The Ontological Argument and the Devil

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Abstract

The 'parody objection' to the ontological argument for the existence of God advances parallel arguments apparently proving the existence of various absurd entities. I discuss recent versions of the parody objection concerning the existence of 'AntiGod' and the devil, as introduced by Peter Millican and Timothy Chambers. I argue that the parody objection always fails, because any parody is either (i) not structurally parallel to the ontological argument, or (ii) not dialectically parallel to the ontological argument. Moreover, once a parody argument is modified in such a way that it avoids (i) and (ii), it is, ironically, no longer a parody - it is the ontological argument itself.

Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)72-91
Number of pages20
JournalThe Philosophical Quarterly
Volume60
Issue number238
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2010