Religious education and religious choice

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Religious education and religious choice. / Hand, Michael.

In: Journal of Beliefs and Values, Vol. 36, No. 1, 06.2015, p. 31-39.

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@article{d5c7798adcdf4766b2f1a29af4a2efe6,
title = "Religious education and religious choice",
abstract = "According to the {\textquoteleft}religious choice case{\textquoteright} for compulsory religious education, pupils have a right to be made aware of the religious and irreligious paths open to them and equipped with the wherewithal to choose between them. A familiar objection to this argument is that the idea of religious choice reduces religion to a matter of taste. I argue, first, that this familiar objection fails and, second, that we nevertheless have good reason to reject the religious choice case. Religious and irreligious views have a core cognitive dimension that makes it inappropriate to talk of choosing between them. What I have elsewhere called the {\textquoteleft}possibility-of-truth case{\textquoteright} remains the strongest justification for compulsory religious education.",
author = "Michael Hand",
year = "2015",
month = jun,
doi = "10.1080/13617672.2015.1013817",
language = "English",
volume = "36",
pages = "31--39",
journal = "Journal of Beliefs and Values",
issn = "1361-7672",
publisher = "Taylor & Francis",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Religious education and religious choice

AU - Hand, Michael

PY - 2015/6

Y1 - 2015/6

N2 - According to the ‘religious choice case’ for compulsory religious education, pupils have a right to be made aware of the religious and irreligious paths open to them and equipped with the wherewithal to choose between them. A familiar objection to this argument is that the idea of religious choice reduces religion to a matter of taste. I argue, first, that this familiar objection fails and, second, that we nevertheless have good reason to reject the religious choice case. Religious and irreligious views have a core cognitive dimension that makes it inappropriate to talk of choosing between them. What I have elsewhere called the ‘possibility-of-truth case’ remains the strongest justification for compulsory religious education.

AB - According to the ‘religious choice case’ for compulsory religious education, pupils have a right to be made aware of the religious and irreligious paths open to them and equipped with the wherewithal to choose between them. A familiar objection to this argument is that the idea of religious choice reduces religion to a matter of taste. I argue, first, that this familiar objection fails and, second, that we nevertheless have good reason to reject the religious choice case. Religious and irreligious views have a core cognitive dimension that makes it inappropriate to talk of choosing between them. What I have elsewhere called the ‘possibility-of-truth case’ remains the strongest justification for compulsory religious education.

U2 - 10.1080/13617672.2015.1013817

DO - 10.1080/13617672.2015.1013817

M3 - Article

VL - 36

SP - 31

EP - 39

JO - Journal of Beliefs and Values

JF - Journal of Beliefs and Values

SN - 1361-7672

IS - 1

ER -