Moral Realism and Program Explanation: A Very Short Symposium 1: Reply to Nelson

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Moral Realism and Program Explanation: A Very Short Symposium 1: Reply to Nelson. / Miller, Alexander.

In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 87, No. 2, 01.06.2009, p. 337-341.

Research output: Contribution to journalEditorial

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@article{ad0da308aa044e218e5291d54a7b6f25,
title = "Moral Realism and Program Explanation: A Very Short Symposium 1: Reply to Nelson",
abstract = "In chapter 8 of Miller [2003], 1 argued against the idea that Jackson and Pettit's notion of program explanation might help Sturgeon's non-reductive naturalist version of moral realism respond to the explanatory challenge posed by Harman. In a recent paper in the AJP [Nelson 2006], Mark Nelson has attempted to defend the idea that program explanation might prove useful to Sturgeon in replying to Harman. In this note, I suggest that Nelson's argument fails.",
author = "Alexander Miller",
year = "2009",
month = jun,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1080/00048400802257721",
language = "English",
volume = "87",
pages = "337--341",
journal = "Australasian Journal of Philosophy",
issn = "0004-8402",
publisher = "Taylor & Francis",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Moral Realism and Program Explanation: A Very Short Symposium 1: Reply to Nelson

AU - Miller, Alexander

PY - 2009/6/1

Y1 - 2009/6/1

N2 - In chapter 8 of Miller [2003], 1 argued against the idea that Jackson and Pettit's notion of program explanation might help Sturgeon's non-reductive naturalist version of moral realism respond to the explanatory challenge posed by Harman. In a recent paper in the AJP [Nelson 2006], Mark Nelson has attempted to defend the idea that program explanation might prove useful to Sturgeon in replying to Harman. In this note, I suggest that Nelson's argument fails.

AB - In chapter 8 of Miller [2003], 1 argued against the idea that Jackson and Pettit's notion of program explanation might help Sturgeon's non-reductive naturalist version of moral realism respond to the explanatory challenge posed by Harman. In a recent paper in the AJP [Nelson 2006], Mark Nelson has attempted to defend the idea that program explanation might prove useful to Sturgeon in replying to Harman. In this note, I suggest that Nelson's argument fails.

U2 - 10.1080/00048400802257721

DO - 10.1080/00048400802257721

M3 - Editorial

VL - 87

SP - 337

EP - 341

JO - Australasian Journal of Philosophy

JF - Australasian Journal of Philosophy

SN - 0004-8402

IS - 2

ER -