Monitoring Corporate Boards: Evidence from China

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Monitoring Corporate Boards : Evidence from China. / Farag, Hisham; Mallin, Chris.

In: European Journal of Finance, 07.09.2017.

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@article{9c6596e4096e4aedb3cfa5e7494a9fc3,
title = "Monitoring Corporate Boards: Evidence from China",
abstract = "China{\textquoteright}s listed companies have two-tier boards comprising of a supervisory board and a board of directors. The supervisory board has the responsibility to oversee and monitor the board of directors. Similarly, the role of the independent non-executive directors (INEDs) is to advise and monitor directors. In this paper we investigate the main board structure hypotheses namely the scope of operations, monitoring and negotiation hypotheses for a sample of Chinese Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) floated on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Our results provide evidence to support the three hypotheses. Interestingly we find that the larger the size of the board of directors, the larger the supervisory board size. Moreover, we find that the higher the proportion of INEDs, the smaller the supervisory board size and this implies that INEDs are perhaps a substituting mechanism for the supervisors{\textquoteright} monitoring role. Finally, we argue that as the Chinese governance structure combines both the German and the Anglo-Saxon models, this creates a conflict between the two boards with respect to the monitoring role. Our results, therefore call for a comprehensive reform in the Chinese governance mechanism. ",
keywords = "dual board structure, IPOs, Corporate governance, monitoring boards",
author = "Hisham Farag and Chris Mallin",
year = "2017",
month = sep
day = "7",
doi = "10.1080/1351847X.2017.1369138",
language = "English",
journal = "European Journal of Finance",
issn = "1351-847X",
publisher = "Taylor & Francis",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Monitoring Corporate Boards

T2 - Evidence from China

AU - Farag, Hisham

AU - Mallin, Chris

PY - 2017/9/7

Y1 - 2017/9/7

N2 - China’s listed companies have two-tier boards comprising of a supervisory board and a board of directors. The supervisory board has the responsibility to oversee and monitor the board of directors. Similarly, the role of the independent non-executive directors (INEDs) is to advise and monitor directors. In this paper we investigate the main board structure hypotheses namely the scope of operations, monitoring and negotiation hypotheses for a sample of Chinese Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) floated on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Our results provide evidence to support the three hypotheses. Interestingly we find that the larger the size of the board of directors, the larger the supervisory board size. Moreover, we find that the higher the proportion of INEDs, the smaller the supervisory board size and this implies that INEDs are perhaps a substituting mechanism for the supervisors’ monitoring role. Finally, we argue that as the Chinese governance structure combines both the German and the Anglo-Saxon models, this creates a conflict between the two boards with respect to the monitoring role. Our results, therefore call for a comprehensive reform in the Chinese governance mechanism.

AB - China’s listed companies have two-tier boards comprising of a supervisory board and a board of directors. The supervisory board has the responsibility to oversee and monitor the board of directors. Similarly, the role of the independent non-executive directors (INEDs) is to advise and monitor directors. In this paper we investigate the main board structure hypotheses namely the scope of operations, monitoring and negotiation hypotheses for a sample of Chinese Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) floated on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Our results provide evidence to support the three hypotheses. Interestingly we find that the larger the size of the board of directors, the larger the supervisory board size. Moreover, we find that the higher the proportion of INEDs, the smaller the supervisory board size and this implies that INEDs are perhaps a substituting mechanism for the supervisors’ monitoring role. Finally, we argue that as the Chinese governance structure combines both the German and the Anglo-Saxon models, this creates a conflict between the two boards with respect to the monitoring role. Our results, therefore call for a comprehensive reform in the Chinese governance mechanism.

KW - dual board structure

KW - IPOs

KW - Corporate governance

KW - monitoring boards

U2 - 10.1080/1351847X.2017.1369138

DO - 10.1080/1351847X.2017.1369138

M3 - Article

JO - European Journal of Finance

JF - European Journal of Finance

SN - 1351-847X

ER -