The Tale of Bella and Creda

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The Tale of Bella and Creda. / Sturgeon, Scott.

In: Philosophers' Imprint, Vol. 15, No. 31, 31, 12.2015, p. 1.

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Sturgeon, Scott. / The Tale of Bella and Creda. In: Philosophers' Imprint. 2015 ; Vol. 15, No. 31. pp. 1.

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@article{add599b6b841453c9f4ccdedf71935d2,
title = "The Tale of Bella and Creda",
abstract = "Some philosophers defend the view that epistemic agents believe by lending credence. Others defend the view that such agents lend credence by believing. It can strongly appear that the disagreement between them is notational, that nothing of substance turns on whether we are agents of one sort or the other. But that is demonstrably not so. Only one of these types of epistemic agent, at most, could manifest a human-like configuration of attitudes; and it turns out that not both types of agent are possible.",
author = "Scott Sturgeon",
year = "2015",
month = dec,
language = "English",
volume = "15",
pages = "1",
journal = "Philosophers' Imprint",
issn = "1533-628X",
publisher = "University of Michigan Press",
number = "31",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Tale of Bella and Creda

AU - Sturgeon, Scott

PY - 2015/12

Y1 - 2015/12

N2 - Some philosophers defend the view that epistemic agents believe by lending credence. Others defend the view that such agents lend credence by believing. It can strongly appear that the disagreement between them is notational, that nothing of substance turns on whether we are agents of one sort or the other. But that is demonstrably not so. Only one of these types of epistemic agent, at most, could manifest a human-like configuration of attitudes; and it turns out that not both types of agent are possible.

AB - Some philosophers defend the view that epistemic agents believe by lending credence. Others defend the view that such agents lend credence by believing. It can strongly appear that the disagreement between them is notational, that nothing of substance turns on whether we are agents of one sort or the other. But that is demonstrably not so. Only one of these types of epistemic agent, at most, could manifest a human-like configuration of attitudes; and it turns out that not both types of agent are possible.

M3 - Article

VL - 15

SP - 1

JO - Philosophers' Imprint

JF - Philosophers' Imprint

SN - 1533-628X

IS - 31

M1 - 31

ER -