Impure prosocial motivation in charity provision: Warm-glow charities and implications for public funding

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Colleges, School and Institutes

Abstract

We show that warm-glow motives in provision by competing suppliers can lead to inefficient charity selection. In these situations, discretionary donor choices can promote efficient charity selection even when provision outcomes are non-verifiable. Government funding arrangements, on the other hand, face verification constraints that make them less flexible relative to private donations. Switching from direct grants to government subsidies for private donations can thus produce a positive pro-competitive effect on charity selection, raising the value of charity provision per dollar of funding.

Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)50-57
Number of pages8
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Volume114
Early online date5 Nov 2013
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2014

Keywords

  • Competition in the nonprofit sector, Private provision of public goods, Tax incentives for giving, Warm glow

ASJC Scopus subject areas