The open question argument

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingEntry for encyclopedia/dictionary

Standard

The open question argument. / Suikkanen, Jussi.

The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. ed. / Hugh LaFollette. 1. ed. Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. p. 3714-3720.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingEntry for encyclopedia/dictionary

Harvard

Suikkanen, J 2013, The open question argument. in H LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. 1 edn, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 3714-3720. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee005

APA

Suikkanen, J. (2013). The open question argument. In H. LaFollette (Ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics (1 ed., pp. 3714-3720). Wiley-Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee005

Vancouver

Suikkanen J. The open question argument. In LaFollette H, editor, The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. 1 ed. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 2013. p. 3714-3720 https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee005

Author

Suikkanen, Jussi. / The open question argument. The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. editor / Hugh LaFollette. 1. ed. Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. pp. 3714-3720

Bibtex

@inbook{8560e6fb9d774780abcdaa3d46932365,
title = "The open question argument",
abstract = "The Open Question Argument (OQA) is a crucial argumentative strategy in metaethics. It is mainly employed against naturalist accounts of moral properties. According to these views, moral properties (goodness, wrongness, cruelty, and the like) are empirically observable natural properties, such as the property of being approved or disapproved by the majority of people (see naturalism, ethical). The defenders of the OQA tend to claim that this argument shows instead either (i) that moral properties are some other, unique kind of properties, or (ii) that the function of our moral language is not to refer to properties but rather to express our conative attitudes (see nonnaturalism, ethical; non-cognitivism). Both these views would support the idea that there is a distinction in kind between facts and values (see fact–value distinction; is–ought gap; naturalistic fallacy).",
keywords = "Metaethics, Open Question Argument, G.E. Moore",
author = "Jussi Suikkanen",
year = "2013",
month = feb,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee005",
language = "English",
isbn = "9781405186414",
pages = "3714--3720",
editor = "Hugh LaFollette",
booktitle = "The International Encyclopedia of Ethics",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
address = "United Kingdom",
edition = "1",

}

RIS

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T1 - The open question argument

AU - Suikkanen, Jussi

PY - 2013/2/1

Y1 - 2013/2/1

N2 - The Open Question Argument (OQA) is a crucial argumentative strategy in metaethics. It is mainly employed against naturalist accounts of moral properties. According to these views, moral properties (goodness, wrongness, cruelty, and the like) are empirically observable natural properties, such as the property of being approved or disapproved by the majority of people (see naturalism, ethical). The defenders of the OQA tend to claim that this argument shows instead either (i) that moral properties are some other, unique kind of properties, or (ii) that the function of our moral language is not to refer to properties but rather to express our conative attitudes (see nonnaturalism, ethical; non-cognitivism). Both these views would support the idea that there is a distinction in kind between facts and values (see fact–value distinction; is–ought gap; naturalistic fallacy).

AB - The Open Question Argument (OQA) is a crucial argumentative strategy in metaethics. It is mainly employed against naturalist accounts of moral properties. According to these views, moral properties (goodness, wrongness, cruelty, and the like) are empirically observable natural properties, such as the property of being approved or disapproved by the majority of people (see naturalism, ethical). The defenders of the OQA tend to claim that this argument shows instead either (i) that moral properties are some other, unique kind of properties, or (ii) that the function of our moral language is not to refer to properties but rather to express our conative attitudes (see nonnaturalism, ethical; non-cognitivism). Both these views would support the idea that there is a distinction in kind between facts and values (see fact–value distinction; is–ought gap; naturalistic fallacy).

KW - Metaethics

KW - Open Question Argument

KW - G.E. Moore

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DO - 10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee005

M3 - Entry for encyclopedia/dictionary

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EP - 3720

BT - The International Encyclopedia of Ethics

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CY - Oxford

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