Is the prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment absolute in international human rights law? A reply to Steven Greer

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

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Is the prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment absolute in international human rights law? A reply to Steven Greer. / Mavronicola, Natasa.

In: Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 3, 09.2017, p. 479–498.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Harvard

Mavronicola, N 2017, 'Is the prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment absolute in international human rights law? A reply to Steven Greer', Human Rights Law Review, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 479–498. https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngx019

APA

Mavronicola, N. (2017). Is the prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment absolute in international human rights law? A reply to Steven Greer. Human Rights Law Review, 17(3), 479–498. https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngx019

Vancouver

Mavronicola N. Is the prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment absolute in international human rights law? A reply to Steven Greer. Human Rights Law Review. 2017 Sep;17(3):479–498. https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngx019

Author

Mavronicola, Natasa. / Is the prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment absolute in international human rights law? A reply to Steven Greer. In: Human Rights Law Review. 2017 ; Vol. 17, No. 3. pp. 479–498.

Bibtex

@article{6161d8797b2b4cbe965353dc98ff024d,
title = "Is the prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment absolute in international human rights law? A reply to Steven Greer",
abstract = "In a recent article, Steven Greer questions whether the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment is really {\textquoteleft}absolute{\textquoteright} in international human rights law, and argues that it is not. In this piece, I consider Greer{\textquoteright}s arguments against the absolute character of the prohibition at law, and find them wanting. In doing so, I clarify what the legal prohibition{\textquoteright}s absolute character entails, and what it does not, addressing misconceptions, and revisit the distinction between negative and positive obligations in human rights law. In responding to Greer{\textquoteright}s arguments, conceptual clarifications are offered which carry significant implications in the context of counter-terrorism and human rights law more widely. At the same time, I underline that the absolute character of the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in human rights law does not close off critical engagement with the issue of individual (criminal) culpability vis-{\`a}-vis the prohibition at human rights law, or with the meaning of the terms torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. ",
keywords = "torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, police, absolute rights, counter-terrorism, G{\"a}fgen v Germany",
author = "Natasa Mavronicola",
year = "2017",
month = sep,
doi = "10.1093/hrlr/ngx019",
language = "English",
volume = "17",
pages = "479–498",
journal = "Human Rights Law Review",
issn = "1461-7781",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Is the prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment absolute in international human rights law? A reply to Steven Greer

AU - Mavronicola, Natasa

PY - 2017/9

Y1 - 2017/9

N2 - In a recent article, Steven Greer questions whether the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment is really ‘absolute’ in international human rights law, and argues that it is not. In this piece, I consider Greer’s arguments against the absolute character of the prohibition at law, and find them wanting. In doing so, I clarify what the legal prohibition’s absolute character entails, and what it does not, addressing misconceptions, and revisit the distinction between negative and positive obligations in human rights law. In responding to Greer’s arguments, conceptual clarifications are offered which carry significant implications in the context of counter-terrorism and human rights law more widely. At the same time, I underline that the absolute character of the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in human rights law does not close off critical engagement with the issue of individual (criminal) culpability vis-à-vis the prohibition at human rights law, or with the meaning of the terms torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.

AB - In a recent article, Steven Greer questions whether the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment is really ‘absolute’ in international human rights law, and argues that it is not. In this piece, I consider Greer’s arguments against the absolute character of the prohibition at law, and find them wanting. In doing so, I clarify what the legal prohibition’s absolute character entails, and what it does not, addressing misconceptions, and revisit the distinction between negative and positive obligations in human rights law. In responding to Greer’s arguments, conceptual clarifications are offered which carry significant implications in the context of counter-terrorism and human rights law more widely. At the same time, I underline that the absolute character of the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in human rights law does not close off critical engagement with the issue of individual (criminal) culpability vis-à-vis the prohibition at human rights law, or with the meaning of the terms torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.

KW - torture

KW - cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment

KW - police

KW - absolute rights

KW - counter-terrorism

KW - Gäfgen v Germany

U2 - 10.1093/hrlr/ngx019

DO - 10.1093/hrlr/ngx019

M3 - Article

VL - 17

SP - 479

EP - 498

JO - Human Rights Law Review

JF - Human Rights Law Review

SN - 1461-7781

IS - 3

ER -