Persistence probability of a random polynomial arising from evolutionary game theory

Van Hao Can, Manh Hong Duong, Viet Hung Pham

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We obtain an asymptotic formula for the persistence probability in the positive real line of a random polynomial arising from evolutionary game theory. It corresponds to the probability that a multi-player two-strategy random evolutionary game has no internal equilibria. The key ingredient is to approximate the sequence of random polynomials indexed by their degrees by an appropriate centered stationary Gaussian process.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)870-890
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of Applied Probability
Volume56
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2019

Keywords

  • Gaussian process
  • Random polynomial
  • equilibrium point
  • evolutionary game theory
  • persistence probability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics(all)
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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