Rail franchises, competition and public service

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Authors

Colleges, School and Institutes

External organisations

  • University of Bristol

Abstract

The use of franchises to deliver rail services has raised major problems. franchises restrict competition in the market, whilst competition for the market through bidding for franchises has also met with difficulties, notably in relation to risk transfer and the recent use of shortterm contracts that have not been awarded competitively. Further, franchise agreements are detailed and highly stipulative and so do not achieve the flexibility and opportunities for innovation originally intended. This reflects an underlying lack of trust resulting from the arrangements adopted on privatisation. By contrast, in Sweden regional services have been procured through contracts with limited risk transfer, and in Italy provision of services has been entrusted to a dominant operator with comparatively limited detailed service specifications; both seem to have been more successful. For the future in the UK, possibilities include greater use of competition, a return to public ownership, regionalisation, and the use of concessions with limited risk transfer to secure stability.

Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)23–50
Number of pages28
JournalModern Law Review
Volume81
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 11 Jan 2018