The representational limits of possible worlds semantics

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The representational limits of possible worlds semantics. / Jones, Nicholas.

In: Philosophical Studies, 05.2015.

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@article{d585c60de79d437d8311bfc957bd11f7,
title = "The representational limits of possible worlds semantics",
abstract = "This paper evaluates Stalnaker’s recent attempt to outline a realist interpretation of possible worlds semantics that lacks substantive metaphysical commitments. The limitations of his approach are used to draw some more general lessons about the non-representational artefacts of formal representations. Three key conclusions are drawn. (1) Stalnaker’s account of possible worlds semantics’ non-representational artefacts does not cohere with his metaphysics of modality. (2) Invariance-based analyses of non-representational artefacts cannot capture a certain kind of artefact. (3) Stalnaker must treat instrumentally those aspects of possible worlds formalism governing the interaction between quantification and modality, under any analysis whatsoever of non-representational artefacts.",
author = "Nicholas Jones",
year = "2015",
month = "5",
doi = "10.1007/s11098-015-0503-4",
language = "English",
journal = "Philosophical Studies",
issn = "0031-8116",
publisher = "Springer",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The representational limits of possible worlds semantics

AU - Jones, Nicholas

PY - 2015/5

Y1 - 2015/5

N2 - This paper evaluates Stalnaker’s recent attempt to outline a realist interpretation of possible worlds semantics that lacks substantive metaphysical commitments. The limitations of his approach are used to draw some more general lessons about the non-representational artefacts of formal representations. Three key conclusions are drawn. (1) Stalnaker’s account of possible worlds semantics’ non-representational artefacts does not cohere with his metaphysics of modality. (2) Invariance-based analyses of non-representational artefacts cannot capture a certain kind of artefact. (3) Stalnaker must treat instrumentally those aspects of possible worlds formalism governing the interaction between quantification and modality, under any analysis whatsoever of non-representational artefacts.

AB - This paper evaluates Stalnaker’s recent attempt to outline a realist interpretation of possible worlds semantics that lacks substantive metaphysical commitments. The limitations of his approach are used to draw some more general lessons about the non-representational artefacts of formal representations. Three key conclusions are drawn. (1) Stalnaker’s account of possible worlds semantics’ non-representational artefacts does not cohere with his metaphysics of modality. (2) Invariance-based analyses of non-representational artefacts cannot capture a certain kind of artefact. (3) Stalnaker must treat instrumentally those aspects of possible worlds formalism governing the interaction between quantification and modality, under any analysis whatsoever of non-representational artefacts.

U2 - 10.1007/s11098-015-0503-4

DO - 10.1007/s11098-015-0503-4

M3 - Article

JO - Philosophical Studies

JF - Philosophical Studies

SN - 0031-8116

ER -