Powerful problems for powerful qualities

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Standard

Powerful problems for powerful qualities. / Taylor, John.

In: Erkenntnis, 24.12.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Harvard

Taylor, J 2019, 'Powerful problems for powerful qualities', Erkenntnis. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00199-y

APA

Taylor, J. (2019). Powerful problems for powerful qualities. Erkenntnis. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00199-y

Vancouver

Taylor J. Powerful problems for powerful qualities. Erkenntnis. 2019 Dec 24. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00199-y

Author

Taylor, John. / Powerful problems for powerful qualities. In: Erkenntnis. 2019.

Bibtex

@article{017c2a97412e4a2289768b429af9a0d4,
title = "Powerful problems for powerful qualities",
abstract = "The powerful qualities view of properties is currently enjoying a surge in popularity. Recently, I have argued that the standard version of the view (associated with C.B. Martin and John Heil) is no different from a rival view: the pure powers position. I have also argued that the canonical version of the powerful qualities view faces the same problem as the pure powers view: the dreaded regress objection. Joaquim Giannotti disagrees. First, Giannotti thinks that the standard version of the powerful qualities view can be differentiated from the pure powers view. Second, Giannotti argues that the powerful qualities view is not susceptible to the regress objection. Third, he argues that there is another reasonable version of the powerful qualities view available, which makes use of the notion of {\textquoteleft}aspects{\textquoteright}. In this note, I respond to Giannotti. I argue that all three of Giannotti{\textquoteright}s arguments are unsuccessful.",
author = "John Taylor",
year = "2019",
month = dec,
day = "24",
doi = "10.1007/s10670-019-00199-y",
language = "English",
journal = "Erkenntnis",
issn = "0165-0106",
publisher = "Springer",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Powerful problems for powerful qualities

AU - Taylor, John

PY - 2019/12/24

Y1 - 2019/12/24

N2 - The powerful qualities view of properties is currently enjoying a surge in popularity. Recently, I have argued that the standard version of the view (associated with C.B. Martin and John Heil) is no different from a rival view: the pure powers position. I have also argued that the canonical version of the powerful qualities view faces the same problem as the pure powers view: the dreaded regress objection. Joaquim Giannotti disagrees. First, Giannotti thinks that the standard version of the powerful qualities view can be differentiated from the pure powers view. Second, Giannotti argues that the powerful qualities view is not susceptible to the regress objection. Third, he argues that there is another reasonable version of the powerful qualities view available, which makes use of the notion of ‘aspects’. In this note, I respond to Giannotti. I argue that all three of Giannotti’s arguments are unsuccessful.

AB - The powerful qualities view of properties is currently enjoying a surge in popularity. Recently, I have argued that the standard version of the view (associated with C.B. Martin and John Heil) is no different from a rival view: the pure powers position. I have also argued that the canonical version of the powerful qualities view faces the same problem as the pure powers view: the dreaded regress objection. Joaquim Giannotti disagrees. First, Giannotti thinks that the standard version of the powerful qualities view can be differentiated from the pure powers view. Second, Giannotti argues that the powerful qualities view is not susceptible to the regress objection. Third, he argues that there is another reasonable version of the powerful qualities view available, which makes use of the notion of ‘aspects’. In this note, I respond to Giannotti. I argue that all three of Giannotti’s arguments are unsuccessful.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85077158213&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s10670-019-00199-y

DO - 10.1007/s10670-019-00199-y

M3 - Article

JO - Erkenntnis

JF - Erkenntnis

SN - 0165-0106

ER -