"Lobbying, institutional inertia, and the efficiency issue in state regulation: evidence from the evolution of bankruptcy laws and procedures in Italy, England, and the US (c1870-1939)"

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Standard

"Lobbying, institutional inertia, and the efficiency issue in state regulation: evidence from the evolution of bankruptcy laws and procedures in Italy, England, and the US (c1870-1939)". / Di Martino, Paolo.

State and financial systems in Europe and the USA. Historical perspectives on regulation and supervision in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries. 2010.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Harvard

Di Martino, P 2010, "Lobbying, institutional inertia, and the efficiency issue in state regulation: evidence from the evolution of bankruptcy laws and procedures in Italy, England, and the US (c1870-1939)". in State and financial systems in Europe and the USA. Historical perspectives on regulation and supervision in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries.

APA

Di Martino, P. (2010). "Lobbying, institutional inertia, and the efficiency issue in state regulation: evidence from the evolution of bankruptcy laws and procedures in Italy, England, and the US (c1870-1939)". In State and financial systems in Europe and the USA. Historical perspectives on regulation and supervision in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries

Vancouver

Di Martino P. "Lobbying, institutional inertia, and the efficiency issue in state regulation: evidence from the evolution of bankruptcy laws and procedures in Italy, England, and the US (c1870-1939)". In State and financial systems in Europe and the USA. Historical perspectives on regulation and supervision in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries. 2010

Author

Di Martino, Paolo. / "Lobbying, institutional inertia, and the efficiency issue in state regulation: evidence from the evolution of bankruptcy laws and procedures in Italy, England, and the US (c1870-1939)". State and financial systems in Europe and the USA. Historical perspectives on regulation and supervision in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries. 2010.

Bibtex

@inbook{638ffcde9d05477f9ae0dcfffbfd6ed7,
title = "{"}Lobbying, institutional inertia, and the efficiency issue in state regulation: evidence from the evolution of bankruptcy laws and procedures in Italy, England, and the US (c1870-1939){"}",
author = "{Di Martino}, Paolo",
year = "2010",
month = jan,
day = "1",
language = "English",
isbn = "9780754665946",
booktitle = "State and financial systems in Europe and the USA. Historical perspectives on regulation and supervision in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - "Lobbying, institutional inertia, and the efficiency issue in state regulation: evidence from the evolution of bankruptcy laws and procedures in Italy, England, and the US (c1870-1939)"

AU - Di Martino, Paolo

PY - 2010/1/1

Y1 - 2010/1/1

M3 - Chapter

SN - 9780754665946

BT - State and financial systems in Europe and the USA. Historical perspectives on regulation and supervision in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries

ER -