Abstract
Some have claimed that identity crowding is a case where we consciously see an object to which we are unable to pay attention. Opponents of this view offer alternative explanations, which emphasise the importance of prior knowledge, amongst other factors. We review new empirical evidence showing that prior knowledge has a profound effect on identity crowding. We argue that this is problematic for the “conscious seeing without attention” view, and supports an opposing view.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 257-265 |
Journal | Thought: A Journal of Philosophy |
Volume | 9 |
Issue number | 4 |
Early online date | 23 Oct 2020 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 23 Oct 2020 |
Bibliographical note
Not yet published as of 14/10/2020Keywords
- attention
- consciousness
- crowding
- redundancy masking
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy