Is the Capgras delusion an endorsement of experience?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Authors

  • Federico Bongiorno

External organisations

  • Department of Philosophy; University of Birmingham; Birmingham United Kingdom

Abstract

There is evidence indicating that the Capgras delusion is grounded in some kind of anomalous experience. According to the endorsement model, the content of the delusion is already encoded in the Capgras subject's experience, and the delusion is formed simply by endorsing that content as veridical. Elisabeth Pacherie and Sam Wilkinson have in different ways attempted to articulate a comprehensive defence of this strategy, but here I argue that the endorsement model cannot be defended along the lines envisioned by either of them. I then offer a more promising way of spelling out the model, according to which the anomalous experience implicated in Capgras is metaphorical in character.

Details

Original languageEnglish
JournalMind & Language
Early online date25 Jun 2019
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 25 Jun 2019

Keywords

  • Capgras, delusion, endorsement model, high‐level perception, metaphorical‐as perception