The Transparent Failure of Norms to Keep Up Standards of Belief
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
Colleges, School and Institutes
We argue that the most plausible characterisation of the norm of truth—it is permissible to believe that p if and only if p is true—is unable to explain Transparency in doxastic deliberation, a task for which it is claimed to be equipped. In addition, the failure of the norm to do this work undermines the most plausible account of how the norm guides belief formation at all. Those attracted to normativism about belief for its perceived explanatory credentials had better look elsewhere.
|Number of pages||15|
|Early online date||14 Feb 2019|
|Publication status||E-pub ahead of print - 14 Feb 2019|
- Belief, Function, Norms, Standards, Transparency