VCG - Combinatorial Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Auctions

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@article{dae2c29082d9466eab8f7cf25251b29b,
title = "VCG - Combinatorial Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Auctions",
abstract = "A VCG auction (named after their inventors Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves) is a generalization of the single-good, second price Vickrey auction to the case of a combinatorial auction (multiple goods, from which any participant can bid on each possible combination). We formalize in this entry VCG auctions, including tie-breaking and prove that the functions for the allocation and the price determination are well-defined. Furthermore we show that the allocation function allocates goods only to participants, only goods in the auction are allocated, and no good is allocated twice. We also show that the price function is non-negative. These properties also hold for the automatically extracted Scala code. ",
author = "Caminati, {Marco B.} and Manfred Kerber and Christoph Lange-Bever and Colin Rowat",
year = "2015",
month = apr,
day = "30",
language = "English",
pages = "1--134",
journal = "Archive of Formal Proofs",
issn = "2150-914X",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - VCG - Combinatorial Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Auctions

AU - Caminati, Marco B.

AU - Kerber, Manfred

AU - Lange-Bever, Christoph

AU - Rowat, Colin

PY - 2015/4/30

Y1 - 2015/4/30

N2 - A VCG auction (named after their inventors Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves) is a generalization of the single-good, second price Vickrey auction to the case of a combinatorial auction (multiple goods, from which any participant can bid on each possible combination). We formalize in this entry VCG auctions, including tie-breaking and prove that the functions for the allocation and the price determination are well-defined. Furthermore we show that the allocation function allocates goods only to participants, only goods in the auction are allocated, and no good is allocated twice. We also show that the price function is non-negative. These properties also hold for the automatically extracted Scala code.

AB - A VCG auction (named after their inventors Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves) is a generalization of the single-good, second price Vickrey auction to the case of a combinatorial auction (multiple goods, from which any participant can bid on each possible combination). We formalize in this entry VCG auctions, including tie-breaking and prove that the functions for the allocation and the price determination are well-defined. Furthermore we show that the allocation function allocates goods only to participants, only goods in the auction are allocated, and no good is allocated twice. We also show that the price function is non-negative. These properties also hold for the automatically extracted Scala code.

M3 - Article

SP - 1

EP - 134

JO - Archive of Formal Proofs

JF - Archive of Formal Proofs

SN - 2150-914X

M1 - 2015-04-30

ER -