Reasons to redefine moral distress: a Feminist empirical bioethics analysis

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Reasons to redefine moral distress : a Feminist empirical bioethics analysis. / Morley, Georgina; Bradbury-Jones, Caroline; Ives, Jonathan.

In: Bioethics, Vol. 2020, 12.07.2020, p. 1-11.

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@article{851b0602d3fd4d9889994f78e5e0c19d,
title = "Reasons to redefine moral distress: a Feminist empirical bioethics analysis",
abstract = "There has been increasing debate in recent years about the conceptualization of moral distress. Broadly speaking, two groups of scholars have emerged: those who agree with Jameton{\textquoteright}s {\textquoteleft}narrow definition{\textquoteright} that focuses on constraint and those who argue that Jameton{\textquoteright}s definition is insufficient and needs to be broadened. Using feminist empirical bioethics, we interviewed critical care nurses in the United Kingdom about their experiences and conceptualizations of moral distress. We provide our broader definition of moral distress and examples of data that both challenge and support our conceptualization. We pre-empt and overcome three key challenges that could be levelled at our account and argue that there are good reasons to adopt our broader definition of moral distress when exploring prevalence of, and management strategies for, moral distress.",
keywords = "clinical ethics, clinical practice, empirical bioethics, feminist ethics, moral distress, nursing ethics",
author = "Georgina Morley and Caroline Bradbury-Jones and Jonathan Ives",
note = "Funding Information: This work was made possible by a Society and Ethics Fellowship for Healthcare Funding Information: Professionals from the Wellcome Trust (Grant ref.: 108640/Z/15/Z). Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020 The Authors. Bioethics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd Copyright: Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.",
year = "2020",
month = jul,
day = "12",
doi = "10.1111/bioe.12783",
language = "English",
volume = "2020",
pages = "1--11",
journal = "Bioethics",
issn = "0269-9702",
publisher = "Wiley",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Reasons to redefine moral distress

T2 - a Feminist empirical bioethics analysis

AU - Morley, Georgina

AU - Bradbury-Jones, Caroline

AU - Ives, Jonathan

N1 - Funding Information: This work was made possible by a Society and Ethics Fellowship for Healthcare Funding Information: Professionals from the Wellcome Trust (Grant ref.: 108640/Z/15/Z). Publisher Copyright: © 2020 The Authors. Bioethics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd Copyright: Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

PY - 2020/7/12

Y1 - 2020/7/12

N2 - There has been increasing debate in recent years about the conceptualization of moral distress. Broadly speaking, two groups of scholars have emerged: those who agree with Jameton’s ‘narrow definition’ that focuses on constraint and those who argue that Jameton’s definition is insufficient and needs to be broadened. Using feminist empirical bioethics, we interviewed critical care nurses in the United Kingdom about their experiences and conceptualizations of moral distress. We provide our broader definition of moral distress and examples of data that both challenge and support our conceptualization. We pre-empt and overcome three key challenges that could be levelled at our account and argue that there are good reasons to adopt our broader definition of moral distress when exploring prevalence of, and management strategies for, moral distress.

AB - There has been increasing debate in recent years about the conceptualization of moral distress. Broadly speaking, two groups of scholars have emerged: those who agree with Jameton’s ‘narrow definition’ that focuses on constraint and those who argue that Jameton’s definition is insufficient and needs to be broadened. Using feminist empirical bioethics, we interviewed critical care nurses in the United Kingdom about their experiences and conceptualizations of moral distress. We provide our broader definition of moral distress and examples of data that both challenge and support our conceptualization. We pre-empt and overcome three key challenges that could be levelled at our account and argue that there are good reasons to adopt our broader definition of moral distress when exploring prevalence of, and management strategies for, moral distress.

KW - clinical ethics

KW - clinical practice

KW - empirical bioethics

KW - feminist ethics

KW - moral distress

KW - nursing ethics

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85087797809&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/bioe.12783

DO - 10.1111/bioe.12783

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85087797809

VL - 2020

SP - 1

EP - 11

JO - Bioethics

JF - Bioethics

SN - 0269-9702

ER -