Non-discriminatory donation relief and strategic commitment under political competition

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Non-discriminatory donation relief and strategic commitment under political competition. / Giovanniello, Monica A.; Perroni, Carlo; Scharf, Kimberley; Slivinski, Al.

In: European Journal of Political Economy, 15.10.2018.

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@article{4f0508c644984323b5c392892e218b7e,
title = "Non-discriminatory donation relief and strategic commitment under political competition",
abstract = "Tax relief for private donations towards the provision of collective goods can protect minorities from majority-driven outcomes in which tax revenues are exclusively used to finance the provision of public goods that are only valued by the majority. In this paper we show that non-discriminatory tax relief for private donations can arise in political equilibrium as a strategic commitment device aimed at creating and supporting political alliances that would not otherwise be able to coalesce.",
keywords = "tax relief, private donations, strategic policy commitment",
author = "Giovanniello, {Monica A.} and Carlo Perroni and Kimberley Scharf and Al Slivinski",
year = "2018",
month = oct,
day = "15",
doi = "10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.10.002",
language = "English",
journal = "European Journal of Political Economy",
issn = "0176-2680",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Non-discriminatory donation relief and strategic commitment under political competition

AU - Giovanniello, Monica A.

AU - Perroni, Carlo

AU - Scharf, Kimberley

AU - Slivinski, Al

PY - 2018/10/15

Y1 - 2018/10/15

N2 - Tax relief for private donations towards the provision of collective goods can protect minorities from majority-driven outcomes in which tax revenues are exclusively used to finance the provision of public goods that are only valued by the majority. In this paper we show that non-discriminatory tax relief for private donations can arise in political equilibrium as a strategic commitment device aimed at creating and supporting political alliances that would not otherwise be able to coalesce.

AB - Tax relief for private donations towards the provision of collective goods can protect minorities from majority-driven outcomes in which tax revenues are exclusively used to finance the provision of public goods that are only valued by the majority. In this paper we show that non-discriminatory tax relief for private donations can arise in political equilibrium as a strategic commitment device aimed at creating and supporting political alliances that would not otherwise be able to coalesce.

KW - tax relief

KW - private donations

KW - strategic policy commitment

U2 - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.10.002

DO - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.10.002

M3 - Article

JO - European Journal of Political Economy

JF - European Journal of Political Economy

SN - 0176-2680

ER -