Moral responsibility and mental illness : a case study

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Moral responsibility and mental illness : a case study. / Broome, MR; Bortolotti, Lisa; Mameli, M.

In: Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, Vol. 19, No. 2, 01.04.2010, p. 179-187.

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@article{002333d036e4403e82482efeb710a334,
title = "Moral responsibility and mental illness : a case study",
abstract = "Various authors have argued that progress in the neurocognitive and neuropsychiatric sciences might threaten the commonsense understanding of how the mind generates behavior, and, as a consequence, it might also threaten the commonsense ways of attributing moral responsibility, if not the very notion of moral responsibility. In the case of actions that result in undesirable outcomes (e.g., someone being harmed), the commonsense conception—which is reflected in sophisticated ways in the legal conception—tells us that there are circumstances in which the agent is entirely and fully responsible for the bad outcome (and deserves to be punished accordingly) and circumstances in which the agent is not at all responsible for the bad outcome (and thereby the agent does not deserve to be punished).",
author = "MR Broome and Lisa Bortolotti and M Mameli",
year = "2010",
month = apr,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1017/S0963180109990442",
language = "English",
volume = "19",
pages = "179--187",
journal = "Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics",
issn = "0963-1801",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Moral responsibility and mental illness : a case study

AU - Broome, MR

AU - Bortolotti, Lisa

AU - Mameli, M

PY - 2010/4/1

Y1 - 2010/4/1

N2 - Various authors have argued that progress in the neurocognitive and neuropsychiatric sciences might threaten the commonsense understanding of how the mind generates behavior, and, as a consequence, it might also threaten the commonsense ways of attributing moral responsibility, if not the very notion of moral responsibility. In the case of actions that result in undesirable outcomes (e.g., someone being harmed), the commonsense conception—which is reflected in sophisticated ways in the legal conception—tells us that there are circumstances in which the agent is entirely and fully responsible for the bad outcome (and deserves to be punished accordingly) and circumstances in which the agent is not at all responsible for the bad outcome (and thereby the agent does not deserve to be punished).

AB - Various authors have argued that progress in the neurocognitive and neuropsychiatric sciences might threaten the commonsense understanding of how the mind generates behavior, and, as a consequence, it might also threaten the commonsense ways of attributing moral responsibility, if not the very notion of moral responsibility. In the case of actions that result in undesirable outcomes (e.g., someone being harmed), the commonsense conception—which is reflected in sophisticated ways in the legal conception—tells us that there are circumstances in which the agent is entirely and fully responsible for the bad outcome (and deserves to be punished accordingly) and circumstances in which the agent is not at all responsible for the bad outcome (and thereby the agent does not deserve to be punished).

U2 - 10.1017/S0963180109990442

DO - 10.1017/S0963180109990442

M3 - Article

C2 - 20226101

VL - 19

SP - 179

EP - 187

JO - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics

JF - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics

SN - 0963-1801

IS - 2

ER -