The epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortions
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
Colleges, School and Institutes
In some neuropsychological disorders memory distortions seemingly fill gaps in people’s knowledge about their past, where people’s self-image, history, and prospects are often enhanced. False beliefs about the past compromise both people’s capacity to construct a reliable autobiography and their trustworthiness as communicators. However, such beliefs contribute to people’s sense of competence and self-confidence, increasing psychological wellbeing. Here we consider both psychological benefits and epistemic costs, and argue that distorting the past is likely to also have epistemic benefits that cannot be obtained otherwise, such as enabling people to exchange information, receive feedback, and retain key beliefs about themselves.
|Journal||Mind & Language|
|Early online date||20 Feb 2018|
|Publication status||E-pub ahead of print - 20 Feb 2018|
- Memory Disorders, Dementia, epistemic status, epistemic innocence, Confabulation