Abstract
The 'parody objection' to the ontological argument for the existence of God advances parallel arguments apparently proving the existence of various absurd entities. I discuss recent versions of the parody objection concerning the existence of 'AntiGod' and the devil, as introduced by Peter Millican and Timothy Chambers. I argue that the parody objection always fails, because any parody is either (i) not structurally parallel to the ontological argument, or (ii) not dialectically parallel to the ontological argument. Moreover, once a parody argument is modified in such a way that it avoids (i) and (ii), it is, ironically, no longer a parody - it is the ontological argument itself.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 72-91 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | The Philosophical Quarterly |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue number | 238 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2010 |