Propositions and cognitive relations

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Propositions and cognitive relations. / Jones, Nicholas.

In: Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, Vol. 119, No. 2, 13.07.2019, p. 157-178.

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@article{5230e717b1fc4edea5b5afc0d26a260a,
title = "Propositions and cognitive relations",
abstract = "There are two broad approaches to theorising about ontological categories. Quineans use first-order quantifiers to generalise over entities of each category, whereas type theorists use quantification on variables of different semantic types to generalise over different categories. Does anything of import turn on the difference between these approaches? If so, are there good reasons to go type-theoretic? I argue for positive answers to both questions concerning the category of propositions. I also discuss two prominent arguments for a Quinean conception of propositions, concerning their role in natural language semantics and apparent quantification over propositions within natural language. It will emerge that even if these arguments are sound, there need be no deep question about Quinean propositions{\textquoteright} true nature, contrary to much recent work on the metaphysics of propositions.",
author = "Nicholas Jones",
year = "2019",
month = jul,
day = "13",
doi = "10.1093/arisoc/aoz013",
language = "English",
volume = "119",
pages = "157--178",
journal = "Aristotelian Society. Proceedings",
issn = "0066-7374",
publisher = "Wiley",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Propositions and cognitive relations

AU - Jones, Nicholas

PY - 2019/7/13

Y1 - 2019/7/13

N2 - There are two broad approaches to theorising about ontological categories. Quineans use first-order quantifiers to generalise over entities of each category, whereas type theorists use quantification on variables of different semantic types to generalise over different categories. Does anything of import turn on the difference between these approaches? If so, are there good reasons to go type-theoretic? I argue for positive answers to both questions concerning the category of propositions. I also discuss two prominent arguments for a Quinean conception of propositions, concerning their role in natural language semantics and apparent quantification over propositions within natural language. It will emerge that even if these arguments are sound, there need be no deep question about Quinean propositions’ true nature, contrary to much recent work on the metaphysics of propositions.

AB - There are two broad approaches to theorising about ontological categories. Quineans use first-order quantifiers to generalise over entities of each category, whereas type theorists use quantification on variables of different semantic types to generalise over different categories. Does anything of import turn on the difference between these approaches? If so, are there good reasons to go type-theoretic? I argue for positive answers to both questions concerning the category of propositions. I also discuss two prominent arguments for a Quinean conception of propositions, concerning their role in natural language semantics and apparent quantification over propositions within natural language. It will emerge that even if these arguments are sound, there need be no deep question about Quinean propositions’ true nature, contrary to much recent work on the metaphysics of propositions.

U2 - 10.1093/arisoc/aoz013

DO - 10.1093/arisoc/aoz013

M3 - Article

VL - 119

SP - 157

EP - 178

JO - Aristotelian Society. Proceedings

JF - Aristotelian Society. Proceedings

SN - 0066-7374

IS - 2

ER -