting duties in. The conclusion reached is that we are yet to be given a reason for thinking that there are irreducible distinctly epistemic duties. Rather if we ought to do anything epistemically, this is only in the sense that an American robin ought to build a nest.

AB - This chapter constructs and considers arguments for the commonly held idea that we have specifically epistemic duties relating to what we believe. It is argued that epistemic duties cannot be generated by appeal to belief’s standard of correctness, normativism about belief, or the rational nature of human believers. The chapter overviews a biological account of belief on which there are only standards derived from biological norms, which do not generate duties to follow the pronouncements of those standards. Finally, the chapter turns to arguments which claim that the existence of epistemic duties is supported by inference to the best explanation. It is argued that the biological account of belief can accommodate the explananda these arguments appeal to without letting duties in. The conclusion reached is that we are yet to be given a reason for thinking that there are irreducible distinctly epistemic duties. Rather if we ought to do anything epistemically, this is only in the sense that an American robin ought to build a nest.

KW - Epistemic duties

KW - Epistemic obligations

KW - Biological function

KW - Reasons to believe

UR - https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429030215

U2 - 10.4324/9780429030215-8

DO - 10.4324/9780429030215-8

M3 - Chapter (peer-reviewed)

SN - 9780367141103

T3 - Routledge Studies in Epistemology

SP - 94

EP - 110

BT - Epistemic duties

A2 - McCain, Kevin

A2 - Stapleford, Scott

PB - Routledge

CY - New York

ER -