Judgment internalism: an argument from self-knowledge

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Colleges, School and Institutes


One of the most important metaethical debates concerns the relationship between evaluative judgments and motivation. The so-called judgment internalists claim that there is an internal modal connection between our evaluative judgments and motivation, whereas the so-called externalists believe that evaluative judgments are connected to desires only through contingent external facts. This debate has reached a standoff. My aim is to introduce a completely new argument for internalism, which does not rely on our intuitions about individual cases. I argue that the truth of internalism explains best why the so-called transparency method yields self-knowledge of what we desire.


Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)489-503
Number of pages15
JournalEthical Theory and Moral Practice
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 18 Aug 2018


  • Desire, Evaluative judgment, Judgment internalism, Moral psychology, Motivation, Self-knowledge