Abstract
We obtain an asymptotic formula for the persistence probability in the positive real line of a random polynomial arising from evolutionary game theory. It corresponds to the probability that a multi-player two-strategy random evolutionary game has no internal equilibria. The key ingredient is to approximate the sequence of random polynomials indexed by their degrees by an appropriate centered stationary Gaussian process.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 870-890 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | Journal of Applied Probability |
Volume | 56 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Oct 2019 |
Keywords
- Gaussian process
- Random polynomial
- equilibrium point
- evolutionary game theory
- persistence probability
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Statistics and Probability
- Mathematics(all)
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty