Moral Realism and Program Explanation: A Very Short Symposium 1: Reply to Nelson

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Abstract

In chapter 8 of Miller [2003], 1 argued against the idea that Jackson and Pettit's notion of program explanation might help Sturgeon's non-reductive naturalist version of moral realism respond to the explanatory challenge posed by Harman. In a recent paper in the AJP [Nelson 2006], Mark Nelson has attempted to defend the idea that program explanation might prove useful to Sturgeon in replying to Harman. In this note, I suggest that Nelson's argument fails.

Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)337-341
Number of pages5
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Volume87
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2009