Abstract
In the semantic debate about plurals, pluralism is the view that a plural term
denotes some things in the domain of quantification and a plural predicate denotes
a plural property, that is, a property that can be instantiated by many things jointly.
According to a particular version of this view, untyped pluralism, there is no type
distinction between objects and properties. In this article, I argue against untyped
pluralism by showing that it is subject to a variant of a Russell-style argument put
forth by Timothy Williamson and that it clashes with a plural version of Cantor’s
theorem. I conclude that pluralists should postulate a type distinction between
objects and properties.
denotes some things in the domain of quantification and a plural predicate denotes
a plural property, that is, a property that can be instantiated by many things jointly.
According to a particular version of this view, untyped pluralism, there is no type
distinction between objects and properties. In this article, I argue against untyped
pluralism by showing that it is subject to a variant of a Russell-style argument put
forth by Timothy Williamson and that it clashes with a plural version of Cantor’s
theorem. I conclude that pluralists should postulate a type distinction between
objects and properties.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 317-337 |
| Journal | Mind |
| Volume | 123 |
| Issue number | 490 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Apr 2014 |