Religious education and religious choice
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
Colleges, School and Institutes
According to the ‘religious choice case’ for compulsory religious education, pupils have a right to be made aware of the religious and irreligious paths open to them and equipped with the wherewithal to choose between them. A familiar objection to this argument is that the idea of religious choice reduces religion to a matter of taste. I argue, first, that this familiar objection fails and, second, that we nevertheless have good reason to reject the religious choice case. Religious and irreligious views have a core cognitive dimension that makes it inappropriate to talk of choosing between them. What I have elsewhere called the ‘possibility-of-truth case’ remains the strongest justification for compulsory religious education.
|Number of pages||9|
|Journal||Journal of Beliefs and Values|
|Early online date||20 Apr 2015|
|Publication status||Published - Jun 2015|