Rail franchises, competition and public service

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Standard

Rail franchises, competition and public service. / Prosser, Tony; Butler, Luke.

In: Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 1, 11.01.2018, p. 23–50.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Harvard

Prosser, T & Butler, L 2018, 'Rail franchises, competition and public service', Modern Law Review, vol. 81, no. 1, pp. 23–50. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12315

APA

Prosser, T., & Butler, L. (2018). Rail franchises, competition and public service. Modern Law Review, 81(1), 23–50. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12315

Vancouver

Prosser T, Butler L. Rail franchises, competition and public service. Modern Law Review. 2018 Jan 11;81(1):23–50. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12315

Author

Prosser, Tony ; Butler, Luke. / Rail franchises, competition and public service. In: Modern Law Review. 2018 ; Vol. 81, No. 1. pp. 23–50.

Bibtex

@article{2ca1ee064838405285763a08e9e85132,
title = "Rail franchises, competition and public service",
abstract = "The use of franchises to deliver rail services has raised major problems. franchises restrict competition in the market, whilst competition for the market through bidding for franchises has also met with difficulties, notably in relation to risk transfer and the recent use of shortterm contracts that have not been awarded competitively. Further, franchise agreements are detailed and highly stipulative and so do not achieve the flexibility and opportunities for innovation originally intended. This reflects an underlying lack of trust resulting from the arrangements adopted on privatisation. By contrast, in Sweden regional services have been procured through contracts with limited risk transfer, and in Italy provision of services has been entrusted to a dominant operator with comparatively limited detailed service specifications; both seem to have been more successful. For the future in the UK, possibilities include greater use of competition, a return to public ownership, regionalisation, and the use of concessions with limited risk transfer to secure stability.",
author = "Tony Prosser and Luke Butler",
year = "2018",
month = jan,
day = "11",
doi = "10.1111/1468-2230.12315",
language = "English",
volume = "81",
pages = "23–50",
journal = "Modern Law Review",
issn = "0026-7961",
publisher = "Blackwell-Wiley",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Rail franchises, competition and public service

AU - Prosser, Tony

AU - Butler, Luke

PY - 2018/1/11

Y1 - 2018/1/11

N2 - The use of franchises to deliver rail services has raised major problems. franchises restrict competition in the market, whilst competition for the market through bidding for franchises has also met with difficulties, notably in relation to risk transfer and the recent use of shortterm contracts that have not been awarded competitively. Further, franchise agreements are detailed and highly stipulative and so do not achieve the flexibility and opportunities for innovation originally intended. This reflects an underlying lack of trust resulting from the arrangements adopted on privatisation. By contrast, in Sweden regional services have been procured through contracts with limited risk transfer, and in Italy provision of services has been entrusted to a dominant operator with comparatively limited detailed service specifications; both seem to have been more successful. For the future in the UK, possibilities include greater use of competition, a return to public ownership, regionalisation, and the use of concessions with limited risk transfer to secure stability.

AB - The use of franchises to deliver rail services has raised major problems. franchises restrict competition in the market, whilst competition for the market through bidding for franchises has also met with difficulties, notably in relation to risk transfer and the recent use of shortterm contracts that have not been awarded competitively. Further, franchise agreements are detailed and highly stipulative and so do not achieve the flexibility and opportunities for innovation originally intended. This reflects an underlying lack of trust resulting from the arrangements adopted on privatisation. By contrast, in Sweden regional services have been procured through contracts with limited risk transfer, and in Italy provision of services has been entrusted to a dominant operator with comparatively limited detailed service specifications; both seem to have been more successful. For the future in the UK, possibilities include greater use of competition, a return to public ownership, regionalisation, and the use of concessions with limited risk transfer to secure stability.

U2 - 10.1111/1468-2230.12315

DO - 10.1111/1468-2230.12315

M3 - Article

VL - 81

SP - 23

EP - 50

JO - Modern Law Review

JF - Modern Law Review

SN - 0026-7961

IS - 1

ER -