Towards a typology of collusive industrial networks: dark and shadow networks

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Towards a typology of collusive industrial networks : dark and shadow networks. / Pressey, Andrew; Vanharanta, M; Gilchrist, A.

In: Industrial Marketing Management, Vol. 43, No. 8, 11.2014, p. 1435–1450.

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@article{899401fdbe4d4e57849419e2e8a712da,
title = "Towards a typology of collusive industrial networks: dark and shadow networks",
abstract = "The prevailing understanding of collusive B2B networks is primarily based on the theories of industrial economists and organizational criminologists. {\textquoteleft}Successful{\textquoteright} collusive industrial networks (such as price-fixing cartels) have been seen to endure due to formal managerial structures of coordination and control. In this paper, we seek to transcend and challenge the understanding of these illegal forms of co-opetition by drawing on evidence from an in-depth examination of four price-fixing cartels that were facilitated chiefly by marketers. Our contribution introduces the notion of {\textquoteleft}shadow networks{\textquoteright} (networks where although attempts are made to ensure secrecy, multilateral modes of network structure dominate akin to {\textquoteleft}normal{\textquoteright} managerial endeavours such as joint ventures) and {\textquoteleft}dark networks{\textquoteright} (networks which appear more opaque and secretive through the adoption of bilateral modes of network structure and limited bureaucracy) to illustrate the types of collusive network forms that may exist. In addition, this allows us to build a deeper understanding of collusive network forms and related inter-firm interaction for an industrial marketing audience. We provide implications for marketing practice, theory, and policy. Specifically, we outline how organizations and the marketing function can perform self-administered antitrust audits in order to help avoid breaches of antitrust. Further, we consider the importance of the two forms of collusive inter-firm networks uncovered where marketers have attempted to render these secret from antitrust agencies, introducing a relatively new line of inquiry to the industrial marketing literature.",
keywords = "Collusive networks, Network structure, Cartels, Dark networks, Shadow networks",
author = "Andrew Pressey and M Vanharanta and A Gilchrist",
year = "2014",
month = nov,
doi = "10.1016/j.indmarman.2014.08.001",
language = "English",
volume = "43",
pages = "1435–1450",
journal = "Industrial Marketing Management",
issn = "0019-8501",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "8",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Towards a typology of collusive industrial networks

T2 - dark and shadow networks

AU - Pressey, Andrew

AU - Vanharanta, M

AU - Gilchrist, A

PY - 2014/11

Y1 - 2014/11

N2 - The prevailing understanding of collusive B2B networks is primarily based on the theories of industrial economists and organizational criminologists. ‘Successful’ collusive industrial networks (such as price-fixing cartels) have been seen to endure due to formal managerial structures of coordination and control. In this paper, we seek to transcend and challenge the understanding of these illegal forms of co-opetition by drawing on evidence from an in-depth examination of four price-fixing cartels that were facilitated chiefly by marketers. Our contribution introduces the notion of ‘shadow networks’ (networks where although attempts are made to ensure secrecy, multilateral modes of network structure dominate akin to ‘normal’ managerial endeavours such as joint ventures) and ‘dark networks’ (networks which appear more opaque and secretive through the adoption of bilateral modes of network structure and limited bureaucracy) to illustrate the types of collusive network forms that may exist. In addition, this allows us to build a deeper understanding of collusive network forms and related inter-firm interaction for an industrial marketing audience. We provide implications for marketing practice, theory, and policy. Specifically, we outline how organizations and the marketing function can perform self-administered antitrust audits in order to help avoid breaches of antitrust. Further, we consider the importance of the two forms of collusive inter-firm networks uncovered where marketers have attempted to render these secret from antitrust agencies, introducing a relatively new line of inquiry to the industrial marketing literature.

AB - The prevailing understanding of collusive B2B networks is primarily based on the theories of industrial economists and organizational criminologists. ‘Successful’ collusive industrial networks (such as price-fixing cartels) have been seen to endure due to formal managerial structures of coordination and control. In this paper, we seek to transcend and challenge the understanding of these illegal forms of co-opetition by drawing on evidence from an in-depth examination of four price-fixing cartels that were facilitated chiefly by marketers. Our contribution introduces the notion of ‘shadow networks’ (networks where although attempts are made to ensure secrecy, multilateral modes of network structure dominate akin to ‘normal’ managerial endeavours such as joint ventures) and ‘dark networks’ (networks which appear more opaque and secretive through the adoption of bilateral modes of network structure and limited bureaucracy) to illustrate the types of collusive network forms that may exist. In addition, this allows us to build a deeper understanding of collusive network forms and related inter-firm interaction for an industrial marketing audience. We provide implications for marketing practice, theory, and policy. Specifically, we outline how organizations and the marketing function can perform self-administered antitrust audits in order to help avoid breaches of antitrust. Further, we consider the importance of the two forms of collusive inter-firm networks uncovered where marketers have attempted to render these secret from antitrust agencies, introducing a relatively new line of inquiry to the industrial marketing literature.

KW - Collusive networks

KW - Network structure

KW - Cartels

KW - Dark networks

KW - Shadow networks

U2 - 10.1016/j.indmarman.2014.08.001

DO - 10.1016/j.indmarman.2014.08.001

M3 - Article

VL - 43

SP - 1435

EP - 1450

JO - Industrial Marketing Management

JF - Industrial Marketing Management

SN - 0019-8501

IS - 8

ER -