Judgment internalism: an argument from self-knowledge
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
Colleges, School and Institutes
One of the most important metaethical debates concerns the relationship between evaluative judgments and motivation. The so-called judgment internalists claim that there is an internal modal connection between our evaluative judgments and motivation, whereas the so-called externalists believe that evaluative judgments are connected to desires only through contingent external facts. This debate has reached a standoff. My aim is to introduce a completely new argument for internalism, which does not rely on our intuitions about individual cases. I argue that the truth of internalism explains best why the so-called transparency method yields self-knowledge of what we desire.
|Number of pages||15|
|Journal||Ethical Theory and Moral Practice|
|Publication status||Published - 18 Aug 2018|
- Desire, Evaluative judgment, Judgment internalism, Moral psychology, Motivation, Self-knowledge